Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has over the past decade grown from a baby new mechanism into a full-fledged multilateral, multifunctional, regional international organization witnessed by the international society. In fact, SCO and its founding are one of the most important post-Cold War events in the non-Western world in absolute terms. It created not only a new system but also a new way of thinking. It has laid a foundation for the improvement of inter-state and intra-regional relations, for the long-lasting sustainable development. The smooth development of SCO is not only due to its geopolitical logic, but also beyond the logic. Its success is first of all attributed to the success of construction of ideas. This is also where the drive of the its long-term development lies.
SCO is still in the inception of its development with plenty of outstanding problems. What will happen to the organization in the next decade or two, or even longer timeframe will largely depend on its institutional designation and the change of the situation in the region.
In terms of the medium and long-term development, the following factors will be most directly relevant.
First, How to Decern the Direction of the Development?
Definition and direction are the primary questions in front of SCO. Which one of the approaches the organization will opt for its integration: to dig the potential within the organization, or to rely on the participants within and without the region? Or have it both ways at once? The member states have reached consensus on the question, i.e., the enlargement of SCO should take into account of the acceptability of the new-born international, regional organization, as well as how enthusiastic is the applying state, and a fully judgment of the current state of the international and fregional situation in order to find a win-win games, though SCO members disagree to a large extent on the definition of openness.
SCO should make strategic choice between superficial prosperity and pragmatic cooperation. The most
important thing to SCO is whether it can avail the chance of integration to maintain and consolidate peace, stability and development of the Central Asia, to further improve the governance of the member states through internal reform and opening to the outside world, and to create better external environment for the good of the wellbeing of the nationals of member states.
Second, How to Boost Cooperation Efficiency?
At present, there are two obstacles to the cooperation efficiency of the SCO: 1, the competition within the multilateral cooperation mechanisms coexisting in Central Asia; 2, the diffusion of the very principle of consultation and consensus. As to the former, we can identify a strong centripetal force in the SCO on one hand, and on the other, SCO has a kind of centrifugal bent, e.g., the Central Asian members of SCO are also members of many integrated cooperation mechanisms. They are of multiple identities. The complexity and plurality of the cooperation mechanism give rise to the undesired consequence that adding transaction cost, and adding difficulty to the internal coordination of the SCO, both compromising the cooperation efficiency of the SCO. In addition, a paradox is appearing to the principle of consultation and consensus emphasized by SCO, i.e., a state of affair, “consultation and dissensus”, has appeared and will appear time and again.
Third, How to Condense and Clarify the Priority of the Direction of SCO?
We should not overestimate or underestimate SCO. SCO should not be all inclusive, comprising everything of cooperation into its own framework. Instead, it should focus on different breakthroughs in different stages of development. SCO should advance economic cooperation at the current stage as much as it advanced security cooperation at the previous stage years ago. The importance of security cooperation will recur when the U.S. and NATO are withdrawing troops from Afghanistan. From the point of view of the present stage, SCO cooperation is fairly modest either in terms of quantity or quality, which is incommensurate with the potential available to it.
Fourth, How to Further Consolidate the Collective Identity?
An international or regional cooperation organization with members of high regional identity will bring sustainable development and social psychological support to the organization and an efficiently operated organization thereupon will help to shape the inspiration of interest and policy orientation on the part of member states. The two will finally interact and realize common development and secure peace, stability and prosperity of the entire region. From this assumption, SCO member states’ regional identity is fairly primary. It is based mainly on the adjustment to the geopolitical and economic configuration in Eurasia, on the shift of international balance of power, and on the interest of member states. It is more of a knee-jerk reaction to the outside impacts by nature, which is increasingly explicit in the wake of the Western presence in Central Asia. Except the real sense of crisis to prevent non-traditional security threat like the “three devils” and to hedge against “color revolution” in maintaining the systemic security, SCO has yet to develop a regional identity with a sense of urgency and mission aimed at maintaining regional peace, stability and sustainable development. Especially, to most of the average populace of the Central Asian nations, SCO is something that “looks good but eats tasteless”.
This might be attributed to the hitherto institutional design and operation of the SCO. To the average people of the member states and the peripheries, SCO is more of a hefty and high-brow, geopolitical and geo-economical design, having little to do with the daily life of the populace. In other words, SCO should pay more attention to providing "public goods" kin to the populace of member states.
Fifth, How to Respond to Challenges to the Systemic Security of the Member States?
To the elites of the Central Asian countries, their strategic attention has focused on the following three issues of “systemic security” since the year 2003: 1. how to marginalize opposition forces, to consolidate the political status of the incumbent regimes and to prevent impacts similar to “color revolution”; 2. how to protect domestic security by combating the Islamic extremism and terrorism in the context of Islamic resuscitation; 3. how to accelerate their national economic development and prevent their economic lifeline from being controlled by other countries. It is the most recent change that the West might think of abandon the direct instrument of “color revolution” to turn to evolutionary change. The dramatic change in the Middle East and North Africa shows that the internal threat is gradually becoming the major challenge to the regimes of Central Asia, and may become the new risk of “revolution” in the context of the deteriorating situation in the neighboring Afghanistan.
Central Asia and the Middle East/North Africa share many similarities. It should not be ruled out that occasional factors might lead to explosion at any time. The SCO member states might enter into a development cycle of high risks and frequent visits of breaking events in terms of systemic security. This will have direct impact on the long-term development of SCO.
Sixth, How to Handle the China-Russia Competition and Cooperation Relations in Central Asia?
The core of the issues of the SCO is in a sense the issue about China and Russia. Sino-Russian coordination is key to further development of SCO. Along with the shift of international balance of power to China, Asia-Pacific and the emerging economies, comes the change of the Russia’s understanding of the SCO. Some of political forces in Russia tend to treat the future development of the organization from the point of view to "balance China of its growing influence in SCO. They are particularly worried that China will "use its economic prowess to strengthen its influence over the region and put priority to its own interest." whether China and Russia can further increase mutual trust and dispel mutual suspicion will directly determine the destination of SCO development.
Seventh, How to Respond to the Presence and Impacts of U.S. and the West as a whole?
The U.S. factor has been one of the most crucial external factors to the development of SCO. Entering into Central Asia is a part of the U.S. Global security strategy. Through its cultivation and advancement during the period around the 9/11 event, the U.S. political, economic and military influences over Central Asia has been amply accumulated. After its withdrawal from Afghanistan, the U.S. will predictably continue to influence Afghanistan more through political, economic and cultural means, though less through military means. Moreover, NATO, EU and OSCE will increase their presence in the region. Thus, in dealing with regional affairs, it is a tendency in the future to absorb partners including U.S. as many as possible. Therefore, the repeated “anti-West and anti-NATO” charges in the West on the SCO will collapse for sure, while SCO will even be more attractive to the outside world. Furthermore, in a broader international cooperation schedule, absorbing of U.S. and other outsiders to the regional cooperation in Central Asia should be based on their joint effort in address the issues of regional stability and challenges.
Eighth, How to Adapt to the Growing Subjectivity on the Part of Central Asian Countries?
The key is that major members like China and Russia should really regard Central Asian countries as the subject of regional affairs in Central Asia, rather than merely an object of great power games. The principle of treating states big and small as equal should be carried out in real terms. The Central Asian countries’ participation in SCO is largely aimed at profiting from the fast growth of China, while they can seek security protection and other interests by joining the rest of 20-some regional and international organizations. Most notably, Central Asians naturally share an apprehension to China, a fast rising power. It is beyond their anticipation that the Chinese influence in Central Asia, especially in economic and financial areas, is expanding so fast. Notwithstanding, Central Asians decline to see Russia to become the only dominant power in the region as well. It can be predicted that so long as the West does not want to overthrow the existing regimes, the cooperation between Central Asian countries and the West might witness a fast growing period. Thus, SCO should take into account this factor in its future development agenda and try to adapt to the factor preemptively.
Ninth, How to Respond to the Evolution of the Security Situation in Afghanistan?
Obama administration is advancing “the new Af-Pak strategy”, handing over “leadership and ownership” to Afghan government. At issue is whether the latter is able to overcome the crisis and realize national reconciliation, lest Taliban force come again. The development of the situation in Afghanistan in the next decade will directly hinge on the peace, stability and development of the SCO members.
It is not a difficult strategic decision for the SCO members as to the alternative choice intervention or not. It is a question of how. SCO has no direct military forces. Nor can it make a breakthrough in the near and medium term. In this sense, it is unrealistic to look forward to SCO in substituting for U.S. and NATO to undertake peace-keeping in Afghanistan directly. After all, the fate of Afghanistan is closely related to the fate of the countries in the region. The Afghan issue should by any means take an important place in the SCO development agenda of the next decade. 1. SCO should put forward its own Afghanistan strategy and an action platform in an appropriate time to express its own stance, viewpoint and vision on the Afghanistan issue in form of white paper. 2. SCO can actively take part in and advance the reconciliation process of Afghanistan, pushing forward the dialogue between Afghanistan government and Taliban. 3. SCO can put priority on pushing for Afghan economic reconstruction on the premise of SCO to participate in no military actions in Afghanistan in the foreseeable future.
All in all, some of the international media have been making various bad mouths on SCO for the last decade, though the reality has dismissed all the doubt, disparage and even containment on SCO as faint and pale. That Central Asia maintains relatively stable is primarily attributed to the presence and development of SCO. Just as the first secretary general of SCO Zhang Deguang put it, “we cannot imagine a Central Asia without SCO, a Eurasia without SCO and an international society without SCO.”
As for China, we believe that China and Russia should not and will not stand in the way of each other. They will certainly overcome various physical and metaphysical difficulties to succeed in realizing higher level of cooperation on one hand, and on the other, China should duly adjust its Central Asia policy in general, and in particular China should not conduct its cooperation with Central Asia only in the general framework of its Russia policy. China should instead pursue a more independent Central Asia policy on the basis of the innate coherency inside the respective developments of China and other members of SCO.

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