China and Vietnam has closely connected with one another for thousands of years, and the geographical destiny makes the two states staying together forever as neighbours. Sino-Vietnamese relationship, therefore, play an important part in both countries’ security, stability, and development. In recent years, Sino-Vietnamese relationship is also often highlighted in international media and researchers as an important factor in the territorial disputes in the South China Sea (SCS). Two most commonly asked questions are whether China would take advantage of its naval superiority to seize control of all structures in the SCS, and whether Vietnam would take side with other countries, including the US, to counter China.

The Global and Regional Context

As the second decade of the 21st century unfolded, the global financial crisis, started from 2008, has not been addressed. Many European countries including Greek, Italy, Portugal, and Spain have been struggling with high sovereign debts and high unemployment rates. The US has not yet recovered. The world economic crisis negatively affected export volumes of China and Vietnam, a key sector for the economic growth of both countries in the last ten years.

In security spheres, uncertainty and political instabilities are wide-spread around the world. Confrontation between the West and Iran for Teheran’s nuclear and missile programs is still at a high level. The Arab Spring revolutions started and spread in many countries in the Middle East and North Africa. In East Asia, tension in the Korean Peninsula escalates at times. Disputes in the SCS have more frequently been witnessed between claimants. Some non-claimant states, including the US, without taking side in the disputes, have clearly announced their national interest in the security of the SCS. US coming back to Asia, as stated in Hanoi in 2010 by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, definitely affects the regional configuration. Meanwhile, East Asia still lacks of a well established regional mechanism for states to deal with economic and security issues. Until now, ASEAN and ASEAN-led mechanisms such as East Asia Summit and ASEAN Regional Forum, not highly valued by many as effective mechanisms, are the only multilateral backbones for regional multilateral cooperation in East Asia.

Against the context of global economic crisis and political instability in many areas of the world, China and Vietnam continue to enjoy political stability and high economic growth rates that they have had during the last decades. At the same time, Beijing and Hanoi also need to deal with social, political, and economic problems, arising as the natural side-effect of the policies which give priority to high economic growth. These issues include the widening gaps between the regions and between the rich and the poor, the social changes, environmental pollution, economic structural transformation, and corruptions. If these problems are not properly handled, the leadership of Chinese and Vietnamese governments and the legitimacy of Chinese Communist Party and Vietnamese Communist Party will all be challenged.

An Overview of Sino-Vietnamese Relations

Both China and Vietnam see sovereignty, political stability, economic growth, and social development, which are mutually reinforcing, as top priority goals for their policy formulations. For these goals to be realised, in the external relations sphere, the two countries need a stable security environment enabling them to invest more resources to look for opportunities to generate domestic economic growth.

In carrying out this policy orientation, at the threshold of the new millennium, China and Vietnam reached an important agreement on land border demarcation in 1999. One year later, in 2000, a bilateral deal on demarcation in the Gulf of Tonkin were signed. The two agreements remove a significant barrier for the bilateral relations. Since then, Sino-Vietnamese ties have been strengthened. The two countries have strong political connections in both government to government and party to party terms. In 2000, at the joint statement on the comprehensive cooperation in the new century, Vietnam and China announced their political will to become “good neighbours, good friends, good comrades, and good partners”. Bilateral high level exchanges have regularly organised.

In economic sphere, within ten years, Sino-Vietnamese trade soared from roughly 3 billion US dollars in 2001 to over 30 billion US dollars in 2011. China is now Vietnamese largest trading partner and one of the top investors in Vietnam. Bilateral trade, however, is not balanced. Vietnam experienced a large deficit of around 13 billion US dollars annually in 2010 and 2011. The two countries are members of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA).

The most sticky issue for the two countries in the years to come, however, is the territorial disputes in the SCS. Although China and Vietnam have finished their border demarcation in the land and in the Gulf of Tonkin, the SCS, also contested by Brunei, Malaysia, and the Philippines in some areas, has not been delimitated. If not properly handled, this could be a potential source for bilateral quarrel and conflicts in the future.

Territorial Dispute in the SCS: the Problem of Different Perception

One could assert that claimants in the SCS may cooperate for a mutual benefit in joint development agreements. Territorial disputes, however, are often not an absolute win-win game. Such issues, therefore, often take long time and are difficult to resolve. For example, the two Sino-Vietnamese border demarcation agreements in 1999 and 2000 took decades to be finalised. The win-win situation in the SCS territorial dispute, therefore, could pragmatically be understood as avoiding a deteriorating situation in the immediate future and gradually reaching to a consensus acceptable for all parties.

China and Vietnam have significantly different positions in the claims in the SCS. China claims all the structures in the SCS and officially submitted its nine-dash line claim to the United Nations in 2009. Vietnam rejected Chinese position, stating that it has strong historical and legal basis to prove its sovereignty over the Paracels (Xisha Islands) and the Spratlys (Nansha Islands). While the problem of overlapping claims may, without any doubt, take years, or even decades to be resolved; the more urgent concern is the increasing frequency of incidents involving the two countries in various issues in the SCS. Exchanges of denunciation between China and Vietnam intensified during the serious cases of Chinese cutting of Vietnamese petroleum exploration ships’ cables in May and June 2011. Tensions over fishing-related issues can be heard in the media almost every month, raising the feeling of an unstable security environment in the SCS.

While Chinese and Vietnamese governments are trying to resolve the disputes in the SCS, the misinformation and difference of perceptions and interpretations could be major factors dividing the two peoples. The Chinese felt hurt when Chinese television broadcasted Vietnamese demonstration in the Chinese embassy and consulate in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City respectively during and after the Chinese cable cutting incidents in 2011. They argue that Chinese people do not demonstrate in front of any Vietnamese diplomatic agencies in China although Vietnam ‘steals’ petroleum from China in the SCS. They are also unhappy with the belief that Vietnam, having received significant Chinese support during its struggle for independence after the World War II, intends to ally with the US to internationalise the SCS issue and counter China, which seeks status-quo and joint development in the SCS. The messages carried in the media are “Don’t play with fire”  and “Time to teach [Vietnam] a lesson” .

On their part, Vietnamese felt painful to hear frequent reports on the incidents, in which large Chinese vessels, including those from Chinese authorities, attacking much smaller Vietnamese fishing boats in the SCS. For many Vietnamese people, China is making use of its growing economic wealth and military power to be more assertive in the territorial dispute in the SCS. The areas for petroleum exploration are well within Vietnamese exclusive economic zones and they could not be considered contested areas. Although no demonstration in China against Vietnam, a Chinese famous online forum (sina.com) in 2008 released a strategy with detailed map, showing a master military plan to conquer Vietnam within 31 days.

Vietnamese people, who have fought thousands of years against some world’s most powerful powers only to gain its own independence, understand the value of peace and are strongly resentful to the phrase “teach somebody a lesson” because it reminds about the confrontation period of Sino-Vietnamese relationship in the current history. Hanoi has also experienced the major power relations and inter-relations, and therefore, does not see it Vietnam’s national interest to ally with one country to counter the other. Vietnamese petroleum exploration in the SCS is in the non-disputable areas well within Vietnamese Exclusive Economic Zone.

Fostering Mutual Understanding for Peace and Security in the SCS

A significant similarity in the mindset of Chinese and Vietnamese people is that they both consider themselves as “victims” and play a reactive role in the escalated tension in the SCS. This poses significant challenge for their respective governments in their negotiation because they cannot appear to be weak in protecting national interests. This means that the extreme nationalist sentiments in both China and Vietnam have impact on the leadership in their resolving the dispute in the SCS.

China and Vietnam have gone through some thousand years of relations of ups and downs, from brotherhood to confrontation. The long history only highlights the fact that, for whatever reasons, conflicts do not benefit any party. Extremist nationalism is a barrier for peace and stability. Finding a peaceful solution to deal with Sino-Vietnamese territorial dispute in the SCS in the broader context of disputes in the SCS is critical for the two countries’ development.

As previously discussed, despite of some lingering issues, China and Vietnam are enjoying a stable and strong connections in both economic and political spheres. In order to further strengthen these relations and make progress in dealing with the SCS issue, the most important duty is to promote mutual trust, which can only be built in the first place through similar interpretation of truth. More exchanges between scholars and especially journalists may enable the two sides to better understand the positions and concerns over the issue of the other side. They will play an important part in connecting the two governments and two peoples by helping avoid misinformation and miscalculation, and foster more rational approaches towards the resolution of the dispute. This will lessen the possibility for the extreme nationalism to drive the two societies apart.

At the same time, respective governments must show their strong political will to avoid complicating the issue. The safety and security of fishers in the SCS are gaining special attention of the whole community in both China and Vietnam, and this will determine the attitude of the one society towards the other. This means two things. First, no violence against fishers in the SCS such as shooting and sinking fishery ships should be tolerated. Second, China and Vietnam should consider cooperation in fishery industry as a breaking point for deepening bilateral cooperation in the SCS. Only by having political determination and making concrete efforts can the spirit of joint development be realised.

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