Every time the Middle East has a new problem, analysts and media ask the same question: whether the United States will send troops to intervene, and the people in Washington's policymaking circles will then ask other countries to send troops together with the United States.

This has actually become the mentality for more than two decades. They asked the same question respectively when Gaddafi was pressing domestic opposition, when Syria's domestic conflicts intensified, when they were concerned about the Iran nuclear issue and when ISIS rose to challenge the regional order.
It is true that the United States did play a constructive role in the Middle East for some time, but great changes have taken place in the region since the new century. In particular, the last decade witnessed the end of America's unipolar system in the Middle East. To deal with problems in the Middle East today, we need go beyond such a mentality.

The unipolar U.S. system in the Middle East is the product of three factors: the ending of the Cold War bipolar system, the super power the United States had and the right policy that the U.S. adopted in the 1990s. While the end of the Cold War paved the way for the United States to grow into a dominant power in the region, the superpower laid a solid foundation for its predominant role, and its right policy served to help the United States establish its status of the single dominant power of the region and its prestige as well. The last is crucial in particular.

In 1991, the United States, leading a coalition of multiple forces, drove Saddam Hussein's forces back to Iraq. This behavior was welcomed by the world since it maintained the rules of international relations and restored the order of the region. The United States also took tremendous efforts to push forward the peace process between Israel and Arab countries. Despite the final stagnation of the peace process, America's efforts are appreciated. The United States had also maintained stability in the Gulf region with dual containments, and in Syria and Lebanon with the recognition of Pax-Syriana.

But unfortunately, the United States has failed to provide public security goods in the Middle East, since entering the new century. With the Iraq war, the United States actually fought a war that it should not have waged, since the war destroyed Iraq's domestic order; it withdrew troops at an inappropriate time, since Iraq's security forces were far from prepared; it refused in November 2013 to aid Iraq's Maliki government with arms inappropriately, since at that moment Iraq was in need of them. As a result, Iraq has become a harbor of extremists.

In addition, the U.S. support for Syria's rebels worsened the country's domestic security, and the chaos became a fertile soil for the growth of radical Jihadists. The United States also failed to broker any meaningful peace agreements between Israel and Palestine. Its unconditional support for Israel resulted in Israel's unwillingness for concessions and Palestine's frustration with the negotiations and the peace process itself. The United States neither successfully contained Iran nor reached reconciliation with it.

The decline of U.S. power in the region also made the United States an unworthy leader. As a result of the mistakes mentioned above, the United States is losing its soft power in the region, and its prestige is being undermined. The Afghanistan and Iraq wars cost the United States tremendous strategic resources, which have reduced its overall strategic capability. And Barack Obama even wants to shift its strategic resources to the Asia-Pacific region. The resources the United States can allocate for the Middle East are decreasing greatly.

Consequentially, the last five years have witnessed the reluctance of the United States to take care of regional affairs as a result of frustration. Barack Obama's administration decided to withdraw troops from Iraq and Afghanistan; it was unwilling to launch a military intervention in Syria, which would have been the right decision, thus producing another disaster; and only decided on a symbolic strike on ISIS after two Americans were beheaded by the radical Jihadists.

And what's more, the pattern of military intervention by external powers as a means to address regional issues is also worthy of reflection. The success of the Gulf War in 1991 might have encouraged Senior Bush's successors to deal with regional issues using military means. But history has proven that success of the Gulf War cannot be duplicated, since the Gulf War only had a limited objective, that is, driving back Saddam's forces.

The lessons of Afghanistan and Iraq wars indicated that the overuses of forces and unreasonable objectives would eventually quagmire the external powers. The Afghanistan and Iraq wars aimed at transformations of political systems.

The overuse of military forces also produced more violence. The radical forces had been able to take advantage of the chaos to grow its own strengths, and had been able to rally forces in the name of fighting against external invasions. The U.S. military presence and its overuse of force have become a part of the problem.

It is true that the United States, with its 35,000 troops stationed in the Middle East, will still be a single most important player in the region, and the West in general will maintain its influence in the region. But with the collapse of America's unipolar system, the Middle East is urgently in need of a new system and a new pattern reflecting the new realities in regional issues.

It is always a tough job to draw the picture of the future Middle East, but it should be clear that regional powers should take up some of the power vacuum and play a bigger role in regional affairs, while the United States should not be responsible. When necessary, regional powers should be responsible for providing forces in an acceptable way. They understand the local situation better than external powers, and are immune from the accusations of being anti-Islam and of leading an external invasion.

For that purposes, regional powers including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey should first define and demarcate their interests and their roles in the region. And the roles of each of these actors should be recognized through candid dialogue and constructive interactions. The elites of leading Sunni states and Shia states in particular should both be aware that they will have to be inclusive of the positions of the other party.

While regional players should play a bigger role, external powers should also have their due roles. External powers, whether established or newly emerging, have to be very clear that they cannot necessarily defeat a local enemy deep seated at home. Lessons are telling.

But external powers can make contributions by assisting in regional economic development. And the projects and programs that will increase employment should be especially welcomed. With jobs, young men will stay in the office rather than being on the streets or in the battlefield.

External powers can also play a role in bridging the differences between rivalries. Their mediation should serve to promote reconciliation among major regional powers, especially those divided for religious reasons.

All in all, America's unipolar system can no longer address the problems in the Middle East, and is even a part of the problem. The Middle East is in need of regionalism. Such an idea might be na?ve, but, if it is not implemented, then the region will continue to experience turbulence.

Source of documents：China.org.cn