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Jan 01 0001
Implementing Development Cooperation:The Cross-Cultural Challenge
By Rogerio F. Pinto
I. The Context of Development Cooperation (DC)
The challenges faced by mankind in the 21st Century can no longer be dealt with within the confines of nation-states or through traditional international relations and national bilateral interdependencies. Hence, nations have resorted to sovereignty pooling and assorted forms of globalized cooperation. Development Cooperation (DC) goals span the gamut of human needs such as peace and security, health, education, poverty, mitigation and adaptation to climate change, human rights, refugees, disaster relief, control of epidemics, etc. International conventions with binding obligations by signatory countries are important drivers of DC as developed countries and global programs offer developing countries many types of assistance for their compliance. Furthermore, an increasingly globalized world brings into the picture a multitude of non-state and non-intergovernmental institutions and forums that provide assorted inputs into DC policy and program implementation outside of the conventional bilateral and multilateral sources of DC. By factoring them in, the DC landscape becomes even more diverse and fragmented in their policies, institutional configuration, and in their cadres.
Another important dimension of contemporary DC is the global arena where exchanges take place. J. M. Severino and O. Ray have construed this arena by articulating the concept “collective and hyper collective action”. They argue that, as DC moves away from purely collective action, it has entered a phase of “hyper collective action” and this arena has become more complex and fragmented.[①] Hyper-collective action is based on multiplication and diversity of DC actors, operating in an unregulated and somewhat unruly environment, where the only residual rule is that of cross-cultural sensitivity, which most actors understand and are likely to work by, despite not being promoted by DC. In addition to the growing number of donor countries, according to the OECD there are now 263 multilateral organizations. Given a universe of 192 countries this figure computes to 4-5 times the number of developing countries, presumably their beneficiaries.
The reasons for the explosion of such donor players are not entirely clear. On one hand there is the geo-political factor of governments of emerging countries wanting to assert their global standing by becoming a “donor country” even if nominally. Romania,[②] for example, is now a “donor country” alongside the US, the UK, Japan, among other heavy weights in the donor scene. China in its own right has also become a major donor. Another explanation is that because of the extent of human needs around the world, the only way to tackle them is by diversifying the cast of players and allowing them to pursue pieces of the DC agenda. Others argue that the “humanitarian” nature of poverty related needs and the scattered distribution of beneficiaries of assistance, especially as regards health and epidemics around the world call for multiple interventions that have individual agents as the key conduits.[③] Fragmentation and incoherence due to diversity of DC policy goals, individual preferences of DC agencies based on their assumption about needs around the world are some of the costs paid by multiple interventions.
Under such circumstances, cross-cultural and technical capacity is an essential requirement. The more diversified the cast of players, the greater the challenge of coordination, of setting common standards and assuring accountability. Hence, despite this diversity, the requirement of cross-cultural capacity remains, as this is the only standard that all are subject to in order to be effective. Moreover, as argued here, in this DC environment more hinges on the capacity of the “foot soldiers” than of the institutional bases where they originate.
In an environment of “hyper-collective action”, institutional harmony and coordination are becoming more elusive and unrealistic. Consequently, despite the appeals of recent DC summits, the achievement of effective DC has become more problematic. This article takes the position that this constraint places a greater burden on individual and organizational actors, as their capacity is at a greater premium in this environment. Indeed this challenge seems greater than the challenge faced by the oligopolistic DC paradigm of the mid 20th century centered on technical cooperation with much fewer players, mostly states and a few multilateral agencies funded by the same states. On the whole, these players were like-minded, more amenable to coordination, common rules and standards, and with clear lines of accountability. For these reasons and because of the upper hand of donors driven by the principle that “he who pays the piper calls the tune” the DC mission at the time was much more manageable. This is clearly not the case today when coordination and convergence among the many and diverse players are next to impossible, despite the exhortations of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.[④]
Cooperation and aid for development (DC) in this environment defy the explicative power of conventional international relations theory as it involves a myriad of players and modalities operating under the evolving rules of global governance. At the donor end it comprises bilateral cooperation agencies, ministries, multilateral institutions for convening and financial assistance, NGOs, private philanthropic organizations, etc. At the recipient end, there are equally assorted entities, and targeted groups. Modalities of DC also vary widely: climate protocols, peace keeping and inspection missions, financial, technical, educational and training, exchanges, joint research, etc.[⑤]
The Paris Declaration, followed by the Accra Agenda for Action under OECD/DAC sponsorship on the same topic represents the most recent attempt to evolve a consensus around DC policy and institutional coordination. They produced a framework based on five “principles”: ownership, alignment, harmonization, management for results and mutual accountability. While these principles are widely uncontested, they share one feature in common: they all rest on the implicit cross-cultural capacity of DC agents and their organizations concerned with their implementation. Without meeting this requirement, these principles remain just that: principles with diminished implementation consequences. This assertion is probably accepted by the authors of these declarations but lack in explicit formulation, priority and ancillary strategies.
The intersection of these elements framed in policies, international cooperation agreements, conventions, protocols and programs honed through endless international gatherings and conferences constitute a mosaic of considerable complexity. Understanding its functioning requires that its component parts be unbundled and their interdependence and causality mapped.
II. An Implementation Agenda
The perceived trend in the literature has been to approach DC at the macro level with a highly aggregated international relations bias, characterizing a macro institutional approach, rather than at the meso or micro level, a reductionist approach, to be found in the realm of other disciplines of the social sciences. Because of the excitement they generate, issues and events of international relations and international development have a powerful media appeal as it is a topic which commands a large readership. The more sedate issues dealt with by the social sciences have little appeal as a topic of interest to readers and audiences at large. While this places International Relations ahead of Social Sciences on journalistic grounds, it does not justify the unbalanced treatment when it comes to understanding DC implementation.[⑥] In addition to providing some balance and operational focus, given the highly aggregated international relations bias of DC, this article also lays the ground for the development of a capacity and competency model to guide training and orientation for the professionalization of DC agents.
In order to temper this trend, focus must be directed to the overlooked micro and meso levels, contributing to “unbundling” the topic, rendering it more balanced and amenable to implementation analysis and outcomes evaluation. Accordingly, this article takes the view that the practical implementation of DC covering any human need of targeted beneficiaries, by any country, program or institution, through any modality must rely on its building blocks: individuals and organizational groups entrusted with delivering DC value. This reductionist approach clashes with the tendency to focus assessment of DC around institutional missions based on declaratory posturing and political articulation by its partners as part of their strategic positioning and alignment on geo-political grounds, and more recently on their ranking on a rate of development scale and global influence.
The broader geo-political and strategic postures of aggregate partners (e.g. countries, multilateral institutions and assorted interest groups) articulated by the endless string of summits, conferences, forums which turn out numerous declarations, protocols, and broad programs and budgets are important determinants of DC formulations and legitimization. However, their effectiveness in terms of outcomes and impacts are largely dependent on the implementation capacity of the mentioned building blocks, especially their “foot soldiers” and their organizational “homes”. This contention resonates with those of others writing on globalization and cooperation. For example, Dirk Messner in a recent article argues that global governance would in principle be doomed to failure if individuals had no ability to cooperate.[⑦] He supports his argument by alluding to the body of theory on collective action and its contributions to the understanding of individual rationality vis a vis the logic and dynamics of collective action, based on trust, reciprocity and optimization of outcomes of group cooperation. He further expresses his belief that the findings of empirical work of collective action theorists also apply to “actors in international networks and negotiation systems, and that there are no patterns of behavior unambiguously determined by objective national interest”.
However, the empirical work on which this belief stands would gain in credibility if the cross-cultural element were factored in and participants in the empirical surveys were to come from assorted cultural spheres, which is more cogent with the intercultural reality of DC. In other words, the commanding dynamics when it comes to implementing DC is that dictated by interpersonal relations, cultural behavior patterns of individuals and groups that interact to deliver DC program and projects. National interests become a somewhat remote background with only nominal value. Moreover, cultural determinants of behavior do not seem to have been controlled.[⑧] If they had, there would be no doubts as to the cross-cultural validity of the belief expressed by Messner. Therefore, this article suggests research that explores the validity of this position by factoring in cultural variation as a determinant of cooperative behavior in the context of DC and global governance.
The same cross-cultural dilemma is posed outside of the DC context, as in the case of international technical exchanges as part of global conventions in any area where global public goods are involved. Let us take the example of the International Atomic Energy Agency, when it engages a signatory country for the purpose of verifying compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Convention. Here, the same intercultural dynamics takes place, except that there is no exchange of aid or technical assistance and the partnership concerned is among all signatory countries. Nevertheless, an equivalent level of cross-cultural capacity is required on the part of the leadership and operative staff of the Agency on the delivery end, and by the agents of the entities object of the verification on the receiving end.
Cross-cultural capacity for DC unavoidably involves two sets of abilities. The first relates to the technical substance of the expertise being transferred or applied across cultural boundaries. The second relates to the ability to successfully straddle these boundaries. To illustrate this point, we take the case of a well-known international financial organization, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which has as its core mission to ensure global financial stability by way of its financing and its considerable technical influence on fiscal-financial matters. Promoting the financial stability and solvency of its member states is an eminently technical, policy-bound challenge, requiring mostly technical expertise. However, the promotion of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to which the IMF has also subscribed, along with practically all multilateral agencies in a clear case of “mission creep”, requires a measure of technical skills. However, a far greater cross-cultural ability is also required to intervene in areas that are to a considerable extent tethered to values and beliefs that only skilled interveners can cut through. In discussing the role of the IMF in implementing the MDGs Tamar Gutner argues that the IMF, given its core mission which it seems to carry out effectively, is least capable to take on poverty eradication initiatives. These are totally counter-intuitive for the IMF as its recommended austerity policies and programs to clients only add to the plight of the poor in the short term. One might also argue that IMF staff is by design not equipped to take on such a mission where cross-cultural skills are critical, yet not necessarily the forte of IMF staff.[⑨]
Many factors contribute to the outcome of DC: policy, design of programs and projects, funding, participation of interlocutors and beneficiary populations, etc. Assessments of DC usually attribute its failures to such causes as: lack of focus on assistance strategies, programs, inadequate attention to the policy framework, insufficient budget allocations, incomplete understanding of socio-political conditions of assisted target environments, weak or absent economic analysis and the lack of participation and ownership by recipients.[⑩] Despite casting the net widely, in ascertaining the causes of DC failure, this list does not include the critical factor of cross-cultural capacity of the “foot soldiers” of DC implementation, the perennial missing link. However, Development Cooperation, by definition transcends national boundaries, cultures, and the practice takes place essentially in trans-cultural terms.
The attendant trans-cultural dynamics, along with the technical competency of DC agents are also key determinants of outcomes. Its understanding includes a characterization of the cultural spaces involved and their interaction when cooperation exchanges take place. This dynamics plays out up-stream when policies and programs of DC are formulated but more so down-stream when they are implemented. Any DC program rests on the organizational constructs of the source of cooperation, mostly a multilateral organization, government agency, an NGO from a donor country where funding originates, or an international NGO. The technical and cultural features of these organizations permeate not only policies and programs but the behavioral performance of individuals and groups called upon to deliver DC.
III. The Need for Further Inquiry on DC Implementation
The inquiry which this article proposes complements other strands of DC research and would focus primarily on the actors involved in implementation: individuals and organizational groups whose attitude, technical competence and behavior are determined, on one hand, by their own cultural, social- psychological and technical profile, and on the other, by their perception of the targeted partners’ profile. The role of individual agents concerned with DC or its “foot soldiers” invariably involves entering the cultural space of a targeted partner, having to understand and negotiate cultural differences to engage in exchanges or to deliver their technical expertise. A deep knowledge of respective languages and symbology, aside from technical competence in the expertise being delivered, are necessary but not sufficient to ensure cross-cultural capacity and ability of partners - What skills are then specifically required? This article attempts to answer this question and suggest a conceptual framework to underpin the research required to assess these skills. It also lays the ground for an approach to develop them.
The conceptual framework underpinning the research approach called for by this article contrasts with the conventional overarching macro political and institutional architecture of DC. Because of its roots in the field of International Relations and Economic Development, this architecture rests on operational concepts supporting transfer of financial resources and technical assistance. Their use is assured and controlled by “projectization” and by operational concepts supporting the development and delivery of assorted types of expertise devoid of any determination of cultural appropriateness to the recipient environment. In its substance, the DC informed by this conceptual framework is driven by a definition of need in terms of technical or financial gaps that should be closed. In its process, the concept underpinning this framework is the key notion of “partnership”, a vain attempt to render equal partners which are inherently unequal. Even in a collaborative relationship there is no equality between a “partner” that provides DC and another that receives it.
In short, cross-cultural capacity is defined as the ability of individuals at both ends of the DC “partnership” to bridge the value/norms gap, yet deliver and absorb the technical paradigm of the cooperation involved. This capacity is equivalent to being culturally empathetic, that is the capacity to transpose to another cultural space to deliver and absorb an expertise. In sum, the determinants of cross-cultural capacity for DC are rooted in their policies, programs and institutions, but more importantly in the cross-cultural capacity of individual agents and their organizations called to implement them. Capacity therefore has an individual as well as an organizational component and both need to be understood in the context of cross-cultural DC.
IV. A Theoretical Framework for Cross-Cultural DC
In a DC “partnership”, cross-cultural capacity should reside at both ends of the partnership: the provider of assistance and the recipient of it. Understanding the source and causes of such cross-cultural capacity and assessing the consequences of robust capacity or lack of it is of paramount importance. In order to achieve this understanding, one needs to start by laying out the theoretical foundations, which includes scoping the universe of cross-cultural DC, that is determining all the conduits of DC. The theoretical underpinnings of the platform enabling this understanding are grounded primarily in the domain of Cultural Anthropology, Social Psychology and Institutional/organizational analysis, as relevant to a reductionist approach to cross-cultural behaviorism. As such it takes the stance that human behavior in organizations is driven essentially by psychic forces inherent in any human being.
Furthermore, behavior is modulated by belief systems which vary with values of collectivities and systems of norms of organizations and groups, in turn modulated by different technical paradigms. It becomes axiomatic then that the comparative cross-cultural study of organizational behavior must dwell on several spheres of human behavior. Consequently, the proposed framework approaches cross-cultural behaviorism by focusing on three varying determinants of behavior: (a) basic values and norms, (b) rational processes or habits of the mind (mind-set), determining technical paradigms; and (c) social-psychological factors as reflected in organizational culture. So, working across cultures as in the case of DC delivery, requires crossing several divides, the cultural, the cognitive-rational, and the social psychological.[11] By combining these levels and divides, this article proposes a typology of styles of cross-cultural DC which can help the pursuit of the key question and a set of hypothetical answers to it.
Individuals engaged in cross-cultural DC have to confront two challenges: On one level they must deal with crossing the cultural, cognitive/rational and social psychological divides between their home profile and that of the partner country/institutions. On the other level, they must conform to the organizational culture (ideology) of their own DC organizations with attendant “conditionalities” of policy and programs of their governing bodies and rules of governance. Goals, organizational standards and operational policies guiding the conduct of these agents are determined by rational criteria by and large shared by its members and somewhat predictable. However, social-psychological determinants of their behavior in work groups and perceptions of those of their DC partners are less predictable and even more complex. Therefore, the challenge of DC is to acquire capacity to promote own-culture adaptation of individuals and groups, in addition to their cross-cultural capacity to complement their language and technical abilities.
On the basis of these challenges, this article proposes a set of profiles of individuals and organizational groups of both donor and recipient partners defined by: (a) own-culture, i.e. their underlying values/normative orientations (b) their technical paradigms i.e. their cognitive/rational elements, (c) the cultural ethnocentricity exhibited in their intervention approaches, (d) the social psychological determinants of individual and group behavior, and (e) their perception of the cultural, cognitive/rational and social psychological profiles of their DC partners. The combination of these profiles suggests cross-cultural DC styles of agents. Pairing styles as opposites in two axes: value/culture and rational/cognitive, allows four typical styles to be hypothesized (Figure 1):
At one end of the value/culture axis there is the recipient-centered adaptive style which is characterized by absence of ethnocentricity and genuine ability to work across cultures. Opposite to this style is the own-culture-centered anti adaptive style characterized by ethnocentricity and abstraction of the recipient cultural environment.
At one end of the rational/cognitive axis there is the non-adaptive technical style which is centered on the technical paradigm of the DC in question. On the opposite extreme of this same axis there is the flexible pragmatic style which focuses mostly on the practicality and feasibility of the DC at hand. This style is amenable to engaging in culture/value adaptation and/or the technical paradigm of the recipient, as dictated by circumstances.
The recipient-centered adaptive style is likely to exhibit the highest level of cross-cultural capacity, while the non-adaptive technical style exhibits the lowest level of cross-cultural capacity and possibly the highest level of technical ability.
The proposed typology identifies the cross-cultural styles predominant among individuals and groups in different modalities and institutions of DC. This mapping of styles suggests the extent to which programs and projects under different modalities and institutions are cross-culturally effective as a result of the style of their members and groups. The same would be done with regards to the cross-cultural perception of the recipient partners by donor partners relative to a set of features characterizing the value/culture and rational/cognitive profile of the recipient partners.
This theoretical framework, resting on these three pillars, along with the proposed typology of cross cultural styles is intended to assist in the pursuit of a cross-cultural approach to DC implementation which is driven by the search of an answer to the basic question below, and validation of the set of hypothetical answers that follow:
To what extent are the successes and failures of DC attributable to its macro level international relations determinants of donor organizations, attendant policies, programs and institutional arrangements, or a function of the behavioral pattern of DC agents and recipients involved in implementation activity at the micro level?[12]
Several key hypotheses are intended to assist in answering this question.[13]
1. Cross-cultural capacity is determined mostly by the level of congruence and adaptation of social psychological styles of individuals and groups across cultures, while cross cultural ability is determined by the congruence and adaptability among technical paradigms of donors and recipients.
2. In modalities and institutions where there is greater congruence on cultural, cognitive/rational, and social psychological grounds between DC partners (donors and recipients), there is less need for cross-cultural capacity/ability, and desirable outcomes are likely. Here the non-adaptive technical or flexible-pragmatist styles would be expected to prevail.
3. In modalities and institutions where there is less congruence on these dimensions, among DC partners there is a greater need for cross-cultural capacity, technical ability and a greater risk to desirable outcomes. Here recipient-centered, adaptive or own-centered anti-adaptive styles would be expected to prevail.
4. Policies and programs delivered bilaterally present the greatest cross-cultural challenges, while those delivered by multilateral agencies with multicultural staffs present a lesser cross-cultural challenge. Prevailing cross-cultural styles are expected to be consistent with this hypothesis.
5. Policies and programs in the “soft” areas of DC present a greater cross cultural challenge than those in the “hard” areas.[14] Prevailing cross-cultural styles are expected to be consistent with this hypothesis.
6. South–South DC poses less of a cross-cultural adaptation challenge because there is less power, economic capacity and influence differentials between the DC partners, making for a more genuine partnership. Prevailing cross-cultural styles are expected to be consistent with this hypothesis.
In order to pursue the proposed inquiry, it would be necessary to identify a suitable sample from the universe under inquiry to be submitted to the appropriate instrumentation to collect the necessary data. To facilitate sample selection, a basic differentiation should be established between Aid and Cooperation for Development policies, programs and countries/institutions. In short, the differentiation proposed here is that in the Aid modality the resources and modus operandi of the DC is controlled by the donor party. In the Cooperation modality decisions on resources and modus operandi are jointly reached by the parties.
In regard to Aid for Development, on the provider side, the sample should include bilateral/donor countries, multilateral and global donors/sponsors and their implementing institutions. Within these, a selection of both hard and soft policies and programs should be made in order to obtain representative variety. Preference should be given to donor/sponsor members of OECD, based on a set of criteria, including availability. On the DC recipient countries and institutions, selection should match those of bilateral donor/sponsor countries, as they would have to be paired up with those targeted by the donor/sponsor countries. The same would apply to the selection of recipients of multilateral and global donors.
In regard to Cooperation for Development, the sample should include members of Governance Clubs such as G-7, G-20, Supranational Structures such as the EU, Global Policy Networks such as Rollback Malaria Initiative, Intergovernmental Policies and regimes such as WTO and Montreal Protocol, as well as members of enterprises engaged in Global Private Governance such as the Global Compact.
With regard to instrumentation, two questionnaires would be proposed. The first one would seek to assess the cross-cultural styles of organizational groups in different donor modalities and institutions of DC. It should reflect the variables used to define the hypothesized cross-cultural styles as discussed above. The identified styles would be cross-checked with the substance and methods of DC programs and projects of their respective modalities and institutions. The instrument would also capture the perceptions of respondents with regard to their recipient partners. The second one seeks to characterize the value/culture and rational/cognitive profiles of individuals and groups of recipient partners as matched with their donor modalities and institutions.
V. Conclusions
This article has argued for a greater focus on the “missing link” in the conceptualization and the practice of Development Cooperation (DC): the micro level “foot soldiers” and their organizational base, as regards their cross-cultural capacity and ability to implement DC. It proposed a conceptual framework for further inquiry into this critical topic and laid the ground for the development of this capacity.
In addition to being based on a novel approach to DC (reductionist) it is clear that ascertaining the features of cross cultural capacity and ability is an eminently challenging task, requiring a unique research expertise not associated with the realm of International Relations, which has engendered DC. However, unless the question for inquiry posed in this article is persuasively answered, efforts to develop the cross-cultural skills of DC “foot soldiers” and their organizations will lack credibility and will not be successful. This article closes with the hope that readers might see the relevance of its case and build on the proposed conceptual framework as a foundation for pursuing further inquiry.

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[①] See Jean-Michel Severino and Olivier Ray, “The End of ODA (II): The Birth of Hyper Collective Action,” Working Paper, No. 218, Center for Global Development, 2010.
[②] Until the 1990s a relatively poor country on European standards, which is now an upper-middle income country and the 11th largest economy of the Continent in nominal GDP terms.
[③] According to the International Development Agency (IDA), in health alone there are more than 100 international organizations. See “Aid Architecture: An Overview of the Main Trend of Official Development Assistance Flows,” IDA, May 2008.
[④] A declaration endorsed by over 100 countries attending a meeting on Aide Effectiveness called by the OECD-DAC in Paris in 2007. This meeting was followed by the 3rd and 4th High Level Forums held respectively in Accra, Ghana in 2008 and in Busan, South Korea in 2011.
[⑤] Deborah D. Avant, Martha Finnemore and Susan K. Sell go beyond state-centered international relations adding to the cast of international governors, international organizations, corporations, professional associations, advocacy groups, to name a few who strive to “govern” international areas in which they have a stake. See Deborah D. Avant, Martha Finnemore, and Susan K. Sell eds., Who Governs the Globe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
[⑥] Even in recent studies focusing on the quality of DC unrelated to issues of international relations, such as “Quality of Official Development Assistance Assessment” done jointly by The Global Economy and Development at Brookings Institution and the Center for Global Development, Washington DC, in 2010, authored by Nancy Birdsal and Homi Karas, the cross-cultural capacity of DC agents is nowhere to be found among the four dimensions (maximizing efficiency, fostering institutions, reducing the burden on recipients and transparency/ learning), and thirty indicators on which the study was based.
[⑦] Dirk Messner, “Three Waves of Global Change: The Dynamics of Global Governance in the first half of the 21st Century,” in Thomas Fues and Liu Youfa eds., Global Governance and Building a Harmonious World, Bonn: German Development Institute, 2011.
[⑧] Here understood as primary, not secondary culture which tends to be homogenized across cultures mostly due to globalization.
[⑨] Tamar Gutner, “The IMF and the Millenium Development Goals,” in Avant, Finnemore, and Sell eds., Who Governs the Globe?.
[⑩] IEG, “Small States: Making the Most of Development Assistance: A Synthesis of World Bank Evaluation Findings,” Washington, D. C.: The World Bank, 2006.
[11] While this framework draws on prior doctoral research conducted by the author, theoretical considerations in this article are meant as cursory references to its theoretical underpinnings, and are not intended as theory building. For an article extracted from the dissertation see: http://www.google.com.br/search?tbm=bks&tbo=1&hl=pt-BR&q=Rogerio Pinto in Systems Thinking-A Resource for Organization Diagnosis and Intervertion&btnG=.
[12] An illustration of this key query is the general frustration with the outcome of the Rio 20 summit, which took place in Rio de Janeiro in 2012. After a long string of meetings relating to sustainable development, agreement on implementation action plans with hard commitments by partners was still not achieved. The record of implementation of previous agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol is also weak.
[13] All with ceteris paribus conditions (all other factors being held equal).
[14] Soft projects refer to those that treat social variables with intended social impacts, while hard projects deal with physical elements