Feng Shuai
Associate Research Fellow
Center for Russian & Central Asia Studies
Institute for International Strategic Studies Assistant Director
Related Articles Commentary Paper SIIS Report
Jul 20 2015
Sino-American Strategic Interactions and the Asia-Pacific Security Landscape
By Feng Shuai
After 2010, the Asia-Pacific region entered a new period of changes and reforms in security terms. Traditional security issues have resurfaced; non-traditional security challenges pop up from time to time; regional security risks proliferate. Given the mounting security tensions, its is a consensus point among regional powers to erect a new regional security architecture that is capable of meeting existential security risks. However, with the glaring differences among the region’s major powers in terms of geography, history, politics, economy, and culture, and the divisions in perception of an ideal regional security architecture, the prospects for such a new architecture are rather uncertain.

The proliferation of security models

Hot-spot security issues in the Asia-Pacific region can be divided into three categories.

First, issues left over from the Cold War. The Cold War came to an end with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, but the residual security structure outlived the Cold War era in the Asia-Pacific, the front-line region in Cold War rivalry. The Korean Peninsular issue, the Taiwan issue, and territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas are the most salient ones in the residual structure. The Cold War legacy has generated security risks which involves high politics issues such as territorial disputes, posing the biggest challenge to regional security.

Second, structural strategic conflicts. Major powers have overlapping interests in the Asia-Pacific and hence, complicated competitions over crucial resources and strategic interests. The U.S. rebalancing strategy has the most perceptible implications for the region. A number of small and medium-sized countries, at the instigation of extra-regional states, commit themselves to the fierce contest over regional resources, for example, the issue of delimitation of maritime boundaries and continental shelves.

Third, non-traditional security risks, such as terrorism, financial risks, drug trafficking, environmental deterioration, impact upon domestic politics and social stability of the region.

With various conflicting and overlapping forces and interests, it has become increasingly difficult to reduce security risks in the region. The lack of basic consensus inside and outside of the region over the ideal model of security architecture for the region has led to the proliferation of security models.

The six emerging security models

1. The alliance-based model. It is an extended version of the American-led hub-and-spokes model erected in the Cold War era. The gravity of this model is in America. The United States’ bilateral ties with Japan, South Korea, Australia, The Philippines, and Thailand are the basis of this structure. The overarching goal of this model is to preserve America’s predominant role in the Asia-Pacific region and therefore the model is regarded as the bedrock and foundation of Asian security and Asia-Pacific prosperity.

2. The East Asia Summit model. The summit is regarded as the center of gravity of regional security cooperation model. After 2011 when American joined the summit, it began to set the agenda for the summit with the help of its close relationships with Asia-Pacific allies, such as Japan, Australia, South Korea, and New Zealand. America’s growing influence in the summit has strengthened its hands in shaping Asia-Pacific security landscape as an extra-regional power.

3. The Sino-American co-governance model. This model is built on coordination and cooperation mechanisms between China and America in the security domain. It attempts to provide a top-level design for the building of an institutionalized Asian security system in which the Sino-American concert will ensure the equal rights and status small and medium-sized countries are entitled to.

4. The CICA model. In this model the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is envisioned to play a central role. And hopes are that the future regional security system will be dominated by Asian countries rather than extra-regional powers. It will be built on the CICA-led pan-Asian security framework to achieve the historic goal of Asian-managed Asian security. In this model, the new Asian security concept prescribed by China is an important founding principle, which accommodates major powers’ role and small states’ aspirations.

5. The sub-regional coordination model. It is envisioned that, under such a model, acknowledging the reality of power diffusion in the Asia-Pacific and the difficulty in establishing trans-regional security institutions, it is best to promote the establishment of small-scale security cooperation institutions in sub-regions to meet emerging security risks. When such sub-regional institutions are well-developed, new links could be forged between them to form a network of security institutions.

6. The ASEAN-led model. In this model, ASEAN will play the leadership role. But with the increasingly fierce strategic competitions among regional major powers, the international space for ASEAN has been squeezed and its capability of effectively handling security issues has been constrained. Therefore, the potential of the model is nearly exhausted.

Institution competitions in the security domain in the Asia-Pacific will become even more fierce in the foreseeable future. The evolution of regional security architecture will be greatly influenced by strategic choices and interactions of major powers, China and the United States in particular. Nonetheless, the direction and model of the future development of security architecture is not difficult to discern. As long as China has a clear-cut objective, plans strategically, and commits to promoting U.S.-China relations as a focal point, the new security architecture for the Asia-Pacific region will be achieved at last.

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