It was announced on Saturday that Barack Obama will cut short his visit to India and will personally go to Saudi Arabia to express his condolences for the death of King Abdullah. This might be the right thing for Obama to do at this particular moment. However, despite the worthiness of his efforts, Barack Obama cannot change the bitter nature of relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia.

U.S.-Saudi relations used to be very solidly founded on mutual need. Saudi Arabia has long been a major petroleum producer and the exporter with the largest surplus capacity, which is the real source of power in controlling oil prices. The country has long been committed to providing a stable flow of oil to "the world of freedom" at reasonable prices. For instance, the Saudis increased oil production to maintain the balance between supply and demand when the two U.S. wars against Iraq in 1991 and 2003 disrupted the oil supply.

Saudi Arabia has also played a key role in supporting U.S. financial hegemony. The Saudis have long been committed to conducting the oil trade in U.S. dollars, which is actually one of the pillars of U.S. world financial dominance. Oil makes up the largest proportion of international trade, so as long as oil is paid for in U.S. dollars, the status of the dollar as a payment currency cannot be shaken.

That's the reason why Saudi Arabia has taken it for granted that the United States will responsibly attend to Saudi national security and geopolitical interests as well. In fact, for a rather long period of time, the U.S. did prove to be a faithful ally. It led multi-national forces to drive Saddam Hussein's forces back to Iraq in 1991 to safeguard order in the Gulf region. The U.S. also invested tremendous strategic resources into containing Iran, a major regional rival of Saudi Arabia. The White House has also sidelined some fierce critics of the Saudi monarchy. Many in Washington believe that the Saudi rulers disrespect human rights, abuse women's rights, and support terrorism.

But the political landscape of the Middle East has changed significantly in the last decade, so the U.S.-Saudi dynamic has also changed accordingly. As a result of the Iraq war in 2003 and the Arab Spring several years later, the Middle East power structure has changed greatly, if not fundamentally. Iran has been able to take advantage of the Iraq war to connect the major Shiite states (Iraq) and sub-state actors (Hezbollah) and rally all these forces under its mantle. By supporting Shiite factions, Iran got deeply involved in the internal affairs of Sunni Arab states like Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Bahrain.

While Iran rose to be a major regional power, the Sunni Arab states were plunged into a variety of difficulties. With the collapse of the (albeit unpopular) Saddam Hussein, the Arab world lost a major counterbalance against Shiite Iran. The Arab world, led by Saudi Arabia, began tenaciously pushing for the fall of Syria's Bashar Assad, but its efforts failed due to Iranian support for the Assad regime. Furthermore, not only did some Arab regimes fall because of the Arab Spring, but some others like Saudi Arabia itself were destabilized.

Despite its frustrations, Saudi Arabia has reasons to be angry with the United States. Under the same logic that governed the Saudi-U.S. relationship in the past, the U.S. should have come to the Saudis' assistance. But unfortunately, the last few years have seen adjustments to U.S. policy toward Iran. Instead of maintaining hostility, the White House has been seeking a breakthrough in nuclear negotiations and détente with Tehran. Or to put it another way, the U.S. is on its way to recognizing Iran's rising status and the geopolitical benefits it has gained in the last few years.

In addition to its anger with Washington's appeasement of Tehran, Saudi Arabia is also dissatisfied with U.S. policy toward Syria. Though the U.S. shares a common interest with Saudi Arabia in wanting to topple Bashar Assad, the U.S. has been reluctant to make an aggressive intervention into Syria's domestic politics.

Saudi anger is also evident. In 2013, Saudi Arabia refused to accept non-permanent membership in the UN Security Council while many other countries lusted after it. Since the end of 2014, Saudi Arabia has refused to reduce oil production to prevent prices from plummeting. It is believed that in doing so, Saudi Arabia is not only targeting Iran and Russia, two supporters of Bashar Assad, but is also targeting the U.S. for its reluctance to meddle in Syrian affairs.

It is true that neither the United States nor Saudi Arabia can pay the cost of a potential divorce. Saudi Arabia still plays an important role in the international economic arena for its status as the largest supplier in the global oil market, which is still important for the U.S. to maintain its financial dominance. That explains why Barack Obama would like to take the opportunity to express his condolences and acknowledge the new Saudi monarch. And despite its oil wealth, Saudi Arabia cannot be self-sufficient when it comes to managing its security needs. Therefore, Saudi Arabia will have to stay within the U.S. embrace.

This act of diplomacy will inject new momentum into U.S.-Saudi relations. Barack Obama can express his country's "traditional friendship" with Saudi Arabia, and can in some way pacify the Saudis' anger. The legitimacy of King Salman's reign will also be enhanced by Obama's visit. Saudi Arabia can also take pride in hosting the leader of the number one global power and show off its weight in global and regional politics before its neighbors.

But beyond that, this diplomatic action will not lead to a return to the warm relations of the past. It is very unlikely that the U.S. will reverse its policy of seeking rapprochement with Iran. Saudi Arabia will not be able to bring the U.S. back into its fold and will have to accept the U.S. decision to play a balancing game with Iran.

Source of documents：China.org.cn