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Jan 01 0001
Africa–Russia: New Wave?
By Alexandra A. Arkhangelskaya
Russian sources present the relations with Africa as purely economic, stressing that its goals are to assist Russian business and to develop mutually beneficial relations with African countries. The common interests lie in the field of resources, infrastructural development, particularly in the sphere of energy resources and nuclear power. This seems consequential from a Russian perspective. A number of big Russian companies are either involved in Africa or are seeking deals there, yet Russia's trade with the continent falls far behind that of China or India. Developing Russia's own enormous energy resources would be a much costlier business than developing the same resources in Africa. But the question that emerges is whether the new involvement is indeed strictly of economical nature or where there are political motives as well.
I. History
Africa and Russia have a long history of friendship going back to the days of the Soviet Union, which shrank pitifully during the 1990s. The collapse of the Soviet Union broke most of Russia’s ties with African countries. Relations with Africa received a relatively low priority, and in 1992 Russia closed nine embassies and four consulates on the continent. Of previously 20 cultural centres, there are only several left on the continent. Relations with some African states worsened in late 1991 when then President Boris Yeltsin ordered to end all foreign aid and demanded immediate repayment of outstanding debts. Since then, things began to gradually change, not only because of Russia’s economic recovery, but due to a more broadminded and rational perception of the modern world by the Russian leadership.
One of the goals set in Russia’s Foreign Policy Doctrine, which was approved by President Putin in February 2013, is to expand its multifaced interaction with African states on a bilateral and multilateral basis, with a focus on improving the political dialogue and the promotion of mutually beneficial economic and trade cooperation, promote the management and prevention of regional conflicts and crisis situations in Africa. An important part of this vector is developing partnerships with the African Union and subregional organizations.[①]
There is a rather broad range of world problems on which the interests of Russia and Africa are close or coincide, and there are many fields in which both sides can fruitfully cooperate. Areas to highlight are: The reform of the United Nations (UN), the promotion of peace, cooperation regarding natural resources, trade and foreign direct investments (FDI).
Politically, in multilateral perspective - a common interest in the formation of the just and democratic world order, based on collective approach to the resolution of international problems and the superiority of international law, should be a priority. Russia believes that the UN supremacy must be maintained. However, the UN must be reformed in order to be stronger and more efficient. Attempts to weaken or undermine the UN, or to build some parallel structure are deemed unacceptable to Russia.
However, no common position has been found either in the UN, or between Russia and Africa, or amongst African states themselves. No model can claim the majority support, and the African proposal is not amongst the favorites for an eventual decision. Instead of consolidating the UN, the heated controversy around irreconcilable proposals is polarizing it. Under the circumstances a compromise intermediate model with several “semi-permanent” members may be a solution for the time being.[②]
Building peace is of vital importance for Africa. Nowadays, more than 200 Russian citizens participate in UN peace missions and operations across the continent. At the height of the civil war in Sierra Leone, for instance, a Russian contingent numbering 115 men was deployed there, along with four Russian military transport planes with crews. At the same time Russia is not the biggest provider of troops and lags behind many countries in number of peacekeepers.
Russia is developing relations with Africa in the sphere of natural resources. However, engaging in mining of African minerals and oil extraction is a matter of expediency for Russia; yet, it is not as vital as for the rapidly growing economies of China and India. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has found itself deprived of much of the supplies of essential minerals for its economy. Many deposits of mineral wealth are now outside of its borders. Russia experiences a growing deficit of some minerals, which has to be covered by import: manganese – almost 100%, chrome - 80%, bauxites - 60%.[③] The main bauxites supplier for Russia is Guinea; the country is one of the world leaders in bauxites production. It is less expensive to extract and transport minerals from Africa than to put into production these deposits of Siberia and Far East, which encouraged the search for Africa resources and resulted in the rise of Russian investments in mining in Africa.
The natural resources discussion, however, also has another angle: 60% of world biogenetical resources – such as fresh water and minerals, are located in either Russia or Africa. Therefore, both sides stand to benefit from joining forces to safeguard their right to control this wealth, especially in the face of recent attempts to declare these resources “an international asset”.
Russia’s trade with Africa is very low compared to such of other BRICS. Russia’s share in the BRIC countries trade volume with Africa is 4%. From 2003 to 2009, Russia invested 9.3 billion in 47 projects in Africa.[④] Africa’s share in the Russia’s foreign trade turnover rose from about US$ 1 billion in 2000[⑤] to US$ 6.75 billion, including 5.14 billion with North Africa. In 2008, trade turnover increased and reached a peak of US$ 8.2 billion, but dropped considerably in 2009 due to the world financial crisis. Trade recovered relatively quickly and was expected to reach up to US$ 10 billion in 2012. However, it is well short of the full potential of economic cooperation between Russia and Africa and overall constitutes less than 2% of the total Russian trade.
The Russian FDI to Africa amount to US$ 5 billion, while total investment stands at about US$ 10 billion. Russia’s outward FDI are led by large multinationals. The largest companies operate in oil and gas, and smaller groups, in metals processing.
Alongside with the exploitation of mineral resources the major spheres of Russia cooperation with African countries are energy, infrastructure, telecommunications, fishing, education, health, tourism, military - technical assistance. The approximate value of Russian assets in Africa is US$ 3 to– 3.5 billion. The record of state and government exchanges provides a list of Russia’s main African partners, including South Africa, Nigeria, Angola, Egypt, etc.
II. Perspectives of BRICS as an Instrument for Promoting African Agenda
The BRICS could develop a common influence in a changing world balance of power. Several fundamental changes and trends are greatly shifting the international environment in which the newly emboldened BRICS will operate.
In this context, Russia can develop its geopolitical ambitions throughout the African continent and reciprocally, African countries could find a partner in the BRICS to elaborate collective voice to be heard on the global stage. The political significance of BRICS is reinforced by the active participation of its five members in both international organizations, such as the UN, WTO, IMF and the World Bank, and informal associations, including the Non-Aligned Movement, the Group of 77, the G-20 and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), as well as regional organizations. Thus, there are objective opportunities for the "co-participation" with other countries in building a fair world order and for exerting a systemic influence and setting the agenda on a wide range of issues, from global to regional, from the well-established to the relatively new.
In the area of conflict resolution, the BRICS could create a platform for appropriate policies and response mechanisms to address local, regional and international political and social turbulence. Determination to promote international peace and security, based on respect for international law, sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states as well as non-interference in their internal affairs forms a common ground to achieve this important goal.
In the sphere of international relations, these political preferences translate into a certain way of doing things. The Western model of ‘Universal responsibility’ is often interpreted differently in the non-western parts of the world. The BRICS can use their collective voice to help preserve a respect for international sovereignty in international affairs. The desire of the developed world to intervene in the domestic domain of other nations can be balanced by the creation and fostering of regional cooperative networks, which may reduce conflict and quell crises. Thus, UN Security Council reform should be an important point on the BRICS agenda. It will show the commitment to building a polycentric and multi-civilizational international system taking account of the interests of all the participants in the international dialogue.
In the context of the need to develop BRICS international position and raise awareness of the international community about the shared aspirations of African countries together with its member countries, it is important to develop in every possible way mutual linguistic, cultural and information cooperation and presence in the global information and media space for the sake of rapprochement of the peoples and cultures.
III. Conclusion
There is a clear imbalance between the political and economic dimensions of the relations between Russia and Africa. Achieving goals of a consolidated global agenda with energy and resource rich African countries is rather more difficult than some Russian politicians might think. While some African leaders may still be grateful to Russia for its assistance during their liberation struggles, they live in a pragmatic world, faced with high domestic expectancies and endowed with understanding of the great competition from China and India. This competition is particularly for the control of energy resources, where Russia is bound to find itself in a head-on collision course not just with the west, but also with China.
The upcoming summit of the BRICS and the planned official visit of President Putin to South Africa will provide opportunities to enhance multilateral relations, above all, to pull the trade and economic relations to the level of policy. The BRICS format can also be expected to facilitate the discussion of the important and essential questions of development and global order in the global context.
There are a number of obstacles to the development of Russian-African relations. For example, lack of knowledge of Russian governmental and business structures about the actual situation and specific counterparts in Africa and, consequently, poor awareness of Africans about the possibilities of Russian partners.
The most important understanding lies in the assumption that the development of wider economic ties with Africa is largely impossible due to the lack of strong support from the Russian state, which is specifically a concern for medium and small income business. Thus to improve the efficiency of its Africa policy, the state needs to build a foreign policy that really reflects the interests of Russian business. There are some positive trends in this direction, but progress is still very slow.
Africa and Russia have a long history of friendship going back to the days of the Soviet Union, which shrank pitifully during the 1990s. The collapse of the Soviet Union broke most of Russia’s ties with African countries. Relations with Africa received a relatively low priority, and in 1992 Russia closed nine embassies and four consulates on the continent. Of previously 20 cultural centres, there are only several left on the continent. Relations with some African states worsened in late 1991 when then President Boris Yeltsin ordered to end all foreign aid and demanded immediate repayment of outstanding debts. Since then, things began to gradually change, not only because of Russia’s economic recovery, but due to a more broadminded and rational perception of the modern world by the Russian leadership.
One of the goals set in Russia’s Foreign Policy Doctrine, which was approved by President Putin in February 2013, is to expand its multifaced interaction with African states on a bilateral and multilateral basis, with a focus on improving the political dialogue and the promotion of mutually beneficial economic and trade cooperation, promote the management and prevention of regional conflicts and crisis situations in Africa. An important part of this vector is developing partnerships with the African Union and subregional organizations.[①]
There is a rather broad range of world problems on which the interests of Russia and Africa are close or coincide, and there are many fields in which both sides can fruitfully cooperate. Areas to highlight are: The reform of the United Nations (UN), the promotion of peace, cooperation regarding natural resources, trade and foreign direct investments (FDI).
Politically, in multilateral perspective - a common interest in the formation of the just and democratic world order, based on collective approach to the resolution of international problems and the superiority of international law, should be a priority. Russia believes that the UN supremacy must be maintained. However, the UN must be reformed in order to be stronger and more efficient. Attempts to weaken or undermine the UN, or to build some parallel structure are deemed unacceptable to Russia.
However, no common position has been found either in the UN, or between Russia and Africa, or amongst African states themselves. No model can claim the majority support, and the African proposal is not amongst the favorites for an eventual decision. Instead of consolidating the UN, the heated controversy around irreconcilable proposals is polarizing it. Under the circumstances a compromise intermediate model with several “semi-permanent” members may be a solution for the time being.[②]
Building peace is of vital importance for Africa. Nowadays, more than 200 Russian citizens participate in UN peace missions and operations across the continent. At the height of the civil war in Sierra Leone, for instance, a Russian contingent numbering 115 men was deployed there, along with four Russian military transport planes with crews. At the same time Russia is not the biggest provider of troops and lags behind many countries in number of peacekeepers.
Russia is developing relations with Africa in the sphere of natural resources. However, engaging in mining of African minerals and oil extraction is a matter of expediency for Russia; yet, it is not as vital as for the rapidly growing economies of China and India. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has found itself deprived of much of the supplies of essential minerals for its economy. Many deposits of mineral wealth are now outside of its borders. Russia experiences a growing deficit of some minerals, which has to be covered by import: manganese – almost 100%, chrome - 80%, bauxites - 60%.[③] The main bauxites supplier for Russia is Guinea; the country is one of the world leaders in bauxites production. It is less expensive to extract and transport minerals from Africa than to put into production these deposits of Siberia and Far East, which encouraged the search for Africa resources and resulted in the rise of Russian investments in mining in Africa.
The natural resources discussion, however, also has another angle: 60% of world biogenetical resources – such as fresh water and minerals, are located in either Russia or Africa. Therefore, both sides stand to benefit from joining forces to safeguard their right to control this wealth, especially in the face of recent attempts to declare these resources “an international asset”.
Russia’s trade with Africa is very low compared to such of other BRICS. Russia’s share in the BRIC countries trade volume with Africa is 4%. From 2003 to 2009, Russia invested 9.3 billion in 47 projects in Africa.[④] Africa’s share in the Russia’s foreign trade turnover rose from about US$ 1 billion in 2000[⑤] to US$ 6.75 billion, including 5.14 billion with North Africa. In 2008, trade turnover increased and reached a peak of US$ 8.2 billion, but dropped considerably in 2009 due to the world financial crisis. Trade recovered relatively quickly and was expected to reach up to US$ 10 billion in 2012. However, it is well short of the full potential of economic cooperation between Russia and Africa and overall constitutes less than 2% of the total Russian trade.
The Russian FDI to Africa amount to US$ 5 billion, while total investment stands at about US$ 10 billion. Russia’s outward FDI are led by large multinationals. The largest companies operate in oil and gas, and smaller groups, in metals processing.
Alongside with the exploitation of mineral resources the major spheres of Russia cooperation with African countries are energy, infrastructure, telecommunications, fishing, education, health, tourism, military - technical assistance. The approximate value of Russian assets in Africa is US$ 3 to– 3.5 billion. The record of state and government exchanges provides a list of Russia’s main African partners, including South Africa, Nigeria, Angola, Egypt, etc.
II. Perspectives of BRICS as an Instrument for Promoting African Agenda
The BRICS could develop a common influence in a changing world balance of power. Several fundamental changes and trends are greatly shifting the international environment in which the newly emboldened BRICS will operate.
In this context, Russia can develop its geopolitical ambitions throughout the African continent and reciprocally, African countries could find a partner in the BRICS to elaborate collective voice to be heard on the global stage. The political significance of BRICS is reinforced by the active participation of its five members in both international organizations, such as the UN, WTO, IMF and the World Bank, and informal associations, including the Non-Aligned Movement, the Group of 77, the G-20 and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), as well as regional organizations. Thus, there are objective opportunities for the "co-participation" with other countries in building a fair world order and for exerting a systemic influence and setting the agenda on a wide range of issues, from global to regional, from the well-established to the relatively new.
In the area of conflict resolution, the BRICS could create a platform for appropriate policies and response mechanisms to address local, regional and international political and social turbulence. Determination to promote international peace and security, based on respect for international law, sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states as well as non-interference in their internal affairs forms a common ground to achieve this important goal.
In the sphere of international relations, these political preferences translate into a certain way of doing things. The Western model of ‘Universal responsibility’ is often interpreted differently in the non-western parts of the world. The BRICS can use their collective voice to help preserve a respect for international sovereignty in international affairs. The desire of the developed world to intervene in the domestic domain of other nations can be balanced by the creation and fostering of regional cooperative networks, which may reduce conflict and quell crises. Thus, UN Security Council reform should be an important point on the BRICS agenda. It will show the commitment to building a polycentric and multi-civilizational international system taking account of the interests of all the participants in the international dialogue.
In the context of the need to develop BRICS international position and raise awareness of the international community about the shared aspirations of African countries together with its member countries, it is important to develop in every possible way mutual linguistic, cultural and information cooperation and presence in the global information and media space for the sake of rapprochement of the peoples and cultures.
III. Conclusion
There is a clear imbalance between the political and economic dimensions of the relations between Russia and Africa. Achieving goals of a consolidated global agenda with energy and resource rich African countries is rather more difficult than some Russian politicians might think. While some African leaders may still be grateful to Russia for its assistance during their liberation struggles, they live in a pragmatic world, faced with high domestic expectancies and endowed with understanding of the great competition from China and India. This competition is particularly for the control of energy resources, where Russia is bound to find itself in a head-on collision course not just with the west, but also with China.
The upcoming summit of the BRICS and the planned official visit of President Putin to South Africa will provide opportunities to enhance multilateral relations, above all, to pull the trade and economic relations to the level of policy. The BRICS format can also be expected to facilitate the discussion of the important and essential questions of development and global order in the global context.
There are a number of obstacles to the development of Russian-African relations. For example, lack of knowledge of Russian governmental and business structures about the actual situation and specific counterparts in Africa and, consequently, poor awareness of Africans about the possibilities of Russian partners.
The most important understanding lies in the assumption that the development of wider economic ties with Africa is largely impossible due to the lack of strong support from the Russian state, which is specifically a concern for medium and small income business. Thus to improve the efficiency of its Africa policy, the state needs to build a foreign policy that really reflects the interests of Russian business. There are some positive trends in this direction, but progress is still very slow.
Source of documents:
more details:
[①] Concept of Russian Foreign Policy, http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/newsline/6D84DDEDEDBF7 DA644257B160051BF7F.[②] T. L. Deich, “Politics as a Factor in Russia’s Image in Africa,” Russia-Africa Relations and Russia’s Image in Africa, Collection of Articles, Moscow: RAN Institute for African Studies, 2007, p. 28.
[③] The World of Africa, #1, 2011, p. 17.
[④] El País, March 5, 2010.
[⑤] Puls Planety, Moscow, 31 March 2003.