Partnership is an over-used term and can be interpreted in many ways. However, here partnership refers to the mezzanine state-to-state relation that is less than allies but more than other ordinary ones. According to my observation, China defines partnership mainly into three groups in the order of comprehensive strategic partnership (China-Russia partnership), strategic partnership (China-ASEAN one) and cooperative partnership (China-Peru one). Here three things worth our attention.

First of all, China was very cautious and kept it low profile when it started its first strategic partnership with Brazil in 1993. It was Russia that initiated the coordinated strategic partnership with China in 1996. China and the U.S. tried to work towards a strategic partnership in 1997 but failed. Until today, China and the United States have tried not to use strategic partnership to characterize their bilateral relationship. Instead China now advocates for New Model of Major Country Relation with the United States based on non-confrontation/conflict, mutual respect and win-win cooperation.

Secondly, China holds that partnerships rather than allies are more conducive to the interests of China and the world. At its very beginning, China made a clear difference between strategic partnership and military alliance. In the course of developments, partnership has become an important form of its relations with countries of importance. Now China has established more than 70 partnerships with the relevant countries and regions, approximately about 40% of those that China has diplomatic relations. To China, partnership has many advantages over military alliance. Partnership is based on but not limited to economic cooperation. Partnership does not aim at a third party and has greater flexibilities. All in all, China holds that at the time of peace, development and win-win cooperation, partnership is more fitting to the real and future conditions than military alliance.

Last but not least, China is at a defining time in terms of its future visions and orientations of the partnership. Inside China the Chinese academia is increasingly debating on the feasibility of partnership. Outside China partnership is yet to be clearer in its definition and more effective in its implementation. More importantly, China is coming closer in the world center-stage and needs to re-define partnership’s position and roles in its foreign relations. As a regional and global power, China also needs to show its leadership and responsibilities by projecting a better and clearer explanation of partnership.

Let us apply these generic terms to the specific China-ASEAN partnership. China and the ASEAN became dialogue partners in 1991. The Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 greatly enhanced the cooperation and trust between the two sides. China and the ASEAN established the strategic partnership towards peace and prosperity in 2003. Just as a reference, China and the EU also established the comprehensive strategic partnership in the same year.

Three great achievements have stood out prominently in the past dozen years of the China-ASEAN partnership. Economically, China is the largest trading partner of the ASEAN and the ASEAN is the third largest one of China’s. The two sides are now working at an enhanced stage of free trade zone. The two sides also cooperate on the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Institutionally, China and the ASEAN have established many dialogue and cooperative mechanisms. China-ASEAN series and especially the summitries have played a big role in keeping their relations stay on the right track. At the working level, the governmental and non-governmental mechanisms cover almost all the fields of their relations. Diplomatically, both sides take the other as its priority. China insists on the ASEAN centrality in the regional integration process. The ASEAN looks to China for diplomatic coordination in many of the international issues.

However, achievements and challenges always go hand in hand. China and the ASEAN are also confronting with a number of challenges. In terms of strategic partnership, the four main challenges are as follows:

Firstly, the new situation asks for new foundation and momentum other than trade in the future China-ASEAN partnership. (1) They need to add new momentum to economic and trade cooperation, especially in investment and inter-connectivity. (2) They need to develop their economic cooperation into development cooperation. Singapore has played an enlightening role in its three joint projects with Suzhou, Tianjin and Chongqing in the past quarter of the century. (3) Economic benefits alone of the partnership are losing steam and they need to broaden and deepen people-to-people exchanges, especially in education, culture and civil societies. In the meantime, they should also encourage more interchanges and cooperation between and among various localities.

Secondly, the benefits of the China-ASEAN partnership will become diminishing if it could not deal with existing and emerging challenges effectively. (1) Both sides should deal with the disputes related to the South China Sea with great caution and responsibilities. They should be confident enough in their own capabilities and visions in dealing with these disputes. (2) A related question is arms race and military confrontation. All the countries concerned should rely more on their political and diplomatic wisdom rather than military powers. Both China and the ASEAN should use all the means available to enhance their mutual trust and adopt confidence building measures (CBMs). (3) China and the ASEAN should work even more closely in dealing with non-traditional security threats. The Jakarta terrorist bombings on January 14, 2016 are but another example of rampant and spreading terrorism and extremism in Southeast Asia. Other non-traditional security threats include massive natural disasters such as Tsunami and earth-quakes, massive epidemics and possible refugee floods. (4) China and the ASEAN should consult more and coordinate more on their respective relations with the third parties such as the United States, Japan and India. These relations should be complimentary each other instead of setting off each other as in many present cases.

Thirdly, both China and the ASEAN are confronting with many new challenges both in forms and substances at the time of China’s rise and the completion of the ASEAN Community. China needs to readjust itself to meet the dual challenges. China needs to work with the ASEAN and its member states at the same time. In addition, China also needs to work with them in both economic and strategic realms. On the ASEAN side, should keep its good traditions of consensus, prudence, caring for others’ comforts and pragmatism.

Finally, there is a danger that the overall China-ASEAN partnership would be hijacked by some specific and individual disputes. Therefore both China and the ASEAN should keep bigger pictures in their minds while dealing with the issues in sights.

Bigger Picture One is the joint efforts to consolidate and promote regional cooperation. The China-ASEAN partnership should be strategic enough to outline the regional cooperation in the fields of politics, economics and securities. For instance, China and the ASEAN should rightly define and effectively promote the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Another example is that they could build up the Belt and Road Initiative in a mutually consultative, constructive and sharing ways.

Bigger Picture Two is the joint efforts to make the best use of the existing and would-be mechanisms. With the completion of the ASEAN Community, the ASEAN should take more responsibilities and possess broader visions in regional and international affairs. The ASEAN is critical at the ASEAN plus formulas and the ARF. The ASEAN serves as the counterpart to the EU in the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM). This year China is the rotating chair for both G-20 and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA). Both China and the ASEAN should and could make the Asian voices heard more loudly and clearly.

Bigger Picture Three is their creativity in thinking and shaping the future strategic partnerships. China and the ASEAN partnership could be expanded into RCEP, EAS and APEC. This partnership could also co-exist with the Greater Mekong Sub-region Economic Cooperation (GMS), the China-Mainland ASEAN countries cooperation in inter-connectivity, the China-Maritime ASEAN countries cooperation in maritime Silk Road. Besides, China and the ASEAN should also think more about sub-regional, interregional and international cooperation.

To conclude, we should also discuss about the think tanks’ role in China-ASEAN relations. Firstly, it is about institution building. In the first few decades of post-WWII and even post-Cold War years, our own institution building was weak and we had to seek for outside help. Obviously, this stage is necessary but it is over now. We have seen mushrooming of Chinese think tanks, even too many in some cases. Likewise we also see the developments of think tanks in the ten ASEAN member states as well as the ISIS ASEAN as a whole. We are now entering an age that we design, develop and expand our own think tanks to meet such new challenges as new differences between China and the ASEAN, fast changing environments and the socialization of media and information.

Secondly, it is about champion-building. Think tanks provide advice to the top leaders in the country, region and the world. Therefore, both China and the ASEAN should give more attention to bringing up the champions in our profession and field. G-20 has T-20, of which the SIIS is a key member. We should have more leading scholars and experts in the interchanges of not only between our two parties but also with the outside world. In a word, we need our own champions and we should also provide champions to the world.

Last but not least, it is about agenda setting and executing. Think tanks are mainly working on strategy and policy studies. Therefore, our work is closely linked with the current jobs of the state and non-state actors. Our jobs are not only to make recommendations to the governments but also shape and lead the public opinions. We should also aim at the days when more think tank people are doing the real jobs in the governments. In other words, we need the Asian type of revolving doors that will make more think tank people not only advocate but also plan and execute strategies and policies.

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