“China’s general diplomatic planning is increasingly enriching and improving to have formed a diplomatic framework, in which diplomatic working at the levels of states, regions and realms complement and reinforce each other, bilateralism and multilateralism combine, and political, economic and cultural diplomacies interact, having omnidirectionally advanced China’s diplomatic working”, wrote PRC Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi on the magazine Seek Truth in October 2012 in reviewing the diplomatic achievement China accomplished in the last decade. To this author, this omnidirectional diplomatic planning is by connotation: a, to continually advance the construction of a new-type great power relations on cooperation and dynamically balanced; b, to build up a new, periphery order driven by the strategic upgrading of the good-neighborly relationship and motivated by the goal of the commonwealth of interest; c, to underscore a mutually beneficial development with developing countries; and d, to strengthen a new posture of global cooperation and governance based on “co-governance” and “sharing responsibilities, expanding common interests and seeking win-win outcomes”. The omnidirectional diplomatic planning has accelerated the transition and upgrading of China’s diplomacy in terms of mindset, capability and vision, and laid down the direction of the diplomatic planning for the next decade.

I. Call on New-type Diplomatic Thinking
The effort to break through the diplomatic stereotype and to foster a new-type diplomacy will boost China’s diplomatic transition and upgrading in the first decade of the new century. It is the most important innovation of the new-type diplomacy--the peace and development strategy with Chinese characteristics--to have recognized the general trend of globalization and multi-polarization and broken through the traditional theories of international relations and traditional mindset regarding the rise of big powers.[①] The innovations were carried out in China’s diplomatic planning that can be outlined in two aspects as follows:
1. The new-type partnership viewpoint is applied in building the strategic mutual trust and balanced development of big powers. China has constantly placed the big-power relations on the key position of the diplomatic chessboard. With the end of Cold War and the evolution of the globalization, China’s big-power diplomacy has experienced deep transition, i.e., China is building a new-type big-power relationship axised on cooperation and with general and dynamic equilibrium. The transition is based on China’s recognition of the substantial change of the international configuration and big-power relations.
First, the scope of the big-power diplomacy is broadened. China is following the waves of newly emerging powers and multipolarization of international power structure in general and, in particular, China is extending its big-power diplomacy from the traditional Western-power orientation to the newly-emerging-power orientation, since the newly-emerging-powers are rising in a grouped and mushroomed fashion, which is altering the Western-centric international power structure that lasted for the last 500 years. On this basis, China further called for building an inclusive big-power network including traditional powers, emerging powers and regional powers, and “China stands ready to work with others, developed and developing countries together, on the basis of universally recognized norms of international law and multilateral decision making, to deal with the challenges and the opportunities before the world today.” [②]
China not only rejects the concept of“G2”,[③] but also dismisses the Cold War mentality of confrontation between different alliances and “sowing discord” to strengthen exclusive and even confrontational military alliance systems.[④] In the realm of security, “China should work for common security in a spirit of democracy, inclusiveness, cooperation and win-win progress. Internal affairs of a country should be handled independently by the country itself and international affairs should be managed collectively through consultation by all. We should be committed to multilateralism and international cooperation, and promote democracy in international relations.”[⑤] These assumptions reflect the new thinking by which China is actively making plans and arrangements to form a omnidirectional, dynamically balanced big-power diplomatic network and to place the priority of the big-power diplomacy on advancing a just, fair and effective global governance framework.
Second, the connotation of big-power diplomacy is re-examined. Competitive cooperation as an idea has become the main axis among big powers, especially between traditional and emerging powers, vis-a-vis the traditional big-power relations featuring strategic confrontation and even military conflict, a commonplace in history. On the surface, competitive cooperation manifests competition and cooperation that are complicatedly interwoven, inter-gamed and mutually impacted, where cooperation is conducted within competition and vice versa; cooperation is true but impacted by competition, and competition is restrained by cooperation. In fact, with competitive cooperation, big-power relations is undergoing historical transformation, i.e., in treating their relations big powers resort less to force, violence, coercion and war, and they instead pursue competitions in economic, systematic, normative and developmental models to secure comparative advantage and take on strategic dialogue and policy coordination to manage their divergence and even conflict, and they only strengthen their cooperation if they face challenges and security threats in common.[⑥]
It is true that competitive cooperation is by no means free of conflicts among big powers, including security dilemmas and even strategic mutual suspicions to varying degrees, especially the historically left-over territorial disputes and disputes of territorial seas, which remain a sensitive security issue at present day. Big powers are far from stopping their scrambling for geopolitical and geo-economic advantages. Gaps in ideologies and value systems are still the major obstacles to the strategic mutual trust among big powers. However, in contrast to those in other historical periods, the present big-power relations involve a complex posture featuring “agreement with differences” and “rivalry without conflict”.[⑦] China believes that profound physical, conceptual and mechanical incentives can be identified behind the present big-power competitive cooperation. By physical incentive, it means that the world is getting smaller and has become a "global village"; Countries are more closely linked and interdependent with their interests more closely integrated than ever before; to some extent, the world has become a community of interests; those selfish practices of conquering or threatening others by force, or seeking development space and resources by non-peaceful means are losing ground.[⑧] By conceptual incentive, it means that the globalization evolves to boost the historical transition of international agendas. In the words of President Hu Jintao, “We should view security in a broader perspective. Security is not a zero-sum game, and there is no isolated or absolute security. No country can be safe and stable in the absence of peace and stability of the world peace and regions.”[⑨] China insists that no big power can be immune from those global security threats, nor can it cope with them alone. Policy coordination and collective cooperation have become the only option for all big powers in response to the increasingly severe transnational and global challenges.[⑩] This historical trend in turn has boosted the influence of the new security concepts of cooperative security, common security and relative security in the international community. Mechanism incentive refers to the trend that big-power coordination mechanism and norm-setting have made much greater progress today than it did in the Cold War period or earlier. In addition to the formal international multilateral coordination institutions, various and frequent, high-level bilateral strategic dialogues have been built among big powers, so did various smaller multilateral and multilateral dialogues to step up policy coordination and strategic communication.
Third, re-orientation of new-type big-power relations. It has become a key to China’s big-power diplomatic transition to explore new-type big-power relations now that big-power diplomacy is widened in its scope and that their competition-cooperation is increasingly complicated. China’s big-power diplomacy faces three tests throughout the new historical period. Test one is how China can transcend the stereotype of “zero-sum game” and “confrontation” among big powers, especially between China--the largest emerging power, and the United States--the largest established power. Since the turn of the millennium, China has actively called on newly emerging powers to stick to “peaceful development road” thanks to globalization and the themes of peace, development and cooperation of the era, and work together with the established powers to build a new-type, mutually-beneficial partnership on the basis of respecting core interests and vital concerns. President Hu Jintao put forward five points at the Opening Session of the Fourth Round of The China-US Strategic and Economic Dialogues, “To build such a new-type relationship between China and the United States as two major countries, we need to think creatively, to trust each other, to act in a spirit of equality and mutual understanding, we need to work actively, and to nourish our friendship”, which reflects China’s newest thinking on the new-type Sino-U.S. relationship and is responded positively by U.S. [11] Test two is how to get rid of the parochial ideological diplomacy, especially the severe restraint of the cold-war thinking imposing on the big-power relations. “We should be more tolerant to one another and live together in harmony; Mutual learning and tolerance among different civilizations are an inexhaustible source of strength for social progress; We should advocate a spirit of openness and tolerance and allow different civilizations and models of development draw on each other's strength through competition and comparison and achieve common development by seeking common ground while reserving differences”, pointed out by President Hu Jintao in his statement at the General Debate of the 64th Session of the UN General Assembly, [12] reflecting a new value system explored and created by China and its new diplomatic concept to maintain peace, prosperity and justice of the world. Test three is how to prevent global governance in the new period from collective actions with leadership absence, a predicament to big powers. For instance, on the world economic governance, Chinese government actively calls for sharing responsibility and leadership of big powers, and emphasizes to “adopt an attitude responsible to history and the future, bear in mind the common interests of mankind, build on what we have already achieved and continue to work in concert for strong, sustainable and balanced growth of the world economy”.[13] Moreover, on international security governance, China calls for seeking security through development, equality, mutual trust, cooperation and innovation to cope with the growingly severe traditional and non-traditional security challenges.[14] These are the concepts of China’s new-type diplomacy featuring “unity, cooperation, mutual support and joint effort to address problems”.
2. China’s relations with developing countries are redefined as seeking common development with the developing countries with the new thinking of “sharing responsibilities, expanding common interests and seeking win-win outcomes”. It has been China’s established diplomatic strategy since the onset of the new century to consolidate the diplomatic status of developing countries as the basic status in China’s overall diplomacy. In this regard, China has to be clear about its own status and stage of development. China must correctly define its own status of a developing country before it can correctly define the historical stage of its relations with developing countries. At the same time, China must make sure that what the international community sees is a real China, and that they reasonably view China’s achievement, difficulties and challenges, as well as its international contributions and capacity, before China can cultivate a propitious environment of social mentality and opinions home and abroad for China to build a mutually-beneficial, cooperative relations with developing countries.
Since the onset of new century, as China has made great progress in its cooperation with developing countries, the international opinions, especially those of the West, began to doubt China as a developing country. On the one hand, the Western developed countries deliberately exaggerate development gaps and different interests between China and the developing countries on the ground of economic globalization, and they allege that China is not a developing country and that “China’s dominance over the world is irreversible” on the ground of China’s “economic achievement”, “high-new-technology”, “foreign aid”, “international influence”, etc.[15] The above allegations, whatever their purpose, have compromised and even weakened China’s status as a developing country and have impacted China’s long-earned, equal, friendly, and mutually-assistant sentiments with developing countries. On the other hand, the Western countries purposefully highlighted the deficiency and flaw in the internal governance of the developing countries as the fundamental reason of their development backward, while the Western countries omitted the fact that the Western-led international system has structurally and systematically restrained the systematic development of the developing countries.[16]
Thus, in the effort to consolidate China’s relations with developing countries it is important that the above Western bias should be reversed through competition for greater international voice. On the one hand, Chinese government and leaders take on various bilateral and multilateral occasions to brief the world of China’s status quo and the direction of its development, stating that “China’s development is a long and arduous task.The scale and complexity of the challenges that we face in the course of development are unmatched anywhere else in the world and have been rarely seen in human history”;[17] “China is still in the primary stage of socialism and remains a developing country”, and it is hoped that a real China be known to the world.[18]
China’s unswerving policy to persist as a developing country is not only in consistent to China’s basic national condition, attributes and ability, but also helpful for defining the basic scope of the China’s national interests, and for the world to identify China’s position in the structure of the international balance of power, which enables China to assume international responsibility and obligation on a reasonable principle.
On the other hand, as for the Western accusation on the ill-governance of developing countries, China stresses that the broad developing countries are in a disadvantageous position in the current international system and reiterates that “the international community should share more responsibility and carefully listen to the appeal of the developing countries and the most underdeveloped countries”, “without wide development and equal participation, there will be no talk of common prosperity of the world, nor talk of building fair and just international economic new order”, and “only the shared interest, responsibility and mutual benefit can bring common interest to the international community”.[19] China have understood that the broad developing countries are the major force to push for the international system to transform in fair and just direction, the major force of the democratization of international relations, and the major force on which China relies in its constructive participation in the transformation of international multilateral mechanism and international system. Since the onset of new century, Chinese government and leaders has constantly emphasized that China is a long-term member of the developing countries, and it is a core value of the China’s diplomacy to seek political, development and security interest in favor of the broad developing countries, and pointed out that China “will intensify cooperation with fellow developing countries, and support that they have a greater say in international affairs. We will remain forever a good partner and brother of developing countries.”[20]
II. Enhancing Capabilities of the New-type Diplomacy
On July 20, 2009, President Hu Jingtao raised the newest requirement on building China’s diplomatic capacities in his speech at the 11th Conference of Chinese Diplomatic Envoys Stationed Abroad, pointing out emphatically that China has to continue to improve its work of diplomatic capabilities and quality so that China will become politically more influential, economically more competitive, more endearing in its national image, and morally more attractive.[21] The first decade of the new century saw enrichment and refinement of China’s diplomatic planning, especially the implementation of China’s periphery strategy and developing-country strategy, which further consolidated the foundation and mechanization of China’s relations with periphery and developing countries, an important evidence of the transition and upgrading of the diplomatic capabilities.
1. China will more proactively upgrade two aspects of building the new periphery order. The first aspect is to upgrade economic cooperation in order to upgrade the mechanization of China-periphery relations. As China has the most neighboring countries, which differentiate largely in national conditions and share the most complicated mutual relations, China has put the periphery strategy as the first of the four strategic priorities since the early new century, observed the principle of being a good neighbor and a good partner of neighboring countries, and constructed a regional economic cooperation framework with the leading engine of China, which in turn supported, consolidated and safeguarded the periphery strategy.
This can be outlined in the following two points: On the one hand, China has constructed a network of bilateral partnerships with almost all neighboring countries, and the number of strategic partnerships is increasing.[22] China maintained its position as the biggest export market of Asian countries and remained the largest trade partner of the DPRK, Mongolia, Japan, the ROK, Vietnam, Malaysia and India respectively. China's investment in Asian countries has grown rapidly. As of November 2011, China's non-financial direct investment in Asian countries totaled US$18.03 billion. China is the No.1 source of foreign investment in Myanmar, Cambodia, the DPRK and Mongolia. It will also build a Free Trade Area (FTA) in each of the ASEAN member countries and lift up economic and trade cooperation through cluster investment. China cooperated closely with Asian countries in the sectors of finance, new and high-tech, new energy, environmental protection energy saving and developmental aids. In 2011, China signed the bilateral currency swap agreement with Thailand, Pakistan and Mongolia worth RMB70, 10, and 5 billion respectively and expanded the currency swap with the ROK to RMB360 billion. The total amount of bilateral currency swap agreements China signed with Asian countries reached RMB775 billion. The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and China UnionPay set up branches in Laos, Singapore, Pakistan and India for business expansion.[23] The partnership with periphery region has especially increased the mutual economic and trade cooperation tie that played a role of ballast to the overall China-periphery relations.
On the other hand, the overall leading role of the sub-regional economic cooperation mechanism is enhanced. China has tried hard to push for ASEAN 1 and ASEAN 3-led economic cooperation, and taken first to kick off China-ASEAN free trade area, which encouraged Japan, ROK, Australia, New Zeeland, India and ASEAN to have signed free trade area agreement. ASEAN 3 mechanism has made great achievement in financial cooperation: they have implemented the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM) and built up a regional foreign reserve bank worth of $120 billion and Regional Credit Guarantee and Investment Facility, which have made great contribution to the East Asian economic and financial stability.[24] China has worked vigorously to advance connectivity construction with periphery countries, and China is ready to establish all-dimensional, in-depth and strategic connectivity with ASEAN, which will further enhance China’s key position in the regional economic cooperation.[25]
The second aspect is to proactively pursue a regional political, security cooperation strategy on both “eastern and western lines”. On the western line, China regards SCO as a center to construct a stable periphery strategy and China is exploring a new-type regional cooperation road based on the new security concept of “mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, and cooperation”, on the implementation of building border military mutual trust, and on “partnership but not alliance” in a sense of comprehensive security, common security and cooperative security. In recent years, China has deepened Sino-Russian strategic partnership and steadily advanced intra-SCO economic and cultural exchanges aimed at rendering SCO into a harmonious and amicable home, a source of strong support for regional security and stability, a driver of regional economic development, and an effective platform for international exchanges with greater international influence.[26]
On the eastern line, as regional political, security order is caught up with aggravating clashes between new and old configurations, China is building up diplomatic capabilities of managing regional hot-spots, shaping regional order and providing more public goods for regions. Since the onset of the new century, China-Asia-Pacific relations is emerged with two great issues. On the one hand, as Asia-Pacific region soared in its economic and strategic status, small and middle countries and groups within the region seek autonomy which overlapped with strategic re-pivoting to Asia-Pacific on the part of powers within and without the region, especially the United States. On the other hand, as China’s comprehensive rise has produced an on-going “systematic shock” on the periphery countries, the lack of inclusive, effective, comprehensive security architect in the region is looming large, which has worsened the binary configuration of the so-called “economic dependence on China, and security dependence on U.S.” emerged from the region. In addition, the growing complex security challenge has furthered the dual effect of the competition-cooperation in the region. Chinese government is embarking on building the following five capabilities in dealing with the growing development in the periphery situation. First, China will stick to the peaceful development path; try hard to dissolve the structural shock of the comprehensive rise of China given the discourse of “power shift”; and to persist in “striving for a peaceful international environment to develop ourselves, and promote world peace through our own development”; and “stay concentrated and guard against complacence and impetuosity” in respect of the strategic direction of peaceful development.[27] Second, China will do its best to enhance the economic cooperation level of mutual benefit, win-win, common development, and step up the role of strategic economic cooperation as “stability valve” and “ballast” to the overall relations, and cultivate the awareness that Asia-Pacific region become a highly interdependent community of interests and destiny.[28] Third, Sino-U.S. relations is used as a leverage to promote “Sino-U.S. X” trilateral diplomacies. China has introduced the Sino-U.S. Asia-Pacific security consultation into China’s Asia-Pacific strategic planning for the sake of promoting China’s cooperation with other countries and groups via Sino-U.S. cooperation and actively advance trilateral diplomacy led by “Sino-U.S. X” relations, which can lead to benign interactions among China, U.S. and neighboring countries.[29] Fourth, China pushed for evolution and transition of the regional cooperation mechanisms by promoting ASEAN-led, inclusive, multilateral security cooperation dialogues, and encouraging ASEAN to exercise “unite and self-dependence” and play a central” role, which can prevent ASEAN not only from becoming an outpost of U.S. containment of China, and but also from forming a “united front against China” in respect of China’s core interests of territorial sovereignty. Fifth, stability and territorial sovereignty are equally important regarding the sea territorial disputes in East China Sea and South China Sea, a policy not only fully demonstrates China’s resolution and confidence in adhering to principle and protecting sovereignty, but also helps to reach agreement with ASEAN on implementing the follow-up Actions Guideline of Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, and setting up 3 billion fund to promote China-ASEAN maritime cooperation, maintaining general stability of the South China Sea situation. On the issue of East China Sea, especially when Japan had brazenly ignited Diaoyu Island dispute that broke the consensus reached by China and Japan on the issue, China is steadfast in defending its sovereignty, which earned China a strategic upper hand. In sum, China endeavors to build up an Asia-Pacific cooperation framework, which is based on common interests, centered on ASEAN, bolstered by big-power coordination, and pragmatically cooperative.
2. China pursues the new-type mutually beneficial strategy to enhance and develop its capabilities to cooperate with the developing world. Since the onset of new century, the measures China has taken to enhance the capabilities can be described as follows: a. the mechanized mutually beneficial cooperation. China has successively issued policy documents on Africa and Latin America, which mapped out policy directions and priority areas. China has also established BRICS summit mechanism, continuously deepened China’s relations with various regional organizations of Africa, Latin America and Arab countries by successively setting up China-Africa Cooperation Forum, China-Arab Cooperation Forum and China-Pacific Island Countries Economic Development & Cooperation Forum, etc. In recent years, developing countries have undergone a severe development crisis thanks to economic globalization and international financial crisis. Chinese government has taken many occasions to urge international society to strengthen cooperation, viewed the developmental issue with a more macro perspective, and actively explored new ways and new areas for South-South cooperation and South-North cooperation, in order to push for extending China’s bilateral cooperation with developing countries to multilateral one.[30]
b. China takes a strategic approach to the developmental aid. China has further combined the two development strategies--developmental aid and developing two markets (markets home and abroad) and using two resources(resources home and abroad) in the first decade of the new century to have basically fulfilled the strategic goal of mutual benefit and common development set up between China and African Countries. On the conference of China government’s work of developmental aid held in August 2010, China reemphasized the priority tasks of improving and strengthening foreign aid in the new situation, including optimizing structure of aid, enhancing quality of projects, enriching content of aid, so as to combine the increase of economic aid to developing countries and strengthening of independent development capability with the deepening of China’s pragmatic, complementary, mutually beneficial cooperation with developing countries.[31]
c. Reforms of international system are approached in a way of forming blocs. China has worked together with developing countries to push for reform and reconstruction of international order. Relying on the collective efforts of the broad developing countries, China has elevated the status of developing countries including China in the international economic governance mechanisms of G20, IMF, world Bank, and through its coordination and cooperation with developing countries, China has defended the basic right and developmental right of developing countries in areas of climate change, developmental cooperation, human rights protection, energy security and food security.
III. Broadening the Vision of New-type Diplomacy
China’s diplomacy in the new period is increasingly transcending regional and local visions and instead taking on a global perspective in shaping its own diplomacy agenda, assuming international responsibility due to a big power in order to build a fairer and more reasonable international order and endeavoring to build a new, multilateral and issue-oriented diplomacy centering on “co-governance” and coupling with capability and responsibility.
1. China’s identity in the international system is confirmed that takes into account both Chinese interest and international expectation. a. China has shifted its international identity from “an outsider” or “a revolutionary” to “a participant”and “a constructor”. “China is a responsible country and Chinese people will remain trustworthy friends and reliable partners of the people of the world. China is a participant, defender and constructor of the international system”, pointed out by Premier Wen Jiabao.[32] China’s formal accession to WTO in 2001 marks China’s comprehensive participation into the current international system. China has made substantial and constructive contribution to the international system reform in the wake of 2008 financial crisis. China not only advocates the spirit of “pulling together in times of trouble to overcome difficulties”, puts forward principles and proposals including “comprehensive, balanced, incremental and effective development”, and steps up assistance to the developing countries, but also expedites its own transformation of development model in order to promote the global economic recovery.[33] b. China has generally completed the participation in the international system in all-directions, in broad areas and on deep levels. China has joined 130-some global and regional, governmental organizations, signed about 200,000 bilateral treaties and over 300 multilateral treaties covering areas of politics, economics, security, science, education, culture, health, etc. China’s access to the international system in a way that shifting from features of passivity, negative, and resistent in the period before the onset of reform and opening-up to features of active, preemptive, and integrated thereafter, and from bilateralism to multilateralism over the two periods, a tremendous change indeed.[34] c. China has tried to shape the sense and identity in common with those of the international community in its participation into the international system. The gaps of perspectives between China and international actors are narrowed. China’s awareness of international society has entrenched. For China, the international community is increasingly interdependent and mutually beneficial in the global era. China has done well in living up to the international treaties, and China’s socialization level is deepened. China has a strong political will in strengthening international cooperation and its foreign policy is highly cooperative.[35]
2. Constructive contribution has increasingly become the major content of China’s interaction with the outside world. a. As one of the core states that is shaping the forthcoming international system, China has revised the connotation of the international order. China is trying hard to call for building a peaceful, gradualist, multilateral, mutually beneficial, diversified, cooperative and co-prosperous, new international order, and proposed systematic initiatives of building a harmonious world aiming at stepping up the ideas of transforming the international system and global governance. Those initiatives include the notions that “China sticks to the concept of building a fair and just international order, the concept of mutually beneficial international development, the new security concept of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equal and coordination, the concept of international responsibility that allows proactivity and achievement, the concept of good-neighborly regional cooperation, and the concept of comprehensive national interest, and China pursues an actively defensive national defense policy and keeps prudent and cautious in handling international affairs.[36] In this process, China shall enrich the connotation of the multilateral diplomatic theory, widen the strategic planning of multilateral diplomacy and build up policy instruments of China’s multilateral diplomacy.
b. China comes up with new thinkings of China’s diplomacy in the new period. They regard the idea of a harmonious world as the core concept of China’s multilateral diplomacy; regard the new developmental concept--the scientific development in the constructions of politics, economics, culture, society and ecology--as the path to realize the peaceful development road with Chinese characteristics; regard building up China’s cultural, soft power--China’s developmental model, life style, cultural values and its endearing, appealing, influence and competitiveness to the world--as the necessary guarantee of shaping China’s relations with the world; regard launching public diplomacy and humanity diplomacy as major platform of promoting China’s new thinking and influencing international opinions; and regard joining and innovating international cooperation mechanisms as the institutional bolster to realize China’s new thinkings. All in all, with the advent of the new century, China’s new diplomatic thinking around the peaceful development with Chinese characteristics broke through the established theories of international relations and conventional mindset regarding the rise of great powers, and made an important contribution to the development of the 21st century international relations and global governance.[37]
c. China has pushed for the reforming and shaping of the regional and issue-oriented multilateral mechanisms, combined the long-term goals with short-term breakthroughs, seized the exceptional opportunities emerging from the international financial crisis, and regarded it as the priority realms for enhancing China’s participation in setting the international rules to enhance the capability of the international financial institutions in their response to the financial internationalization, and enhance discourse power and power of participation of the developing countries. At the same time, China has pushed for institutional cooperation with developing powers to create strategic environment and institutional guarantee for China’s peaceful development and deepened financial and economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region to enhance China’s capability and influence in participating in reforms of international financial and economic systems.
d. China has developed the economic diplomacy. By the strategic transition of economic diplomacy, China has integrated political and economic cooperation, synchronized cooperations both on the levels of states and regions, and developed a relatively complete system of both looking abroad for investment and attracting overseas investment in favor of China’s development strategy.

Source of documents：