The new round of negotiations between Iran and P5 1 regarding Iran's disputed nuclear program held in Almaty, Kazakhstan, on February 26 expectedly ended without reaching any meaningful results, despite serious and positive engagements between Iran and the six parties. The real sticking point of the Iranian nuclear deadlock lies on the West's poor understanding of what Iran really wants. And whether a breakthrough will be available will depend ultimately on whether the West will seriously consider Iran's legitimate concerns.

James Lindsay and Ray Takeyh, two American scholars on Iran issues, argued in a March/April 2010 issue of Foreign Affairs that the Islamic Republic is determined to become the tenth nuclear power. Though personal, the perceptions well reflect the common understandings that Western officials and scholars share about Iran's real intentions. Logically, the West has been making every possible effort to press Iran to give up its nuclear capability. The West's concern might be reasonable but is poorly based.

Iran's position regarding its nuclear capability should be addressed specifically. Generally speaking, there are four types of nuclear capabilities marked by the level of uranium enrichment. Uranium enriched with purity of 5 percent can be used in a nuclear power plant; purity of 20 percent can be used for medical purposes; purity of 40-50 percent can be used to propel ocean going ships; purity of 90 percent can be used to make nuclear weapon.

Iran actually has different positions regarding the four different capabilities. Firstly, Iran strongly sticks to having the capability of enriching uranium with purity of 5 percent. It has declared officially that it cannot depend on a foreign supply of fuel since it is going to build 15-20 power plants according to a 20-year vision before 2024, and a statement made shortly before the Almaty negotiations clarified in detail that it is going to build 16 nuclear power plants.

Secondly, Iran has said it pursues 20 percent purity uranium. Iran claims that its medical isotopes, which were previously imported from Argentina, are running out of stock. And if it cannot get them from the international market, it will have to enrich uranium with purity of 20 percent itself. Or to put it another way, if Iran can import these isotopes, it might give up such capability. Iran has 500,000 cancer patients waiting for treatment every year, which requires medical isotopes.

Thirdly, Iran has modest impetus to produce 40-50 percent purity uranium. In 2012, Alaeddin Boroujerdi, chairman for the Committee for Foreign Policy and National Security, argued that Iran should enrich uranium with purity of 40-50 percent to power ocean going ships. Though such a proposal does represent the views of some of Iranians, it is not supported in Iran's policy making circles. It indicates that Iran is far from being ready to initiate the decision making process for such a level of capability.

Fourthly, Iran will not likely produce weapon's grade uranium. Unlike the North Korea, Iran has clearly stated that it has no intention of making nuclear bombs. To assure the world, Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei even issued a religious fatwa saying that Iran would not develop nuclear weapons. Iran's commitment should be serious since any reneging against the commitment might seriously undermine the Supreme Leader's reputation.

Constructive negotiations should be based on balanced approaches that address the concerns of both sides. If the negotiations only take care of the concerns of the West but not those of Iran, they will not be productive. As mentioned above, Iran will not likely concede regarding its capability to enrich uranium with purity of 5 percent for its peaceful use of nuclear energy, but will be willing to negotiate on its rights for producing 20 percent purity uranium.

Therefore, the right negotiating approach should be: firstly to recognize definitively of Iran's right to pursue 5 percent purity enrichment capability; secondly to persuade Iran to give up rights for 20 percent purity enrichment activities while ensuring its supply from international market; thirdly to strengthen inspections on activities that might lead to weapon-grade capabilities.

In previous negotiations, the West seemed unwilling to talk about Iran's concerns. That's why they failed. Fortunately, during Almaty round of negotiations, it seemed that the West had substantially softened its position. They did not talk about Iran's 5 percent purity enrichment, which means that the West actually acquiesced to Iranian demands; they talked about 20 percent purity enrichment, but recognized Iran's limited rights for such capability, and did not call on Iran to discard its stock of approximately 134 kg of such uranium. That's the reason why the latest rounds of discussions were widely regarded as positive.

The two sides agreed to meet again in early April. That's certainly good news. However, if the West and the six parties really want a breakthrough, they should offer a definite guarantee for Iran's supply of 20 percent purity uranium. Iran's position is very clear: If it cannot buy foreign medical isotopes, it will produce them itself.

And what kind of rewards they can offer is also very critical. In the Almaty negotiations, the West offered easing of gold sanctions and petrochemical products, but Iran said that such an offer would not be sufficient. Although it is impossible that the West will cancel all sanctions as Iran required in exchange for Iran's concession of 20 percent purity uranium, it opened a window for further negotiations.

Last but not the least, the attitudes of the West and the six parties toward Iran is important. Iran always demands equal treatment and respect. Major Iranian politicians persistently stress that Iran wants a just and equal negotiations process, and Iran will not negotiate under duress.

 

Source of documents：China.org.cn