- Jin Liangxiang
- Senior Research Fellow
- Center for west Asian & African Studies
- Institute for International Strategic Studies
May 26 2014
What the changes in Syria mean
By Jin Liangxiang
The last months have witnessed several major developments in the Syrian issue including the withdrawal of the opposition troops from Homs, the so-called capital of the revolution, Bashar Assad's announcement that he was joining the presidential election and the resignation of Lakhdar Brahimi, the UN and Arab League special envoy. These are obviously in Bashar Assad's favor, but the Syrian crisis is far from over. On the contrary, Bashar Assad will have to face tough challenges.
The United States and the West at large have been making efforts to make the world believe that Bashar Assad's regime would soon collapse ever since the Syria crisis broke out in March 2011. Both Barack Obama and John Kerry have frequently claimed that Bashar Assad must leave. The precedents, Tunisia's Ben Ali, Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, Yemen's Ali Abdullah Salehi and Libya's Muammar Qaddafi certainly strengthened the belief.
Historical analogies can be sources of human wisdom, but they are not always right. The stories on the ground in Syria have proved different. Bashar Assad's regime seemed to have survived the crisis as the opposition forces, hungry and exhausted, abandoned Homs in early May. Though the recapture of Homs is far from being a full victory for the government, it is least likely that the opposition will be able to organize a meaningful comeback. Otherwise, it should not have withdrawn from a city so important, both politically and strategically.
The victory in the battle fields of Homs and other parts of the territory has greatly enhanced the legitimacy of Bashar Assad's regime. Hence, Assad's decision to hold the presidential election and to participate in it is a calculated one. He seems to have no competitors.
But this decision suggests that Bashar Assad would like to take the advantage of the favorable situation to enhance his position and political power through an election since he might not be optimistic about the prospect of the negotiation.
Through the decision, Bashar Assad might also try to send a clear signal that he is here to stay, and it is not realistic to expect him to step down. Or to put it another way, the opposition cannot achieve what they cannot achieve on the battlefield.
That also explains the reason why Brahimi resigned, short of sufficient previous evidence. Bashar Assad's unwillingness to negotiate might be reasonable. How could a party with an obvious advantage give up some of its power to a disordered defeated one? A political structure always reflects a comparison of strengths. And Bashar Assad is still the incumbent president. But such a decision has made his work extremely difficult. He might feel that he can no longer play a due role in the absence of political negotiation.
Though Bashar Assad might have survived the most difficult phase, the political crisis is far from over. The opposition still exists and represents part of the Syrian population. They still occupy a considerable proportion of Syria's territory. What's more, they still have support from the gulf Arab countries and the West.
It is true that the opposition cannot topple the regime using military force, and it is highly possible that Bashar Assad will win the election. But the regime will not be able to eliminate all of the opposition forces in the predictable future.
Whether Syria will have a peaceful and stable future will depend on whether Bashar Assad can be inclusive toward the opposition. A good policy would be to forgive and tolerate those who used to fight against him. Otherwise, the situation in Syria will remain volatile in the long term.
Fortunately, the government is moving in that direction. In some regions, so long as the opposition troops give up their guns, they are being allowed to go home.
The United States and the West at large have been making efforts to make the world believe that Bashar Assad's regime would soon collapse ever since the Syria crisis broke out in March 2011. Both Barack Obama and John Kerry have frequently claimed that Bashar Assad must leave. The precedents, Tunisia's Ben Ali, Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, Yemen's Ali Abdullah Salehi and Libya's Muammar Qaddafi certainly strengthened the belief.
Historical analogies can be sources of human wisdom, but they are not always right. The stories on the ground in Syria have proved different. Bashar Assad's regime seemed to have survived the crisis as the opposition forces, hungry and exhausted, abandoned Homs in early May. Though the recapture of Homs is far from being a full victory for the government, it is least likely that the opposition will be able to organize a meaningful comeback. Otherwise, it should not have withdrawn from a city so important, both politically and strategically.
The victory in the battle fields of Homs and other parts of the territory has greatly enhanced the legitimacy of Bashar Assad's regime. Hence, Assad's decision to hold the presidential election and to participate in it is a calculated one. He seems to have no competitors.
But this decision suggests that Bashar Assad would like to take the advantage of the favorable situation to enhance his position and political power through an election since he might not be optimistic about the prospect of the negotiation.
Through the decision, Bashar Assad might also try to send a clear signal that he is here to stay, and it is not realistic to expect him to step down. Or to put it another way, the opposition cannot achieve what they cannot achieve on the battlefield.
That also explains the reason why Brahimi resigned, short of sufficient previous evidence. Bashar Assad's unwillingness to negotiate might be reasonable. How could a party with an obvious advantage give up some of its power to a disordered defeated one? A political structure always reflects a comparison of strengths. And Bashar Assad is still the incumbent president. But such a decision has made his work extremely difficult. He might feel that he can no longer play a due role in the absence of political negotiation.
Though Bashar Assad might have survived the most difficult phase, the political crisis is far from over. The opposition still exists and represents part of the Syrian population. They still occupy a considerable proportion of Syria's territory. What's more, they still have support from the gulf Arab countries and the West.
It is true that the opposition cannot topple the regime using military force, and it is highly possible that Bashar Assad will win the election. But the regime will not be able to eliminate all of the opposition forces in the predictable future.
Whether Syria will have a peaceful and stable future will depend on whether Bashar Assad can be inclusive toward the opposition. A good policy would be to forgive and tolerate those who used to fight against him. Otherwise, the situation in Syria will remain volatile in the long term.
Fortunately, the government is moving in that direction. In some regions, so long as the opposition troops give up their guns, they are being allowed to go home.
Source of documents:China.org.cn