Debates over Asian security architecture can be divided into two categories: one from a narrow perspective and the other from a broad one. The former one is function-centric, focusing on institutional design and capacity-building in security matters. The latter is “order-oriented,” revolving around the legitimacy of the whole set of regional security mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific region. Therefore, the current debate over the Asian security order boils down to the essential question of whether and how Asian powers can build a stable and sustainable regional security architecture.

In today’s world, international order must be cultivated, not imposed. In the absence of a broad-based consensus on regional order among Asian countries, no painstakingly erected architecture and management of international relations can sustain Asia’s regional order. Two questions merit regional actors’ special attention.

The first is about the subjectivity in building the Asian security order. It is undoubtedly logical for regional countries to play the leading role in addressing regional security issues. However, regional players confront two impediments. On the one hand, due to the geographic, cultural, historical, economic, and political diversities in the region, there exist different geographic “plates” in security terms: East Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, West Asia, and so on. Subjectivity in sub-regional security can not be overlooked when it comes to Asian security subjectivity.  On the other hand, since the end of the Cold War, intra-regional and trans-regional interactions in Asia have been strengthened. Marching on the path toward a hub for global industrial, transport, and value chains, a dynamic Asia has found that the boundaries of its economy, politics, and security have been blurred and expansive. This diverseness, blurredness, and expansiveness has complicated the debate over the subjectivity of Asian security. But the key is who can represent a region as diverse as Asia; who has the legitimate right to set the security agenda for Asia and its constituent sub-regions; and how to balance sub-regional diversity and regional unity?

The second question is about the role of America’s Asian alliance system in the building of Asian security order. China, the U.S., and other players, all have hugely different perceptions on what role the American-led alliance system should play in Asian order building. China thinks that America’s defense arrangements with its Asia allies aim at containing and tying down China. Such belief reinforces America’s stereotyped perception that China intends to undermine U.S. leadership role in the region by weakening its alliance system. The U.S. reiterates that its alliance system functions as the underpin of Asian security order, confirming Chinese perception that the United States intends to keep China out of Asia’s core security mechanisms. As for small and middle countries in the region, a rough balance of power between the U.S. and China is what they would like to see because such a state leaves much room for their role in building a new security order.  For the benefit of an enduring Asian security order and with a view to providing more regional public goods for Asian security, the United States, China, and other regional players need to explore the possible directions in which the U.S. alliance system could evolve into a more open and inclusive arrangement, jointly find a new approach to make different regional security arrangements more compatible, less exclusive and confrontational. This will be a significant factor in the building of future regional security order.
 

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