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- Jin Liangxiang
- Senior Research Fellow
- Center for west Asian & African Studies
- Institute for International Strategic Studies
Mar 28 2014
Can Obama pacify the Saudi anger?
By Jin Liangxiang
As Barack Obama is due to visit Saudi Arabia on March 28, the issue of U.S.-Saudi relations was highlighted again. President Obama's visit indicates that U.S.-Saudi differences, big as they are, should not be exaggerated, and they do in fact have reasons to embrace each other.
The recent Saudi anger toward the United States, marked by its refusal to accept the two-year non-permanent membership of the UN Security Council, actually reflected its long-accumulated dissatisfaction with the U.S. policies across various Middle East issues. Though Obama's sincerity of improving relations with the Saudis should not be doubted, that what he can really do remains limited. The change in the U.S. policy is of a structural and strategic nature, rather than of a tactical one.
Saudi Arabia regards toppling down the Bashar Assad regime as its vital interest since Assad is allies with Iran, a major regional rival of Saudi Arabia. In addition, Saudi Arabia strongly expects the United States to directly bomb Assad's regime. It also expects the United States will take a tough stance against Iran or even bomb it just to eliminate Iran's nuclear facilities. Saudi Arabia believes that a neighbor holding nuclear potential will pose a major threat to its national security.
It is true that the United States shares some of the interests and concerns with Saudi Arabia in the abovementioned areas. Yet it is highly unlikely that the United States will do as Saudi Arabia requires. It seems that the United States is not ready to invest more strategic resources in the Middle East. A single presidential visit by no way can pacify the Saudi anger.
In 2014, the U.S. budget deficit will reach US$18 trillion, 20 percent more than its annual GDP. Within this context, the United States can neither be financially ready nor determined to once again take military action in the region. The decade-long quagmire of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars not only exhausted U.S. resources, but also undermined the U.S. willingness to take in military actions.
Not to say, the United States regards the Asia-Pacific, instead of the Middle East, as much more important in its overall global strategy, and is shifting its resources towards that region. Rising tensions between the West and Russia -- on the Ukraine issue -- are also attracting U.S. strategic resources. The United States is certainly much busier than Saudi Arabia assumes.
Last but not least, it is also not possible that the United States will broker a balanced peace agreement between Palestine and Israel, which has long been an obstacle in U.S.-Saudi relations. As always, the U.S. administration remains under pressure of Jewish lobbyists.
However, even though the problems will persist in the relations between both nations, neither can pay for the cost of a divorce. Due to its energy resources, Saudi Arabia has always been an important player in international politics, but does not possess the proportionate military capability. Saudi Arabia and Iran have been looking at each other as rivals for many years, but Iran has a population of 75 million, three times that of Saudi Arabia, and armed forces of 900,000 soldiers, nine times the size of Saudi Arabia.
For this precise reason, Saudi Arabia has to take it as the national strategy to depend on the United States for security protection. There should be no changes here in the foreseeable future as no other major powers can replace the United States in providing security.
Saudi Arabia is also highly relevant to U.S. interests. Many international observers believe that Saudi Arabia will still be important for the United States economically. The United States in turn will have to regard Saudi Arabia as an ally in maintaining reasonable oil prices in international markets, which is also one of the preconditions for prosperity of the U.S. economy.
Nevertheless, U.S. oil import from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf has decreased in recent years as a result of so-called shale gas revolution. What is even more important, the United States has to make sure that oil from Saudi Arabia is paid in U.S. dollars -- one of the foundations of the hegemony of the U.S. dollar.
All in all, Obama can reiterate that Washington does care about the Saudi concerns, but it simply still cannot meet Saudi concerns by taking action. And thus the Saudi anger cannot be pacified.
The recent Saudi anger toward the United States, marked by its refusal to accept the two-year non-permanent membership of the UN Security Council, actually reflected its long-accumulated dissatisfaction with the U.S. policies across various Middle East issues. Though Obama's sincerity of improving relations with the Saudis should not be doubted, that what he can really do remains limited. The change in the U.S. policy is of a structural and strategic nature, rather than of a tactical one.
Saudi Arabia regards toppling down the Bashar Assad regime as its vital interest since Assad is allies with Iran, a major regional rival of Saudi Arabia. In addition, Saudi Arabia strongly expects the United States to directly bomb Assad's regime. It also expects the United States will take a tough stance against Iran or even bomb it just to eliminate Iran's nuclear facilities. Saudi Arabia believes that a neighbor holding nuclear potential will pose a major threat to its national security.
It is true that the United States shares some of the interests and concerns with Saudi Arabia in the abovementioned areas. Yet it is highly unlikely that the United States will do as Saudi Arabia requires. It seems that the United States is not ready to invest more strategic resources in the Middle East. A single presidential visit by no way can pacify the Saudi anger.
In 2014, the U.S. budget deficit will reach US$18 trillion, 20 percent more than its annual GDP. Within this context, the United States can neither be financially ready nor determined to once again take military action in the region. The decade-long quagmire of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars not only exhausted U.S. resources, but also undermined the U.S. willingness to take in military actions.
Not to say, the United States regards the Asia-Pacific, instead of the Middle East, as much more important in its overall global strategy, and is shifting its resources towards that region. Rising tensions between the West and Russia -- on the Ukraine issue -- are also attracting U.S. strategic resources. The United States is certainly much busier than Saudi Arabia assumes.
Last but not least, it is also not possible that the United States will broker a balanced peace agreement between Palestine and Israel, which has long been an obstacle in U.S.-Saudi relations. As always, the U.S. administration remains under pressure of Jewish lobbyists.
However, even though the problems will persist in the relations between both nations, neither can pay for the cost of a divorce. Due to its energy resources, Saudi Arabia has always been an important player in international politics, but does not possess the proportionate military capability. Saudi Arabia and Iran have been looking at each other as rivals for many years, but Iran has a population of 75 million, three times that of Saudi Arabia, and armed forces of 900,000 soldiers, nine times the size of Saudi Arabia.
For this precise reason, Saudi Arabia has to take it as the national strategy to depend on the United States for security protection. There should be no changes here in the foreseeable future as no other major powers can replace the United States in providing security.
Saudi Arabia is also highly relevant to U.S. interests. Many international observers believe that Saudi Arabia will still be important for the United States economically. The United States in turn will have to regard Saudi Arabia as an ally in maintaining reasonable oil prices in international markets, which is also one of the preconditions for prosperity of the U.S. economy.
Nevertheless, U.S. oil import from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf has decreased in recent years as a result of so-called shale gas revolution. What is even more important, the United States has to make sure that oil from Saudi Arabia is paid in U.S. dollars -- one of the foundations of the hegemony of the U.S. dollar.
All in all, Obama can reiterate that Washington does care about the Saudi concerns, but it simply still cannot meet Saudi concerns by taking action. And thus the Saudi anger cannot be pacified.
Source of documents：China.org.cn