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I. Military Diplomacy in Chinese Perspective: Definition, Forms and Roles
Military diplomacy has gained more and more prominence in the international arena since the end of the Cold War. Armed forces and defence ministries have participated in a growing range of peacetime cooperative activities worldwide. As noticed by Cottey and Froster, military diplomacy has been experiencing a shift since the end of the Cold War and the key shift is that military diplomacy “is now being used not only in its longstanding realpolitik role of supporting the armed forces and security of allies, but also as a means of pursuing wider foreign and security policy goals.”[①] However, just as states employ a spectrum of military diplomatic activities, the terms used by different governments to define these activities are equally colorful. As the leading and most active player of military diplomacy after the end of the Cold War, the United States adopted the terms “Peacetime Engagement” or “Military-to-Military Relations” rather than “Military Diplomacy”. The United Kingdom began to formally use the term “defence diplomacy” in The Strategic Defence Review White Paper 1998.[②] In December 2000, a Policy Paper named Defence Diplomacy[③] was issued by the Ministry of Defence, UK.
It was in the early 1990s that military diplomacy began to attract the attention of the Chinese government. The People’s Liberation Army has been more and more actively engaged in military diplomacy of various kinds. Military diplomacy as a term first appeared in the China’s National Defence in 1998, which stated that “Chinese armed forces have been active in participating in multilateral military diplomatic activities…China has been active in developing an omni-directional and multi-level form of military diplomacy.”[④] Since then, the term “Military Diplomacy” has appeared frequently in media reports. Although the significance, objectives and principles of military diplomacy were stated in the defence white papers, a definition of military diplomacy has not been given. As a result, the definition and activities of military diplomacy are still under hot discussion in the academia in China and different scholars define military diplomacy differently in light of their own understanding.[⑤]
With reference to various definitions and in light of the practice of China’s military diplomacy, military diplomacy can be defined as follows: It is the exchanges, negotiation and activities with relevant departments of other states, group of states or organizations, conducted by the defense ministries and armed forces of a sovereign state, and organizations or individuals authorized by the government, with the aim to promote and achieve national interests and national security. It is an important component of the overall diplomacy of a certain state, as well as embodiment of the national defense policy of this state in external relations.[⑥]
There are diversified forms of military diplomacy practiced by different countries. To facilitate research, it is reasonable to categorize them according to the objectives, as well as timescale of them. The first category is Media Management. It refers to timely news and information release and reaction and clarification of inaccurate news and reports. The second category is Exchanges and Communication. It refers to communication and exchanges between countries with the objective of reducing suspicion, increasing transparency, promoting mutual trust or economic gains. The third category is Relations Building. The most important characteristic of this category is that certain cooperative relations or preventive mechanisms are established. The last category is International Responsibility. A country intends to show its sense of international responsibility through these activities. (See Table 1.1)
As an important component of overall national diplomacy, the ultimate goal of military diplomacy is to safeguard and promote national interests, especially national security interests. At the same time, military diplomacy is the peaceful use of military strength. It combines both soft- and hard-powers and plays relevant roles of both military and diplomacy in practice.[⑦] Military diplomacy of various forms plays at least the following six roles: first, to shape a favorable international strategic environment through international exchanges and cooperation. Second, to avoid misunderstanding and misjudgment by enhancing trust and reducing suspicion, so as to create conditions to prevent, manage, and defuse crisis. Third, to express goodwill and project a favorable international image by participating in peacekeeping or humanitarian relief operations. Fourth, to promote development of the army and national defense by learning the advanced military thought, military technology and tactics through bilateral exchanges. Fifth, to expand influence by enhancing recipient’s trust in and reliance on the national defense structure, military command system and weapons and equipment. Sixth, it is also a way of deterring the potential adversary by showing the strength of the armed forces in the course of bilateral military exchanges and joint military exercises.
II. Historical Review of China’s Military Diplomacy in Africa
To have a better understanding of the current China’s military diplomacy in Africa, a brief historical review is necessary. With the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the PLA began to engage in foreign military relations in a more systematic way. In light of the evolution of China’s overall foreign policy and the changes in the international situation, the history of PLA’s military diplomacy in Africa can be divided into six major periods as follows:
The first period (from 1949 to the end of the 1950s) witnessed the beginning of China’s military diplomacy in Africa. After the founding of the PRC, the Chinese government adopted the “lean to one side” policy. The policy of “leaning to one side” declared that China would lean to the side of socialism. Therefore, military cooperation and communication with socialist countries became the main content of China’s military diplomacy in this period. This period also witnessed the beginning of China’s developing defense relations with and providing military assistance to Africa. Although faced with an extremely difficult situation, China provided some military assistance to several African countries, such as Algeria and Guinea[⑧].
A main feature of the second period (from 1960 to the beginning of the 1970s) was the active provision of military assistance and support to newly independent countries and independent movements in Africa. Whereas the U.S. hostility towards China did not change, China’s relations with the USSR dramatically deteriorated at the end of the 1950s. At the same time, decolonization and independent movements in Africa and Asia were gathering momentum. In this period, the newly independent countries and independent movements in Africa were the main targets of China’s military diplomacy in Africa. Active provision of military assistance was the main form. During the visit to Africa at the end of 1963 and beginning of 1964, Premier Zhou Enlai announced the “Eight Principles” for providing economic and technological assistance to foreign countries, which also served as the guiding principles for military assistance. In this period, Algeria and Tanzania were the major recipients of Chinese military assistance. China had sent more than 1500 military experts to 25 countries including many African countries such as Algeria, Tanzania and Egypt and trained nearly 5000 foreign participants including many from Africa, such as Tanzania, Ghana and Congo(Brazzaville). [⑨]
The third period (from the beginning of the 1970s to 1978) commenced with a thaw in Sino-US relations. Thereafter, China’s relations with other Western countries improved. Anti-hegemonism, especially the hegemony of the Soviet Union, became the primary task in China’s foreign policy. China continued to provide military assistance to some newly liberated and independent countries and liberation movements. China’s policy of military assistance suffered setbacks in this period, which witnessed both the climax and disruption of China’s assistance to Algeria. After the beginning of the construction of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway, China enhanced her military assistance to Tanzania.[⑩] China had trained over 7500 foreign military participants from nearly 40 countries, including Tanzania[11].
The fourth period (from 1979 to 1989) is a period of adjustment in terms of both Sino-African relations and China’s military diplomacy in Africa. Based on the strategic assessment that peace and development are the themes of the world, China adopted the policy of “Reform and Opening up” to develop its economy. In order to serve this policy, China’s foreign policy was gradually adjusted to be the Independent Foreign Policy of Peace. China adjusted the scope, objects, scale and means of military assistance to Africa. With regard to the object, China had gradually reduced its support to some leftist parties and anti-government forces. In terms of forms and means of military assistance, China replaced the purely free assistance with combination of free assistance and assistance with loans. In terms of the content of assistance, the proportion of financial assistance to weapons and equipment assistance has been adjusted. In addition, forms and ways of training African military students had experienced changes[12]. As a result, this period witnessed the rapid decline of military assistance to the liberation movements in Africa.
The fifth period (from 1990 to 1999) commenced with the end of the Cold War. During the first few years of this period, China’s military diplomacy encountered setbacks. China’s military diplomacy with the Western countries was almost reduced to nil. But the end of the Cold War opened up a new and broader space for China’s military diplomacy. From 1993, China’s military diplomacy began to develop in an all-dimensional and multi-level direction. A new pattern in China’s military diplomacy had taken form. Beginning in 1996, China enhanced its efforts of military diplomacy in Africa, which resulted in much more high-level military visits to African countries.[13] In addition, “China’s effort in peacekeeping operations in Africa from the 1990s is steadily and quickly transformed from unwilling participation to responsible contribution.[14]
The sixth period (from 2000 to now) witnesses further development of China’s military diplomacy in Africa. “The establishment and continuous development of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation and the Chinese government’s sincere implementation of its commitment of assistance to Africa elevated the Sino-African relations to a new level.”[15] China’s military diplomacy also enjoyed rapid development with closer cooperation in security affairs and more diversified exchanges with African countries. To cope with the threat of Somalian piracy, the Chinese government decided to send PLA naval fleets to the Gulf of Aden to carry out escort missions in December 2008.
III.Current China’s Military Diplomacy in Africa
3.1 Objectives of China’s military diplomacy in Africa.
China’s military diplomacy is an important adjunct to overall diplomacy and a major means to achieve national defense objectives. Objectives and nature of China’s military diplomacy in Africa are defined by its Africa policy and defense policy.
With the rapid development of Africa and the rise of China, Africa has become of higher strategic significance to China at least in the following three aspects: firstly, it is the strategic pivot of China’s diplomacy with valuable political and diplomatic meanings; secondly, it is an important partner to achieve economic recovery and development; thirdly, it is an arena for China to exhibit and build national image.[16] Therefore, “enhancing solidarity and cooperation with African countries has always been an important component of China’s independent foreign policy of peace. China will unswervingly carry forward the tradition of China-Africa friendship, and proceeding from the fundamental interests of both the Chinese and African peoples, establish and develop a new type of strategic partnership with Africa, featuring political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural exchange.”[17] The general principles and objectives of China’s Africa policy are: sincerity, friendship and equality; mutual benefit, reciprocity and common prosperity; mutual support and close coordination and learning from each other and seeking common development.[18] With regard to security affairs, “China will strengthen efforts to participate constructively into African peace and security affairs on the basis of adherence to the principle of non-interference.”[19]
China’s armed forces unswervingly implement the military strategy of active defense. Besides safeguarding national sovereignty, security and territorial integrity, and supporting the country’s peaceful development, another fundamental policy and principle of China’s national defense is deepening security cooperation and fulfilling international obligations. According to the latest defense white paper, The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces, “China’s armed forces are the initiator and facilitator of, and participant in international security cooperation. They uphold the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, conduct all-round military exchanges with other countries, and develop cooperative military relations that are non-aligned, non-confrontational and not directed against any third party… China’s armed forces work to promote dialogue and cooperation on maritime security; participate in UN peacekeeping missions, international counter-terrorism cooperation, international merchant shipping protection and disaster relief operations; conduct joint exercises and training with foreign counterparts; conscientiously assume their due international responsibilities; and play an active role in maintaining world peace, security and stability.”[20]
Accordingly, the objectives of China’s military diplomacy in Africa can be generalised as follows: The first objective is to shape a favourable regional and international environment for peaceful development. The fast rise of China, especially the steady efforts of modernisation of the PLA, has aroused concerns in Western countries, as well as China’s neighbours. Under the influence of the so-called “China Threat”, even some African countries began to worry about the uncertainty of China peaceful development. In addition, seeing the rapid rise of China, many African countries began to pin much higher expectations on China. Since military diplomacy can enhance transparency of China’s capability and intention, reduce suspicion and promote mutual trust, it can be employed as a useful means to enhance their understanding of and support for China’s peaceful development. China’s constructive participation into security affairs, including peacekeeping and anti-piracy efforts, is conducive to safeguarding regional peace, which is certainly desirable for shaping a favorable environment for the peaceful development of China.
The second objective is to safeguard national interests in Africa by supplementing bilateral political and economic relations. On the one hand, military cooperation between states is a major index of the intimacy of bilateral relations. On the other hand, military assistance and cooperation undoubtedly supplements and cements bilateral relations. With the rise of China and the rapid development of Sino-African relations, China has more and more political, economic and security interests in Africa. To safeguard these national interests, it is necessary for the military diplomacy to play a supplementary role by means of cementing bilateral relations. “To promote high-level military exchanges between the two sides and actively carry out military-related technological exchanges and cooperation”[21] is no doubt an important measure to strengthen bilateral relations. Moreover, such non-traditional security threats as terrorism and piracy are still rampant in Africa. China’s enterprises, investment, citizens and shipping are becoming more and more exposed to various non-traditional security threats. In consideration of the relative weakness of military strength of some African countries, China takes it as an important responsibility to provide assistance to enhance the security and military capabilities of African countries and promise that “it will continue to help train African military personnel and support defense and army building of African countries for their own security”[22].
The third objective is to promote the building of a harmonious world by shouldering international security responsibility and duty. The China’s Peaceful Development highlights that “China advocates the building of a harmonious world of durable peace and common prosperity and works with other countries in pursuing this goal. To China, it is both a long-term objective and a current task.”[23] As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China shoulders important responsibility for regional peace and harmony in Africa. China aims to make contributions to regional peace and building of a harmonious world through various activities of military diplomacy in Africa, including active participation in peacekeeping and escort missions and enhanced cooperation in the non-traditional security fields.
The last objective is to project an image of a responsible and peace-loving country to the world. China’s national image has not caught up with the fast development of its economy in the international arena and has become an increasingly important issue. A famous British scholar noticed that “China’s greatest strategic threat today is its national image. … How China is perceived by other nations will determine the future of Chinese development and reform.”[24] As a result of the continuous efforts of “demonizing China” by some Western countries, many misunderstanding and accusation of China’s African strategy, such as “neo-colonialism”, “resources plundering”, “indifference to human rights”, etc. appeared and gained ground, which brought about negative influence to China-Africa relations. The Chinese government recognised this problem and are keen to project China as a main responsible and peace-loving nation to the world, which was reflected by the reiteration of “peaceful development” in the governmental reports as well as speeches of the leaders. Active participation in peacekeeping, disaster relief operations, arms control efforts and some other activities in Africa are meant to project a positive image abroad for China and the PLA.
3.2 Pattern of China’s military diplomacy in Africa in the 21st century.
In the 21st century, the PLA conducts active military exchanges and cooperation with militaries of other countries and “has created a military diplomacy that is all-directional, multi-tiered and wide-ranging.”[25] Nevertheless, “its military diplomacy in Africa remains limited compared to defence exchanges in other regions”[26]. Constrained by both historical, practical and strategic factors, China’s military diplomacy in Africa are mainly focused on the following several areas:
Military exchanges and communication. It is the most common phenomenon of modern military diplomacy and includes many different forms. First, exchanges of military visits. It is an important and fundamental form of PRC’s military exchanges with other countries. As highlighted in China’s African Policy, the Chinese government attaches great importance to high-level military exchanges with African countries. Bilateral high-level military exchanges between China and African countries have been remained at a stable and relative high level. “The frequency of high-level military delegations visits between China and Africa increased at the end of the 1990s, but has largely remained constant over the past decade.”[27] “Bilateral military exchanges between China and African countries have remained stable at an annual average of 26”[28].
Second, military attaches. “By August 2009…China established military attaché offices in 109 countries, and 101 countries established military attaché offices in China.”[29] It is estimated that China has nearly 20 military attaché offices in Africa[30], whereas African countries increased their permanent defense attaché offices in Beijing from thirteen in 1998 to eighteen in 2007.[31]
Third, defence dialogue. In April 2003, China and South Africa established the China-South Africa Defence Committee to exchange views on international and regional security situation as well as cooperation between the armed forces of two sides. So far, five meetings of the Defence Committee have been held.
Fourth, exchanges of warship visits. In July 2000, a PLA naval fleet paid a visit to South Africa and Tanzania, which was PLA Navy’s first visit to Africa. In Oct. 2008, a frigate of South Africa Navy visited Shanghai, China, which was the first visit of South Africa warship to China. In April 2011, a PLA naval fleet visited Durban, South Africa. In 2002 and 2010 respectively, after passing through the Suez Canal, PLA naval fleet called at Alexandria, Egypt.
Fifth, functional exchanges. Functional exchanges covering military education, training, communications, logistics, equipment and technologies have been on the increase.[32] “It increases high-level visits and exchanges between junior and intermediate officers, and seeks to broaden cooperation fields with these countries. For the first time, China sent a hospital ship, the Peace Ark, to visit the Republic of Djibouti, the Republic of Kenya, the United Republic of Tanzania, the Republic of Seychelles and other African countries and provided humanitarian medical service. Also for the first time, China hosted workshops for heads of military academies from English-speaking African countries, for directors of military hospitals from French-speaking African countries, and for intermediate and senior officers from Portuguese-speaking African countries.”[33] A workshop for heads of military academies from French-speaking African countries was also held in May 2011[34].
Military assistance. Some scholars believe that “China offers at least modest quantities of military assistance or training to nearly every African country with which it has diplomatic relations.”[35] According to the statistics of a foreign scholar, the major African recipients of China’s military assistance are Angola, Ghana, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Sudan and Tanzania and most of the assistance was provided in the forms of loan or donation of materials or equipment. The loans were mainly used to improve the facilities of recipients, such as building or renovation of headquarters, Ministry of Defence, training centers, upgrading military communication, or construction of hospital. The equipment or materials were mainly uniforms, ambulances, counter-mine, military trucks and other logistics materials.[36] And it is necessary to highlight that much of China’s military assistance were out of humanitarian reasons rather than commercial purposes, which were mainly reflected in de-mining support provided by China. In recent years, China provided free de-mining equipment to Angola, Mozambique, Chad, Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, Sudan and Egypt and provided fund for the mine-sweeping operation in Ethiopia.[37]
Military training. To African countries, military training is also an important means of military assistance and has been a major component of China’s military diplomacy in Africa since the beginning of bilateral military relations. After the Reform and Opening up of China, especially after the 1990s, foreign military training of the PLA got rid of the bondage of ideology and the objects of foreign training were broadened to the majority of developing countries and even some developed countries. At present, there are more than 20 military colleges and training organs being involved in foreign military training.[38] More and more foreign officers came to study in the PLA colleges. In the two years from 2007 to 2008, “some 4,000 military personnel from more than 130 countries have come to China to study at Chinese military educational institutions.”[39] A large part of them are from African countries. Besides regular training, PLA also provides some short-term training courses. For instance, it held de-mining training courses for Angola, Mozambique, Chad, Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, and both northern and southern Sudan.[40] In addition, “in 2009, for the first time, China sent a medical detachment to Africa to hold a joint operation with Gabon, to conduct medical training and rescue exercises, and to provide medical assistance for local residents”.[41]
Peacekeeping in Africa. China earnestly fulfills its international responsibilities and obligations, and supports and actively participates in UN peacekeeping missions. The Chinese peacekeeping troops and specialized peacekeeping personnel “are mainly tasked with monitoring ceasefires, disengaging conflicting parties, providing engineering, transportation and medical support, and participating in social reconstruction and humanitarian assistance”. “To date, the PLA has dispatched 22,000 military personnel to 23 UN peacekeeping missions... So far, China is the biggest troop and police contributor among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. It also dispatches the most numbers of troops for engineering, transportation and medical support among all the 115 contributing countries. China pays and contributes the largest share of UN peacekeeping costs among all developing countries.”[42] The majority of China’s peacekeeping personnel and troops are now in Africa. By December 2012, a total of 1,842 PLA officers and soldiers have been implementing peacekeeping tasks in nine UN mission areas. Among them about 80% are carrying out UN missions in Africa.[43] It is worth noting that “Chinese peacekeepers are consistently rated among the most professional, well-trained, effective and disciplined contingents in UN peacekeeping operations”[44]
Escort missions in the Gulf of Aden and waters off Somalia. In line with relevant UN resolutions, China dispatched naval ships to conduct escort operations in the Gulf of Aden and waters off Somalia on December 26, 2008. They are mainly charged with safeguarding the security of Chinese ships and personnel passing through the Gulf of Aden and Somali waters, and the security of ships delivering humanitarian supplies for the World Food Program and other international organizations, and shelter pass-by foreign vessels as much as possible. Until now, the escort mission in the Gulf of Aden and waters off Somalia has become regular mission of the PLA Navy. “As of December 2012, Chinese navy task groups have provided protection for four WFP ships and 2,455 foreign ships, accounting for 49% of the total of escorted ships. They helped four foreign ships, recovered four ships released from captivity and saved 20 foreign ships from pursuit by pirates.”[45]
3.3 Contribution and characteristics.
In comparison with the military diplomacy of other countries, China’s military diplomacy in Africa has the following characteristics: First, it is peaceful. “The underlying idea of China’s military diplomacy is ‘peace and harmony are the most precious’”[46], which was manifested in the basic principles and policy of China’s diplomacy and ideas of “New Security Concept” and “Harmonious World”. In line with both China’s interest of peaceful development and common aspiration of African countries and peoples, peace is obviously both an objective and a characteristic of China’s military diplomacy in Africa.
Second, it is cooperative. In practicing military diplomacy in Africa, the PLA has attached great importance to cooperation with not only African countries, but also international and regional organizations including the UN, AU and other sub-regional organizations. In addition, as noticed by a foreign scholar, “there is no evidence that China’s military aid aims at counterbalancing other powers, such as the United States”, “despite the strategic importance of Africa, China does not attempt to safeguard its stronghold by unilaterally projecting military power.”[47]
Third, it is equal. Equality has long been a general principle of China in developing relations with African countries. “China adheres to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, respects African countries’ independent choice of the road of development and supports African countries’ efforts to grow stronger through unity.”[48] Bilateral military relations were developed on an equal footing between China and African countries and military assistance were provided with no political conditions attached.
Fourth, it is subordinate. Being subordinate has dual meanings here. On the one hand, as an important component and adjunct of China’s overall diplomacy, military diplomacy should serve, and be subordinate to, the overall diplomacy. On the other hand, “China believes the solution of African hotspot issues need support and help from the international community, but the international community should sincerely respect AU and African countries’ dominant role in solving African issues and should refrain from ‘exceeding its duties and meddling in others’ affairs’”[49]. That is to say, China’s military diplomacy is not seeking to play a dominant role in resolving African security issues, which forms a striking contrast to the practice of some other major powers.
Fifth, it is modest. China neither has nor seeks to establish large scale military presence in Africa. “China has no bases in Africa like the United States or France, nor does it train African soldiers to deal with hostility perceived by China as a threat to its national interests.”[50] In terms of the scale of military assistance and amount of military training, China lags far behind that of the United States. “Hence, China’s military diplomacy in Africa remains modest, and it certainly has not kept up with the impressive number of trade officials posted in African countries to strengthen economic ties in the last few years.”[51]
It is fair to say that China’s military diplomacy in Africa, peacekeeping missions in particular, makes an important contribution to regional peace, stability and development. “China’s higher profile in peacekeeping reinforces both the perceived legitimacy and the effectiveness of UN peace missions…AU and UN officials believe, the presence of Chinese peacekeepers sends a reassuring message and helps the mission to project an image of being inclusive, impartial and genuinely multilateral.”[52] In addition, “Chinese peacekeepers are well accepted and have participated in improving local populations in Africa”[53], “over the past 22 years, Chinese peacekeepers have built and repaired over 10,000 km of roads and 284 bridges, cleared over 9,000 mines and various types of unexploded ordnance (UXO), transported over one million tons of cargo across a total distance of 11 million km and treated 120,000 patients”[54], among which most of them were accomplished in Africa.
Besides these contributions, China’s efforts in strengthening military exchanges and providing military assistance and training have been helpful to strengthen the self-peacekeeping and security capabilities of AU and Sub-Regional Organizations, as well as the technology and security capabilities of various African countries. For example, as the supreme foreign military training base of China, the College of Defense Studies at National Defense University, has trained over 4000 senior military officers and government officials, among which more than 300 took the positions of military leaders, ministers of defense, chiefs of general staff and commanders of different services in their respective countries.[55] Many of these outstanding graduates of the CDS, NDU are from African countries.
By making an important contribution to regional peace and development, China’s military diplomacy in Africa has achieved its objectives. And China’s diplomacy as a whole “has played an indispensible role in enhancing comprehensive development of state-to-state relations, safeguarding national sovereignty, security and development interests, promoting modernization construction of the army and national defense, and maintaining world peace.”[56]
IV. Challenges and Prospects
Taking the current African situation into consideration, China’s military diplomacy in Africa is facing with several major challenges.
The first and biggest challenge comes from suspicion and competition from Western countries. Although China’s active participation in the African peace and security fields has won universal recognition from the international community, especially African countries, Western countries are still deeply suspicious and wary of China. Since China’s model of peacekeeping and peace construction in Africa is different from theirs, in its efforts of peace construction in Africa, China adheres to two basic principles. The first is non-interference and respect for sovereignty of African countries; the second is attaching equal importance to peace and security, and economic development and believing that economic development is the precondition of peace and security. Whereas Western countries put human rights above sovereignty and believes that freedom and democracy are the precondition of sustainable peace in Africa.[57] What’s more challenging is the large-scale expansion of military presence in Africa by some Western countries, especially the United States. In the excuse of counter-terrorism, America has greatly expanded its military presence in Africa. With the establishment of the AFRICOM, American military has conducted diversified activities of military diplomacy in Africa. At the same time, Americans established an arch-shaped strategic axis stretching from Djibouti, South Sudan, and Uganda to the DRC.[58] The US has greatly enhanced its military cooperation with these countries. In addition, at the end of 2012, the US announced that it will send troops to 35 African countries. It is reported that the Americans have established a network of UAV bases in Djibouti, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Seychelles, and Niger. In a sense, America’s expanding large military presence in Africa demonstrates militarization of its African policy and means ever more military intervention in African security affairs by the American troops. Obviously, it is also a measure of America to contain China’s influence in Africa.[59] It is a grave challenge to China’s military diplomacy in Africa, as well as China’s Africa strategy.
The second challenge originates from misunderstanding and gaps of understanding. There are some kinds of misunderstanding about China’s Africa strategy and gaps of understanding between China and African countries. As noticed by a former Chinese Special Representative of African Affairs, a great challenge is the gaps of understanding about the ideas of governance and ideology between China and African countries. “They (African countries) accepted a set of Western ideas, especially ideas of humanitarian intervention and responsibility of protection, on which China has reservations.”[60] With the rapid rise of China, especially the rapid development of Sino-African relations, such misunderstanding and criticisms of China’s Africa policy as “China Threat”, “Neo-Colonialism” and “Resource Plundering”, appeared in Western countries and spread to Africa, which will inevitably cause negative impact upon China. At the same time, “in recent years, with the rise of China’s overall national strength and international influence, African countries pin much more expectations on China and hope China to have more participation into African peace and security affairs. However, since China is still a developing country, there is a gap between Chinese real capability and expectations of African countries. Moreover, it takes time to accumulate experience.”[61]
The third challenge lies in the security situation in Africa. Although the political and security situation in Africa is generally stable, Africa is faced with both turbulences in some countries and serious diversified non-traditional security threats. The deeper China ventures into the resource-abundant African continent, the more it stumbles upon various security challenges. With more and more Chinese enterprises entered into Africa, there are more and more Chinese emigrants in Africa. There is little authoritative statistics about Chinese emigrants to Africa. But a scholar estimated that the number of overseas Chinese in Africa exceeded one million at the end of 2012.[62] Security of these overseas Chinese aroused unprecedented attention of the Chinese government. In February 2011, the turbulent situation in Libya posed grave security threats to Chinese institutions, enterprises and nationals there. To protect the security of these overseas Chinese, “the Chinese government organized the largest overseas evacuation since the founding of the PRC, and 35,860 Chinese nationals were taken home. The PLA contributed ships and aircraft to the effort.”[63] The large numbers of overseas Chinese in Africa put forward new requirement on the PLA military diplomacy in Africa. In addition, more and more Chinese nationals are becoming the major targets of armed robbery, murder, kidnapping, and even terrorist attack, which also require the PLA to strengthen international cooperation in these fields. In one word, how to protect national interests and security of nationals while adhering to the traditional general principles became an important question China’s military diplomacy has to answer.
Looking into the future, nevertheless, China’s military diplomacy in Africa has a huge potential and bright future, since it enjoys many strategic opportunities: First and foremost, it has been a commitment of the Chinese government that “China will continue to firmly support Africa in its endeavor to independently resolve regional issues and make greater contribution to peace and security in Africa.”[64] “China will launch the ‘Initiative on China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security’, deepen cooperation with the AU and African countries in peace and security, provide financial support for the AU peace-keeping missions in Africa and the development of the African Standby Force, and train more officials in peace and security affairs and peace-keepers for the AU.”[65] Certainly, there are some other opportunities: In terms of the international and regional situation, peace and development remains the defining features of the times and the common aspiration of both Chinese and African peoples; The rapid development of China and African economies and ever closer relations provides foundation and incentive for both sides to have more security cooperation and military exchanges; Modernization of the PLA has created material conditions for it to play a more active role in the military exchanges in Africa and make much more constructive contribution to regional peace; The ever transparent and experienced PLA has become more and more confident in conducting military exchanges with other countries.
However, to ensure a bright future for China’s military diplomacy in Africa, the Chinese government and the PLA should pay attention to the following points:
First, more strategic coordination between security policy and development policy. Security and development are the two basic difficulties closely correlative to each other, which requires major countries’ greater attention while dealing with African issues. However, as noticed by a scholar, “at present, China’s development policy and security policy towards African to a larger degree are independent or in parallel with each other. There is neither coherence nor strategic coordination”[66]. With the deepening of Sino-African relations, especially the ever more fierce competition from Western countries, it is necessary for China to combine development policy with security policy. Under the general framework of the FOCAC, more coordination and cooperation should be conducted among relevant departments, institutions and enterprises.
Second, more support to the “African Peace and Security Architecture”. The AU, sub-regional organizations and major regional countries in Africa have spent major efforts on safeguarding regional peace and stability, actively push forward the construction of African collective security mechanism by establishing the “African Peace and Security Architecture” and have been committed to “solve African issues in African way”.[67] To support African countries and relevant organizations to play a dominant role in African security affairs, it is necessary for China to provide more support to the construction of the “African Peace and Security Architecture”. And it is necessary for the PLA to strengthen functional dialogues with the Architecture.
Third, more communication and coordination with Western countries, especially the United States. Due to historical reasons, Western countries have played an important role in coping with security issues in Africa. To cope with some security threats and solve security issues, it is necessary for China to strengthen communication and coordination with them. Importance of coordination with them has been testified by the escort missions in the Gulf of Aden, in which a certain degree of coordination and cooperation has been proved to be effective. As noted by a scholar, China may take tentative steps to develop coordination and cooperation in African security affairs with the United States through the framework of the FOCAC.[68] On such a basis, it is beneficial for the PLA and US army to have communication and cooperation on African security affairs.
Fourth, more practical cooperation to cope with non-traditional security threats. African countries are still suffering from various non-traditional security threats. Since major countries and African countries share more common and overlapping interests in the non-traditional security threats in comparison with traditional ones, there are more opportunities and broader space for them to cooperate in this regard. As mentioned above, China’s national interests and Chinese nationals have been more and more exposed to these non-traditional security threats. Practical cooperation in this field is conducive to African security and stability, as well as protection of China’s national interests and Chinese nationals in Africa. Therefore, it is reasonable for the PLA to provide more assistance and strengthen cooperation with African countries in the field of non-traditional security threats.
Fifth, more public diplomacy conducted by the PLA. To project a good image in Africa, the AFRICOM has attached great importance to public diplomacy. It is proved that public diplomacy conducted by American troops is accepted and welcomed by the ordinary African people. There are about 1,500 peacekeeping troops and dozens of military attachés in Africa. Some kinds of public diplomacy were practiced by them in Africa, which was highly appreciated by the local people. However, these activities dwarf before the tremendous public diplomacy efforts by the US AFRICOM troops. It is recommended that the PLA peacekeeping troops and military attachés in Africa spend more efforts on activities which have close relations with and will be well accepted by the local people. At the same time, it is necessary to pay attention to publicity work and let known what they have done among the African people.
Source of documents:Global Review
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[①] Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster, Reshaping Defence Diplomacy: New Roles for Military Cooperation and Assistance, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 7[②] The Strategic Defence Review White Paper 1998, Ministry of Defence, UK, p. 22, http://www. parliament.uk/Templates/BriefingPapers/Pages/BPPdfDownload.aspx?bp-id=RP98-91.
[③]“Defence Diplomacy,” Policy Papers, No. 1, Ministry of Defence, UK, 2000, http://www. mod.uk/issues/cooperation/diplomacy.htm/.
[④] China’s National Defence 1998, Information Office of the State Council, the People’s Republic of China, July 1998, http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/5/index.htm.
[⑤] See for example, Xiong Wuyi and Zhou Jiafa eds., Military Encyclopedia, Beijing: Great Wall Publishing House, 2000, p. 1240; Qian Qichen ed., Dictionary on World’s Diplomacy, Beijing: World Affairs Press, 2005, p. 956; Zhu Meisheng eds., An Introduction of Military Thoughts, Beijing: National Defence University Press, 1999, p. 1; etc.
[⑥] Guo Xinning, On Military Diplomacy and China’s Practice, Beijing: National Defence University Press, 2010, p. 94.
[⑦] Wang Qiaobao, “China’s Military Diplomacy in the Last Decade—Retrospect and Prospect,” Global Review, No. 2, 2013, p. 21.
[⑧] Xu Weizhong, “Chinese Participation in African Security Cooperation and Its Tendency,” West Asia and Africa, No. 11, 2010, p. 12.
[⑨] Xiao Tianliang ed., Military Diplomacy of PRC, Beijing: National Defence University Press, 2011, pp. 65, 66.
[⑩] Xu Weizhong, “Chinese Participation in African Security Cooperation and Its Tendency,” p. 12.
[11] Xiao Tianliang ed., Military Diplomacy of PRC, p. 74.
[12] Ibid., pp. 86-88.
[13] Ibid., p. 95.
[14] Kossi Ayenagbo et al, “China’s Peacekeeping Operations in Africa: From Unwilling Participation to Responsible Contribution,” African Journal of Political Science and International Relations, Vol. 6, No. 2, p. 22.
[15] Xie Yixian ed., Contemporary History of China’s Diplomacy, 1949-2009, Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 2009, p. 516.
[16] Luo Jianbo, “Why Sino-African Relationship so Important?” Study Times, April 1, 2013.
[17] Chinese MOFA, China’s African Policy, January 2006, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/ t230615.htm.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Lu Shaye, “Seizing Opportunities and Overcoming Difficulties to Promote the Development of China-Africa Relations,” China International Studies, No. 2, 2013, p. 4.
[20] The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces, Information Office of the State Council, the People’s Republic of China, April 2013, http://eng. mod.gov.cn/Database/WhitePapers/.
[21] China’s African Policy.
[22] Ibid.
[23] China’s Peaceful Development, Information Office of the State Council, the People’s Republic of China, September 2011, http://english.gov.cn/official/2011-09/06/content_1941354.htm.
[24] Joshua Cooper Ramo, “Brand China,” Working Paper, No. 827, The Foreign Policy Centre, February 2007.
[25] Qian Lihua, “Proactively Forging Ahead and Innovating Military Diplomacy,” Qiu Shi Theory, No. 15, 2012, p. 48.
[26] Jonathan Holslag, “China’s Next Security Strategy for Africa,” BICCS Asia Paper, Vol. 3, No. 6, p. 15.
[27] Saferworld, China’s Growing Role in African Peace and Security, Saferworld Report, January, 2011. p. 38.
[28] Holslag, “China’s Next Security Strategy for Africa,” p. 10.
[29] Qian Lihua, “Review of China’s Military Diplomacy in the Past 60 Years,” Qiu Shi Theory, No.18, 2009, p. 28.
[30] Xu Weizhong, “Chinese Participation in African Security Cooperation and Its Tendency,” p. 14.
[31] David H. Shinn, “Military and Security Relations: China, Africa, and the Rest of the World”, in Robert I. Rotberg ed. China into Africa: Trade, Aid and Influence, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2008,p. 163
[32] Wang Xuejun, “Review on China’s Engagement in African Peace and Security,” China International Studies, No. 32, January/ February 2012, p. 34.
[33] China’s National Defense in 2010, Information Office of the State Council, The People’s Republic of China, March 2011, http://english.gov.cn/official/2011-03/31/content_1835499_11. htm.
[34] “Wei Fenghe Meeting with All Participants of Seminar of Presidents of Francophonie-African Military Institutions,” China MOD, May 31, 2011, http://news.mod.gov.cn/diplomacy/2011-05/ 31/content_4244597.htm.
[35] Shinn, Military and Security Relations: China, Africa, and the Rest of the World, p. 161.
[36] Holslag, “China’s Next Security Strategy for Africa,” p. 11.
[37] Wang Xuejun, “Review on China’s Engagement in African Peace and Security,” p. 34.
[38] Xiao Tianliang ed., Military Diplomacy of PRC, p. 206.
[39] China's National Defense in 2008, Information Office of the State Council, the People’s Republic of China, January 2009, http://english.gov.cn/official/2009-01/20/content_1210227.htm.
[40] China’s National Defense in 2008.
[41] China’s National Defense in 2010.
[42] The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Bates Gill and Chin-Hao Huang, “China’s Expanding Role in Peacekeeping: Prospects and Policy Implications,” SIPRI Policy Paper, No. 25, November 2009, p. 26.
[45] The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces
[46] Wang Qiaobao, “China’s Military Diplomacy in the Last Decade,” p. 22.
[47] Holslag, “China’s Next Security Strategy for Africa,” pp. 10, 15.
[48] China’s African Policy.
[49] Lu Shaye, “Seizing Opportunities and Overcoming Difficulties to Promote the Development of China-Africa Relations,” p. 4.
[50] Holslag, “China’s Next Security Strategy for Africa,” p. 12.
[51] Ibid, p. 10.
[52] Gill and Huang, “China’s Expanding Role in Peacekeeping,” p. 27.
[53] Kossi Ayenagbo et al, “China’s Peacekeeping Operations in Africa,” p. 32.
[54] The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces.
[55] “National Defence University Comprehensively Facilitate Training Foreign Military,” Jiefanjun Bao, March 15, 2009.
[56] Qian Lihua, “Proactively Forging Ahead and Innovating Military Diplomacy,” p. 48.
[57] Wang Xuejun, “Review on China’s Engagement in African Peace and Security,” p. 41.
[58] Li Anshan, “Obama’s Africa Trip and Implications for China,” The Contemporary World, No. 10, 2013, p. 33.
[59] Ibid.
[60] Liu Guijin, “Foreign Assistance and Hijack: Problems and Dilemma of China-Africa Relations,” World Affairs, No. 4, 2012, p. 33.
[61] Lu Shaye, “Seizing Opportunities and Overcoming Difficulties to Promote the Development of China-Africa Relations,” p. 6.
[62] “Turbulent Africa and Virginian for Chinese Migrants,” Xinhua, November 15, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/edu/2013-11/15/c_125705827.htm.
[63] The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces.
[64] “Xi Jinping Delivers a Speech at the Julius Nyerere International Convention Center in Tanzania, Stressing China and Africa Will Always Remain Reliable Friends and Faithful Partners,” Chinese MOFA, March 25, 2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/xjpcf1/t1025803.shtml.
[65] Open Up New Prospects for A New Type of China-Africa Strategic Partnership, Speech by H.E. Hu Jintao, President of the People's Republic of China, At the Opening Ceremony of the Fifth Ministerial Conference of The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, Beijing, July 19, 2012, http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/dwjbzjjhys/zyjh/t953172.htm.
[66] Zhang Chun, “ ‘Development-Security Nexus’: The African Policies of China, EU and USA,” Chinese Journal of European Studies, No. 3, 2009, p. 86.
[67] Lu Shaye, “Seizing Opportunities and Overcoming Difficulties to Promote the Development of China-Africa Relations,” p. 2.
[68] Wang Hongyi, “Finding the Way for Cooperation Between China and America in Africa,” China International Studies, No. 2,2013.