More than 30 years has passed since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. At the time, many Iran watchers believed that religion would not play a primary role in future Iranian diplomacy. While in some ways this is true, the fact remains that religion is still a fundamental part of Iran's foreign policy strategy.

The advancement of information and communication technologies in the 21st century have made people more knowledgeable, reasonable and realistic, but have not substantially changed the way that human beings interact with each other, and religion still defines human relationships.

Muslims, who believe that "Muslims all are brothers", as laid out in the Quran, identify with each other collectively as well as individually. That is the Islamic logic of diplomacy that connects various Muslim countries and communities. As a leading country among Shiite nations, Iran is no exception.

When talking about the relationship between religion and state, Shiism can be divided into two camps: activism, which advocates strong engagement of religion with politics, and neutral, which avoids managing Muslims' day-to-day lives.

Many analysts have been enthusiastic about the similarities between Iraqi and Iranian Shiites. But very few realize the differences between the two. Generally speaking, Iraqi Shiites practice neutrality. For instance, Iraqi Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, though a revered Islamic thinker followed by the majority of Iraqi Shiites and millions across the world, including those from Iran, restrains his personal influence in major domestic and regional issues.

Quite differently, Iran's more conservative form of Shiism began under Ayatollah Khomeini and has not changed under present day Ali Khamenei, and a large number of clerics in Qom back the idea of velayat-i-faqih, that is, governments with authority over Shiites should be run by religious clerics in accordance with Islamic law. And the founding of the Islamic Republic actually safeguarded the role of religion in politics at the national level.

Diplomacy is usually regarded as an extension of internal politics. Therefore, policy expanding religious ideology in the 1980s should be the logical outcome of the Islamic Revolution. And religion has been a major factor influencing Iran's foreign policy throughout the 1990s and the beginning of the new century, and is expected to play a role in its foreign policy so long as the Islamic Republic exists. Despite change, consistency is obvious.

During and shortly after the Islamic Revolution, religion was the main objective of diplomacy, partly due to released passion after suffering an extended period of oppression. Though things have changed greatly, today's Iran is more of a nation-state rather than a cause of religious revolutionary. Yet as a leading Islamic state, claimed by itself and partly recognized by the world, Iran still believes it has a religious obligation to work for the interests of Muslims across the world.

The summer of 2012 witnessed fierce clashes between Muslim Rohingyas and Buddhists in Myanmar. Far removed from southeastern Asian countries, Iran was one of the few Muslim countries that had offered substantial support. Iran's major political figures, from the Supreme Leader to the president, the Majilis speaker and the Judiciary minister, all strongly condemned the violence against Myanmar Muslims.

They criticized other Muslim countries' silence and Western indifference to the violence, and urged the UN and other international organizations to take action to protect Muslim Rohingyas. Mahmoud Safari, Iran's consul general at Hyderabad, delivered a check for 6,500 Indian rupees (about US$1,166) to the Confederation of Voluntary Organizations, which works alongside the UN Human Rights Commission, to help refugees.

Iran's concern and diplomacy regarding the 2012 Eurovision Song Contest held in Azerbaijan in May offers another example on how the need to protect the security of religious ideology affected Iran's foreign policy. Some Iranian clerics thought that some of the activities might be a desecration to the Islamic religion. Iran's Ayatollahs even felt offended learning that there would be a gay parade at the end of the pageant, which was actually not planned, according to reports.

Some Iranian clerics voiced strong criticisms against the event. Ayatollah Sobhani issued a statement urging Muslims in the region to protest the contest. Azerbaijan is another country where a majority of its citizens are Shiites, and maintain close ties with Azeris living in Iran.

The disputes caused tensions in bilateral relations between Iran and Azerbaijan, with two opposing demonstrations occurred in Azerbaijan. One opposed the potential kitsch performances; the other protested against Iran's intervention in front of Iran's embassy in Baku. On May 20, Iran recalled its ambassador. Iran officially explained it as a consultation, but Western media interpreted it as a response to the protests.

Religion for Iran is also part of regional geopolitics. It seems that Iran has been well aware that it is not realistic to encourage Muslims in other regional countries to establish Islamic governments by overthrowing incumbent regimes. But the identity of a leading Shiite Muslim state is always the starting point of Iran's policy in regional affairs. Iran regards leading and unifying the Shiite countries and communities as religious obligations.

The Afghanistan and Iraq wars, by eliminating the Taliban regime to the east and Saddam Hussein's regime to the west, both of which used to be Iran's arch enemies, have given Iran more influence in regional affairs. Thus, Iran has been able to play a leading role free of checks from its neighbors.

Furthermore, the demise of Saddam's regime in Iraq transformed Iraq from a Sunni country into a Shiite nation overnight, paving the way for a geographical connection of Shiites from Iran to Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. A balanced confrontation between Sunnis and Shiites has emerged for the first time in the history of bilateral relations. Before that, Shiites could not form a unified force with real strategic significance due to geographical fragmentation.

The role of Iran as a leading Shiite country was especially noticeable in the so-called Arab Spring. Iran criticized Saudi Arabia's crack down on its domestic anti-government oppositions striving for more political rights, which mainly comes from the Shiite population in the southeast.

Iran strongly condemned joint military action by the GCC to repress the Shiite insurgents in Bahrain. Iran's Grand Ayatollah Hossein Nouri Hamedani even strongly lashed at a proposal that might lead to a union between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, where Shiites makes up 70 percent of the population. He said that neither Al Khalifa, the King of Bahrain, could rule over the people by force, nor could the Saudis absorb Bahrain.

Iran has also given moral, political and material support for Syria's Bashar Al-Assad, who is an Allawite, a minor Shiite sect. Iran's support has been crucial for the survival of Assad's regime in its two-year resistance against pressures for him to step down.

All in all, despite external and internal changes during the last three decades, religion is still a critical factor shaping Iran's foreign policy. Iran sees itself as having a religious responsibility to work for the interests and rights of Muslims at home and abroad, and feels it necessary to act to ensure the security of its religious ideology and enhance the role of Shiite countries and communities in regional affairs.

Of special consideration is that Iran's religious diplomacy in the 21st century is generally defensive rather than offensive, although Iran is still wrongly categorized by the West as a fundamentalist state that advocates terrorism. Iran is still working for global recognition of the Islamic Republic and the survival of the Islamic system.

Source of documents：China.org.cn