The Iran nuclear issue on January 20, 2014, entered the implementation phase of the "Joint Plan of Action," also referred to as the interim agreement, which certainly spells good news; but despite the optimism, obstacles remain omnipresent. Whether the United States will be able to remove its sanctions on Iran's oil and financial sectors, marking Iran's core concerns, is just one of them; and judging by the difficulties on the U.S. part, the prospect of the Iran nuclear issue remains complicated. U.S. Congress is now in fact discussing the installment of new sanctions on Iran instead of the removal of those currently in place.

The question then remains, how will things unfold? Here follows a sketch of three possible scenarios.

The first scenario will be that the United States and Iran maintain the status quo on the basis of the interim agreement. In this case, the interim agreement cannot be implemented as a result of U.S. Congress either passing new sanction bills or not being able to remove a substantial part of the existing sanctions on Iran's oil and financial sectors. Yet both sides are either still willing to interact according to the principles and spirit of the interim agreement or they will extend the agreement to a designated term. In other words, Iran will still honor its commitments, including freezing its efforts to advance the country's nuclear capabilities and keep its nuclear program and activities necessarily transparent. In return, both the United States and European countries will freeze the sanctions.

This first playbook should make an acceptable option for both sides, though neither side is 100 percent satisfied as both possess strong home front forces that oppose any reconciliation between the two. In this scenario, the United States can make sure that Iran's nuclear program is not diverted for military purposes in the predictable future, while Iran can seize the opportunity of détente to improve relations with both its neighbors and several European countries.

The second scenario will see further substantial concessions on Iran's part in exchange for some incremental concessions on the U.S. side. That is to say, Iran is also willing or has to accept the outcome, even if the United States does not remove the sanctions on its oil and financial sectors. The nation must also be fully aware that it has no other choice -- judging by the current comparison of power. In this situation, Iran might keep its uranium enrichment capability at 5 percent purity, give up its rights to enrich uranium with higher purity and cooperate with IAEA regarding regular inspections. Obama's government, with presidential authority, removes the sanctions on Iran's oil and financial sectors for 240 days, according to the relevant bills altogether, and ease other sanctions as well.

Though this scenario ends with Iran's further compliance and limited concessions on the U.S. side, it does not mean that Iran will not see any gains. On the contrary, Iran can also witness potential advantages. The country will have its compliance in this regard appreciated by some major European countries and developing countries alike, and will break through its diplomatic impasse on a global scale. As a matter of fact, shortly after the interim agreement was reached, politicians from Britain, Italy and Germany have already visited Tehran to improve relations.

On the other hand, Iran's compliance will make it difficult for the United States to assert legitimacy of the sanctions on Iran's oil and financial sectors, and the U.S. will have its own image greatly undermined due to seemingly inflexibility. A U.S.-EU discrepancy in this regard is bound to increase, proving it even harder for the United States to reach an international consensus on the Iran nuclear issue.

The third scenario will be a new round of confrontations between the United States and Iran. In this design, Iran's conservatives would strongly oppose the unbalanced concessions of their government. As a result, the negotiations would be disrupted and new U.S.-Iran confrontations would arise. Though it is highly unlikely that Hassan Rouhani's government will initiate a hard line foreign policy, chances will be high that Iran will see another radical president after Rouhani leaves office.

All in all, if sanctions on Iran's oil and financial sectors cannot be removed, a new round of rapprochement between the United States and Iran will not necessarily be irreversible, and any U.S.-Iran reconciliation will still be vulnerable. We can expect any outcome to the Iran nuclear issue, even expect the unexpected, but the first scenario will be the most likely, then the second and then the third.

Worthy of a special nod is the fact that Hassan Rouhani seems to have been well-prepared for all the predictions regarding the nuclear issue. He even wrote a three-step proposal about Iran-U.S. relations shortly after his election as president. The first step is to change confrontation into tension between the two, the second step to gradually reduce tension and on a third level then to improve relations in other areas. Rouhani well understands that Iran-U.S. relations cannot be reversed and the nuclear issue cannot be solved overnight.

Rouhani's government budget for 2014 also reflects such calculations. According to a Tehran Times report on December 30, 2013, Rouhani's government actually produced two shadow budget plans for 2014. The original one assumes the status quo will be maintained; the two shadow plans deal with the scenarios of either sanctions being removed or sanctions being added respectively.

Source of documents：china.org.cn