Engagement for Africa’s development has become a raison d’état for South African foreign policy since the end of Apartheid. It is one of the clearly stated elements in South Africa’s “distinctive national voice”. South Africa claims to be a voice for the continent in multilateral forums like the G20 and, from April 2011 on, in the BRICS grouping (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). It is clearly this self-perception that has informed the choice of topic for the Durban BRICS summit in March 2013.

I. Rationale for Cooperation and for a Focus on Africa
South Africa is highly interested in support for its African agenda, which inter alia is hoped to help foster infrastructure on the continent, as well as push for development progress that would also improve governance as well as peace and security on the continent. The concern for security does feature higher on the agenda of larger investors in Africa, not least so for China and Brazil (as contributions to this publication illustrate). These overlapping agendas can either be the basis for collaboration – or, in other instances, for competition of states on the African continent.
South Africa is the only African BRICS state and it thus has specific stakes in and on the African continent. Despite some continuity in South Africa’s self-perception as a middle-power,[①] the content and the channels of South African engagement have fundamentally changed since the end of Apartheid. Since 1994, South African foreign policy has been stoutly Pan-African. Former president Thabo Mbeki coined the term “African renaissance”, meaning that Africa would be able to reach its full potential after all African states gained their independence with the fall of the Apartheid regime. Mbeki was also among the initiators of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), which in 2001 established a governance agenda for the continent. South Africa has articulated an ‘enlightened self-interest’ in being located in a peaceful and economically prosperous region since Nelson Mandela became president, as outlined in Mandela’s contribution to the journal Foreign Affairs in 1993.[②] It is in this context that the strong push from South Africa for a BRICS development bank, which is one clear item on the agenda for Durban, has to be understood.
II. Where and How Does South Africa Engage?
South Africa is by far the largest continental economy, with a substantial part of the Sub-Saharan GNI produced in the province of Gauteng. This economic weight provides substance for a political and diplomatic clout. With regards to the BRICS and other international forums, it is arguably this high-profile political position in Africa that has won South Africa a seat at the table.[③] Yet, the strong stance on the African continent has limitations in a setting with 54 states. Though groomed by outside powers, the country has to be realistic about its leverage in Africa; it is politically trying to ‘speak softly’ and to present itself as an ‘honest broker’ in matters concerning other African states, rather than acting like a hegemon.[④] The country’s government is to date cautious to be a team player in Africa.
The instrument for cooperation is diplomacy and, to quite an extent, cooperation for development. Development cooperation if presented as donor-recipient relations can be read as symbolises inequality in relations is therefore a difficult topic, like for other countries in the ‘global south’. Quite a number of actors in South Africa emphasise that South Africa is not a donor country, but a partner to other states through South-South Cooperation (SSC). The term SSC, however, is still very flexible, which partly creates its attraction. It is difficult to pin down to one concept, as argued elsewhere.[⑤] The high receptiveness amongst South African officials for the term “South-South Cooperation” also has to be regarded in this context.
Unlike other emerging countries and therefore unlike BRICS partners, South Africa’s preferred channel of engagement is multilateral. Its financial contributions privilege regional organisations, especially the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). This, however, limits commercial considerations in the engagement. South African activities are not necessarily opening up markets for business; benefits for enterprises are rather indirect through creation of good will towards the ‘brand’ South Africa.
South African development cooperation is almost exclusively African by nature. An estimate of more than 95 per cent is to African countries, predominantly in the sub-region South of the Congo, but also including projects in Southern Sudan, Guinea or Rwanda.
III. Institutions in South Africa’s Development Engagement
The core of the South African bilateral development programme is a dedicated fund in the Department for International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) called the African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund. In addition, other government departments have minor sums for cooperation and also invite staff from neighbouring states’ administration for training or engage directly in other countries in capacity-building.[⑥]
South Africa is about to create a dedicated agency for development cooperation, called SADPA: South African Development Partnership Agency. The work of this structure builds on instruments such as the African Renaissance Fund (ARF). The ARF came into being in January 2001 through an Act of Parliament and represents an estimate of one third to half of South Africa’s international cooperation funding. The Fund’s goals include the promotion of democracy and good governance, conflict prevention and settlement, social and economic development as well as humanitarian assistance and the support for human resource development. The ARF legislation does not prioritise one goal over others; the regional focus on Africa, however, is clearly indicated.
The Fund was at the level of around Euro 45 million for the financial year 2011–12, rapidly growing from Euro 30 million in 2008. The annual reports of DIRCO provide details on spending and include an assessment grid on the value-for-money delivered with the projects. The South African administration is trying to increase financial leverage for its activities through triangular or trilateral cooperation arrangements. South Africa appears to be relatively successful in this endeavour, while still being cautious not to be perceived as a donor which could compromise the African identity.
The infrastructure needs of the African continent are obvious and the sector thus features among the topics that the ARF aims to address. Yet, equally obvious are the limited financial means of South Africa in the face of the continental challenges. Infrastructure is a task beyond bilateral settings, trying to include other finance sources. The Development Bank of Southern African (DBSA) provides funding for development projects in the region. Based in Midrand, the Bank was originally established to fund development in the so-called Bantustans, supposedly independent political entities within South Africa during Apartheid that were established to disenfranchise the black population at the time. The funding needs clearly exceed the capacities of the South African bank and support by the African Development Bank, the World Bank and other multilateral finance institutions is required.
IV. Challenges for South Africa’s African Agenda
Like other ‘emerging economies’, South Africa continues to be an aid recipient with vast internal development challenges, and is thus facing questions about the legitimacy to spend money beyond its borders. Being an electoral democracy, this argument carries particular weight in South Africa. The support for an African agenda can be expected to be broad based; geography clearly is translating into a vocation. Yet, this has to be balanced with a domestic focus, as one does not win elections with a foreign policy agenda. Former President Mbeki was voted out of office by his party not least based on allegations of loftiness and being out of touch with South Africa’s internal challenges. However, engaging in its neighbourhood for peace, stability and development remains in the clear interest of South Africa.
With discussions around the establishment of a dedicated structure for development partnerships resolved, the creation of an effective implementing body remains on the agenda. Some initial steps towards the creation of SADPA as an administrative unit are expected for April 2013. South Africa’s bilateral development cooperation activities currently are rather small scale and include ad hoc projects. The plethora of small engagements needs to be bundled and focused if South Africa wants to have an impact despite limited resources – albeit being on a very different scale this reflects arguments for a change in the institutional setting in China (see Liu, this publication). Furthermore, the emphasis on results – and possibly tough discussions with partners about a lack of development orientation – is difficult to reconcile with the government’s emphasis on eye-level partnership and with its delicate leadership role. It is however implied by the NEPAD agenda as well as the very goals listed in South African development cooperation.
The engagement within the BRICS is thus complementing other South African activities meant to foster development on the African continent. This certainly includes debates on peace and security and structural reform of global governance. And, not to forget, this also includes an element of competition, as South African enterprises are facing competition by other BRICS actors in what they consider their natural area for economic expansion. With the particularities of South Africa, however, trade is not following the flag (nor vice versa); rather, both seem to operate alongside each other. The African agenda is emphasised as the underlying tune of all these endeavours.

Source of documents：