I. China’s Global Strategy and View of UN Security Council

As an ancient saying goes, China is an old civilized nation endowed with new missions. It vividly depicts the subtlety embedded in China’s pursuit of the goal of reemerging as a global power. On the one hand, being the second largest country in terms of aggregate economic output and the top exporter in the world, China has acquired greater capacity in imposing influence on international affairs. Yet on the other side, China is still in search of a self-identity in the international community as well as a clear global strategy and foreign policy goal.

The first step of China’s attempt in forging a global strategy was manifested in its clarification of core national interests in recent years. As then President Hu Jintao announced in July 2009, China’s diplomacy must “safeguard the interests of sovereignty, security, and development”. Laterly, the former State Councilor Dai Bingguo further specified the core national interests into three aspects: China’s political stability; sovereign security, territorial integrity, and national unification; and China’s sustainable economic and social development.[①] Such an explicit specification is conducive to the forming of a national interest-based global strategy.

Now the two aspects of the global strategy have gradually come into shape, that is, the worldview reflecting evolving trend toward a multipolar world and the prudential management of major power relations with a view to reducing misperceptions and addressing common challenges. First, China’s worldview is mainly based on observations from two aspects. One is the global power shifting from west to east and from established to emerging powers. Another is the interconnectedness and interdependence of global issues.

In its eleventh section of the Report of the 18th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, it made an assessment on the characteristics of the current international system and the evolving direction of global order. It said that “peace and development remain the prevailing current trends. The global trends toward multi-polarity and economic globalization are deepening.”[②] This means that China still see the current global situation as amicable to both China’s development and the forging of international peace.

With the rising of non-western powers, the power balance has changed a little toward more even distribution of influence among major powers. The United States, while still being the only superpower in the world, behaves more like the “first among equals” with its power limited by the complexity of various types of threats and crises. The assessment of decline of American power is definitely overestimated. The point is that no single country could ever be equipped with enough capacity in handling various crises and conflicts around the world alone, however powerful it would be. Instead, a multipolar world with intense dialogues and consultations among the major powers may be a better way to address various types of challenges and threats. Under this circumstance, a wise and effective approach to managing major power relations is critical to the stability of the international system and smoothness of transition process, which is of particular importance to the relationship between the two major powers of China and the United States.

In February 2012, the then Vice President Xi Jinping called for “a new type of relationship between major countries in the 21st century”. The subsequent interpretation and enunciation by senior Chinese officials gradually formed a new Chinese idea presented to manage major power relations. The “new type of major power relationship”, as elaborated by Chinese Ambassador to the United States Cui Tiankai, is “based on mutual respect and aims to achieve win-win cooperation. Mutual respect means that both sides are willing to listen to each other's voice, understand each other, put us into each other's shoes and accommodate each other's comfort level. Win-win cooperation means that both sides should determine to abandon ‘zero-sum’ game, welcome each other’s success and try to find opportunities from the other's success.”[③] On another occasion, he also mentioned that this new type of relationship is also the shared responsibility of the two countries to the global community.[④] As a brief sum-up, the gist of this new idea is to emphasize mutual respect, mutual understanding, cooperation, and appropriate management of differences and disputes in bilateral relations, as well as common responsibility to the global community in vindication of international peace and good order.

Another critical element in China’s global strategy relates to China’s vision of its own power and global influence. David Shambaugh may have some credits for assigning China as still only a partial power, lacking in many aspects the necessary elements for a full global power. “China is present and active in various parts of the globe and in various functional spheres – but is not (yet) influencing or shaping actors or events in various parts of the world.”[⑤] This may be a little over-exaggerated by downplaying China’s great efforts invested in “quiet diplomacy”.

However, one unique Chinese characteristic in comparison to rising powers in history has definitely restraint China’s ambition of greater international clout. The fact is that China will still be a relatively poor country for a long time with its per capita income far below that of the developed countries, even if its gross economic output could outpace that of the United States. China is becoming a “powerful but poor” major power, which will definitely have long-term impact on China’s foreign policy and international behaviors.

China used to strictly stick to the guidance of “keeping low profile while playing a role in certain international affairs”, which means that China is comfortable with its inconspicuous role in world affairs and always puts the priority on domestic economic development. China’s voting records in this period could in some way be a demonstration of China’s reluctance to get involved into time- and resource- consuming efforts in managing international crises. According to statistics acquired from the Security Council voting records during the period of 1991 to 2005, China had abstained in 51 Security Council resolutions during the voting process, which made China the permanent member using most abstention votes in this period. These votes were mainly made in the 1990s. Since 2000 China has substantially reduced its use of abstention votes.[⑥] The abstention votes vividly manifest China’s “principled pragmatism” in the Security Council deliberation process. In one way, China never easily back off on issues in connection with principles it has been adhered to. In the meantime it has always been ready to make compromises and just signaling its discontent with certain part of the resolutions via the abstention votes. This behavioral model is mainly out of two considerations, that is, the concern for keeping the Security Council moving on and not being blocked and a clear mind of China’s limited capacity and influence in global affairs.

However, with a rapidly rising comprehensive national capacity, there have been hot debates on the appropriateness in continuing to hold on to this idea of “keeping low profile” inside China at both the academic and governmental levels. Recently one Chinese scholar advocated the idea of “Creative involvement” for China’s foreign policy. It emphasizes leadership, initiative, and constructiveness in China’s diplomacy.[⑦] Yet China’s official statements still keep a more prudential stance by making certain change to this guiding principle while still adhering to it. Now it is elaborated as “keeping low profile while playing a proactive role in certain international affairs”. This clearly shows China’s efforts in weighing a nuanced balance between its focus on domestic priority and the needs to increase its international clout.

While China is now having a global strategy in the making, the United Nations Security Council has become the critical organ for promoting such a strategy. Despite the history of being one of the founding members of the United Nations, the People’s Republic of China did not get its lawful representative seat as the legitimate government of China at the UN as well as the Security Council until 1971.

Yet the late coming has not reduced China’s support for the Council’s work as a permanent member. Actually the Council had been one of the few multilateral forums China could play a relatively influential role in the past two or three decades. In participating various multilateral forums, China mainly pursues the following policy goals. First is to defend China’s national interests through multilateral forums. Second is to, engage major powers in the world, in particular the United States. Third is to, address international or transnational threats to peace and security. In this way, China hopes that the Council could be better prepared for evolving power configuration and changing natures of global challenges.

In this globalized world, the challenges to mankind manifest the characteristics of multiplicity and complexity. So the Council is faced with tougher job by focusing on the interconnectedness and interdependence of all these challenges and threats. On the other hand, the rise of emerging powers and relatively weakening of the established Western powers have in effect made this world more fragmented, crowded, and also more heterogeneous. The heterogeneity is reflected in the weakened global consensus on the role and power of the UN, especially in the security area. In the past, the United States can transform its own hegemonic interest into the collective will of the United Nations Security Council by dominating the agenda-setting and decision-making process of the Security Council.[⑧] However, in parallel with the undergoing power shift, the attempts of the western powers to infiltrating the UN with Western concepts and ideas have been met with great resistance from the emerging powers, with the great debates arising from NATO military intervention in Libya being just a case in point. It also means that various countries need to have more open and candid dialogues and consultation, with the aim of forging a new global consensus of equity, fairness, and inclusiveness. During this process, the interaction between China and the US in the Council with a view to building the new type of major power relationship is definitely critical to the Council’s ability to continue to play a crucial role in maintaining international peace and security.

II. China’s Principled Pragmatism in the UN Security Council

2.1, China’s Evolving View on State Sovereignty and Non-Interference

In the wake of the end of Cold War, the concept of sovereignty has become the target of suspicion and criticism all the times. The rediscovery of international human rights and rapid emergence of international criminal law has even aggravated the decline of sovereignty. The successful integration of the European Union also gave people around the world such unrealistic expectation of the existence of supranational organizations or civitas maxima.

In China’s view, today’s world is still mainly dominated by sovereign states, with sovereignty being the essential element in statehood. It is usually referred to as the combination of domestic authority and independence in the international community. Yet China’s perception of state sovereignty has undergone great change in recent years, which has led China to turn more in the thinking of moderate sovereignty rather than absolutist sovereignty. In the history of international politics, the absolutist sovereignty doctrine had dominated the discourse on sovereignty. This doctrine originated from Jean Bodin’s Les Six livres de la République (1576), arguing for the indivisible sovereignty as an embodiment of unrestrained sovereign will. Sovereign states can only be bound by the rules accepted with their voluntary self-restraint actions. Just as Lauterpacht pointed out, prior to the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War of 1928, by availing itself of its unlimited right to declare war the State could gain entire freedom from these restraints and acquire the right to treat its neighbor thus attacked as a veritable caput lupinum to the point of legally permissible annihilation through conquest and annexation.[⑨] In the wake of the end of the WWII, the Charter of the United Nations explicitly stipulated a general prohibition on the use of force, which had deprived the sharpest weapon of the absolutist shibboleth. Sovereignty today is regarded more and more as falling within the bounds defined by the principles and rules of international law.

Traditionally state sovereignty has usually been enunciated in terms of basic rights of states. However, recently there has been a new interpretation of sovereignty from the perspective of responsibility with the coming up of the concept of “responsibility to protect” (R2P) and its subsequent adoption by the 2005 World Summit Outcome.

The new perspective of Sovereignty as Responsibility brings fresh interpretation of sovereignty. It means that sovereignty manifests itself as the combination of rights and responsibilities both at home and abroad. Domestically, sovereignty originates from the conferment of peoples of the nation, which means that the foremost important task of sovereignty is to protect its peoples from myriads of dangers and threats, as well as taking respective accountability for damages caused to its peoples. Internationally, sovereignty is empowered by international law, which means it’s obligated to abide by the principles, rules and institutions of international law, and assume state responsibility for international delicts.

Seeing sovereignty as responsibility helps us to better understand the inherent nature and scope of sovereignty. In general terms China has not opposed to the new interpretation of sovereignty as responsibility since it coincides in a way with China’s gradual recognition of sovereignty not as an absolutist doctrine. However, there is still a great division surrounding the potential implication for intervention. In his report on responsibility to protect as of 2009, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon enunciated the three pillars of this concept. The first pillar places the primary and perpetual responsibility on states in protecting their own nationals from grave crimes such as genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. The second pillar advocates for the duty of the international community in providing assistance to national governments with a view to better and effective protection.

Both the first and second pillars bode well for China’s ideas and perception since it still puts national sovereignty at the priority and central place. The most controversial one is the third pillar which demands the international community to take timely and decisive actions to address the failures of national governments in protection, when some of these governments are “unwilling” or “unable” to honor its responsibility to protect the peoples. China has been showing its great suspicion and criticism of the third pillar, since it may inevitably lead to coercive intervention measures taken by powerful countries over internal affairs of weak countries. There is also another aspect of sovereignty as responsibility which is sometimes ignored by some proponents but attached with great importance by China, that is, the building of a responsible sovereignty. This point may deviate a little too far from the views regarding sovereignty as an obsolete concept. Yet recent developments in international affairs have shown the resilience of sovereignty as a basic political and legal governance institution. For most countries and peoples the configuration of sovereignty provides basic guarantee for their rights of independent choice of political, economic and social development path fitting well with local cultural tradition and social norms, and also a shield from unwarranted outside interference and interruption. So China views the strengthening of national sovereignty as a necessary element for effective global governance.

On the other hand, China’s changing view on the nature of sovereignty also leads to the re-interpretation of non-interference principle. As for its legal source, the non-interference principle under contemporary international law is mainly defined by Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter, which says not to “intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state”. Parallel with the development of the concept of sovereignty, the Non-interference Principle should also be put under the constraint of international law. The application of this principle mainly depends on how to interpret “essentially within the domestic jurisdiction” as well as the authoritative source in interpreting, implementation, and intervention.

First, according to Article 2(7), its application should not prejudice the effect of Chapter 7 on the maintenance of international peace and security. The practices of the Security Council in the post-Cold War era show that, it has expanded greatly the scope of application for Chapter 7 through the broader interpretation of the terms of “acts constituting breach of or threats to peace”, which under many circumstances has been applied to the situation of civil wars and gross humanitarian crises. There are some basic elements under consideration while authorizing international intervention, such as the protection of civilians in armed conflicts, the level of humanitarian crisis, spillover effect of civil wars, and the treaty or other legal obligations undertaken by relevant countries. In recent years, China has gradually stepped away from a rigid position concerning intervention measures to a qualified consent to certain well-articulated cases. China’s consent is always accompanied with the legal belief that resolutions of the UN Security Council don’t have the status of precedents, since the Security Council always takes a case-by-case approach. What’s more important, as the executive organ of the UN, it lacks the capacity to legislate even for the UN, not to mention to erect new rules of international law. As far as the legitimacy and authoritativeness of intervention is concerned, the Security Council is always in a better position to assume the role as a legitimate international intervener based on the power conferred by the UN Charter, which established the Security Council as the primary UN organ responsible for maintaining international peace and security and also made the Council’s action under Chapter 7 binding on all UN member States.

In addition, it’s also worth noting that the role of relevant regional organizations has been rising. With the enhanced institution- and capacity-building in regional organizations around the globe, they have become a critical actor in the process of deliberation and implementation of intervention actions. Bearing in mind the existence of such a distinction between the global and regional level actions, China sometimes has a dichotomy of matters appropriate for measures taken at the regional or global level. In the past, China has argued that certain country-specific cases in the Council’s deliberation may better be put under respective regional arrangements instead of being dealt with at the Council level, such as the cases of Myanmar, North Korea, Zimbabwe, etc. In practice China has proved to be all the more an active player at the regional or sub-regional level in Asia.

As the precondition and basis for resolutions and actions of the UN Security Council and various regional organizations, the process of consensus-building before any decisions taken should always be assigned with a central role. In 2003, the American unilateral military actions against Iraq without explicit Security Council authorization had not only caused great damage to the authoritativeness and legitimacy of UN collective security system, but also undermined the legal and moral basis of humanitarian intervention actions. As political commentator David Rieff writes, “Regime change – its moral legitimacy and political practicality – is the ghost at the banquet of humanitarian intervention.”[⑩] The subsequent developments in Libya after the Security Council Resolution 1973 had provided another direct lesson for many UN members, including China and Russia. The resolution authorized the establishment of a “no-fly zone” in certain areas of Libya for the purposes of protecting civilians and securing humanitarian access. However, with the legitimacy for military actions derived from the authorization of the resolution, military forces of those countries intervening in Libya had wantonly set aside the primary purpose of the resolution while launching military campaign, ultimately replacing the mandate of “protection of civilians” with the target of “regime change”.

Based on the lessons learned from the case of Libya, China has established a firm stance on the Syria issue. China maintains that the Council should not take hasty decisions under Chapter 7 before it can have clear knowledge and judgment of the actual situation and changing direction in Syria. The Council’s resolutions should take full account of regional peace and stability and its impact on specific countries. The involvement of the Council should be tasked with the goal of seeking a widely-supported political and diplomatic solution, not that of changing arbitrarily the national government and its domestic political process. “Operations involving the protection of civilians must be authorized by the Security Council and carried out in an orderly manner under the auspices of the United Nations. No party should arbitrarily interpret Security Council resolutions; no actions overstepping Council mandates should be allowed.”[11]

Based on these considerations, China vetoed three draft resolutions on Syria (S/2011/612, S/2012/77 and S/2012/538). However, on 20 July 2013, one day after the latest draft resolution having been vetoed, the Resolution 2059 was adopted unanimouly to authorize the renewal of the mandate for United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) for another 30 days.[12] This was a clear rebuttal to the allegations of a paralyzed Council on the Syria issue due to vetoes by China and Russia. Instead, the mediation efforts by the UN and Arab League have never stopped, shown by the activities of UN/Arab League Joint Envoy and International Action Group on Syria. China always hails and supports the efforts made at different levels in search of a political solution to Syrian crisis.

Now there seems to be at least certain consensus on addressing the Syrian crisis with most countries seeing political solution as the only feasible way. The Council members need to have close consultations among themselves as well as with stake-holding countries in the settlement of this crisis. In sum, it has always been China’s stance that the Council should always be cautious in authorizing international intervention and the coercive intervention measures should not become regular business of the Council with military actions always being the exceptional last resort.

2.2, China’s increasing contribution to UN Peacekeeping

In the past several decades, China has shown great change in attitudes toward UN peacekeeping operations. At the beginning, China viewed peacekeeping as another instrument used by hegemonic powers to legitimize and support their actions of expanding sphere of influence and interfering into domestic affairs of many small and medium-sized countries. To some extent, this view had succinctly reflected the fierce competition for dominance and control between the two superpowers. Since the end of the Cold War, China gradually recognized the contribution of peacekeeping in maintenance of peace and stability under new circumstances.

The Hammarskjold Principles of consent-based, neutrality and non-use of force except for self-defense also fitted well into China’s adherence to non-interference principle. Since then China has become a firm vindicator of these principles to be applied in peacekeeping operations. In the Council’s resolutions concerning peacekeeping operations in the 1990s, China made in general a dichotomy between different types of peacekeeping operations. It has opposed those operations that have deviated from the traditional peacekeeping principles and has supported those operations that have upheld these principles.[13]

Yet China had been reluctant to directly send troops to join the operations until the end of the 1990s. Such kind of hesitance ended with a complete turn of attitudes. As one Chinese scholar observes, “the year of 1999 marked the beginning of a new era for China’s participation in UNPKO. Beijing’s increasing commitment to UNPKO can be witnessed through its deliberate efforts in improving its training capabilities, increased participation in international cooperation and exchange activities, and ever-increasing contribution of both military and police units.”[14]

China’s changing attitudes were closely connected to its perception of national interests and foreign policy goals. China’s security and development interests now have become inseparable from its overseas interests. The protection of China’s overseas interests has included various policy concerns, such as the protection of overseas Chinese, securing of stable energy supplying sources, ensuring the safety of maritime transportation lanes, etc. What’s more important, the UN-sponsored peacekeeping operations provided China with the means and channels to exert global influence. As an emerging power in this interdependent world, the path for China’s rise is definitely completely different from the rising paths of the old powers. China needs to manage its rising path in a more peaceful and orderly way. In terms of management and resolution of international conflicts, China’s role manifests more in the use of multilateral platforms, the focus on political and diplomatic measures, and the stress on involvement and consent of all relevant parties.

The UN-sponsored peacekeeping operations just provide the most appropriate tools for China’s policy considerations. China now has become the largest troop-contributing country among the P5 in the Council, the largest contributing country of engineering corps, logistical support units, and medical teams among all the troop-contributing countries, and largest contributor of assessment to UN peacekeeping operations among developing countries. In practice, China always argues that the peacekeeping operations should be conducted in a way conducive to dealing with the root causes of conflicts and forging solid base for subsequent large-scale rebuilding work. Up to now China has only dispatched non-combating troops to join peacekeeping forces, with engineering corps and medical teams constituting the major components of Chinese peacekeepers. This reflects to some extent China’s worry about the risk of peacekeeping troops being endowed with too much power of using force. Yet in practice the non-combating feature of Chinese peacekeepers has become a unique advantage and contribution to peacekeeping operations. Just as Bates Gill and Huang has observed, Chinese peacekeepers are consistently rated among the most professional, well-trained, effective and disciplined contingents in UN peacekeeping operations. Assessments of Chinese peacekeepers’ performance are generally positive.[15]

However, with the rising complexity of both the international and domestic environment for peacekeeping operations, the differences surrounding the guiding peacekeeping principles also loom large. These principles have been the guiding principles and remain the corner stone of UNPKOs. Yet western countries have endeavored to expand the scope of conflict situations applicable for peacekeeping operations, with the intention of including confrontational conflict situation into the scope of peacekeeping operations so as to expand the power of peacekeeping forces in terms of using force. Sometimes it just turns out to be a robust peace enforcement action rather than peacekeeping operation. Showing strong suspicion to such a worrisome trend, emerging powers insist that peacekeeping operations should remain in the field of neutral stance to prevent escalation of inter-state or intra-state conflicts. The peacekeeping forces should not have too large scope of power in terms of using force and interfering into domestic affairs of host states. In resonance with the views of other emerging power, China has been arguing for a principle-driven peacekeeping operation. The current expansive mandate for peacekeepers will definitely cause great damage to the impartiality of peacekeeping missions, which has long been the unique advantage of peacekeeping operations. By sticking to impartiality, peacekeeping missions can set the condition for further political and diplomatic measures to consolidate the peace process.

Another related concern is the potential casualty ensued if peacekeeping troops are getting more and more involved into civil conflicts and become a party to the conflicts. Any unexpected casualty of Chinese peacekeepers may lead to a U-turn of China’s attitudes toward peacekeeping since it is of great concern to the Chinese Government and people to secure the safety of Chinese troops. In this vein, China also urges the Council to further clarify mandates of peacekeeping missions. This can both define clear scope of maneuver for peacekeeping missions and help the Council scheduling a clear timetable for the exit of peacekeeping missions as well as transition to peacebuilding process.

2.3, China’s Advocacy for Preventive Diplomacy in Regional Arrangements

During the past decade, China has been experimenting in both the ideas and institutions of preventive diplomacy at the regional or sub-regional level. This may be seen as one important manifestation of China’s embrace of more flexible and updated approach toward the non-interference principle.

In the past, Chinese officials and academics held a negative view on the concepts of conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy, since this may mean that Western countries could use their prevailing economic, political and military advantages to interfere arbitrarily into domestic affairs of many developing countries. Since preventive diplomacy demands preliminary intervention at the risk of potential conflicts, which means the pre-judgment of political, economic and social risks and threats hidden inside relevant countries, this may constitute an arbitrary interference into domestic affairs.

However, the impacts of contemporary conflicts or crises tend to become more perplexed and long term-oriented, China has to rethink its negative attitude toward conflict or crisis prevention with its interests inextricably connected with crises outside of China. The major developments in this aspect mainly manifest in the institutional building of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). In the wake of Kyrgyzstan’s “tulip revolution” and Ukraine’s “orange revolution” in 2005, China saw the great need for regional collective preventive measures to address internal turmoil and conflicts breaking out in its neighboring countries. The SCO became the best candidate in handling related issues. In 2006, the Regulations on Observer Mission from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization at Presidential and/or Parliamentary Elections as well as Referendums was adopted. Since then the election observer missions from SCO member countries have been regularly sent to monitor and ensure a smooth and uninterrupted election process.

China actively joined such joint efforts in securing the peaceful operation of political elections of member countries. In the 2012 SCO Beijing Summit, SCO members made some revisions and supplements to the Regulations on Political and Diplomatic Measures and Mechanism of Response to Events Jeopardizing Regional Peace, Security and Stability first adopted in 2009, so as to better reflect and address changing threats and challenges to internal stability of member countries. The revised version incorporated such measures as joint early warning, crisis management, and protection of evacuation of foreigners. The Joint Declaration of Beijing Summit also made special reference to the guiding principles related to the above-mentioned measures. It stressed that, “regional affairs should be settled through the consultation among relevant countries and organizations in the region. It is up to the countries in this region to decide on the specific cooperation methods and mechanisms to maintain regional security and stability.” “If there exist situations constituting threats to peace, stability, and security of certain member country or the whole region, SCO member countries will take respective political and diplomatic measures stipulated by relevant regulations, with a view to handling crises promptly and appropriately.”[16]

In East Asia, China has often shown due respect for ASEAN’s role of leadership in initiative-making and agenda-setting. All the related parties have emphasized the importance of comfortableness throughout the whole negotiation process, the aim of which is to better adapt to the diversity and differences in terms of cultural, social, and economic development. In 2001, the ASEAN Regional Forum elaborated the Eight Key Principles of Preventive Diplomacy. These principles emphasized the use of diplomatic and peaceful methods such as diplomacy, negotiation, enquiry, mediation, and conciliation; use of non-coercive measures without military action and use of force; settlement through consultation and consensus; voluntarily-based; and the respect for sovereign equality, territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of State.[17] These principles have been upheld and observed from time to time in the process of crisis prevention. One of the flashpoints arising from these principles is the confidence-building measures (CBM) among many countries in the region. In 2002, China and ASEAN member countries signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which had become an important step forward in China’s practice of preventive diplomacy in this region. In 2011, in the wake of a tragic incident in Mekong river, China together with Thailand, Laos, and Myanmar launched the joint patrol along the Mekong river, which could also be seen as a small step for China’s preventive diplomacy practice. This also shows clearly China’s preference for preventive diplomacy at the regional or sub-regional level, since it’s always China’s belief that such practices are better prepared for regional arrangements rather than the Security Council.

III. China’s Considerations on Enhancing the Council’s Effectiveness and Efficiency

The United Nations has long been plagued by the concerns about efficiency and effectiveness. There needs further reform on the institutional framework and working approaches of the UN agencies, with the aim of adapting the UN to a more pluralized and fast-changing world. Therefore, China supports necessary and reasonable reforms to the Security Council so that it will enjoy more authority and efficiency and better fulfill the responsibilities for maintaining international peace and security bestowed on it by the Charter of the United Nations.[18]

The reform of Security Council needs to address the issues existing in current Council’s work, such as the pace and capacity in response to crisis and conflicts, involvement of non-Council members into its work, clarification of Council’s scope of competence, etc. China’s major position manifests in two aspects.

First, the priority of Council reform should be the increase of representation of developing countries and granting more space for small and medium-sized countries to get involved into Council’s deliberation process. The goal of equitable geographic distribution should be achieved with special reference to the representation of different civilizations and cultures. The voices and representation of African countries must be increased. China will never support any reform draft failing to win widespread support from African countries.

Second, the Council reform is closely connected to the future role of the UN and common interests of all members. There needs deep consultation among all the members so as to accumulate wide consensus. Given the broad agenda of the Security Council reform, it is important to continue with democratic and patient consultations to accommodate the interests and concerns of all parties, seek a package solution and reach the broadest possible agreement. In China’s view, the existing great division among different groups in relation to Council reform has shown clearly that, instead of rushing for a vote which will definitely make countries around the world more split, a widespread consultation process is desperately in need. The Security Council reform is closely connected with the transformation of collective security regime established under the UN Charter and with the Security Council as the critical organ. So this reform is definitely not just concerned with changes in the composition of membership and working methods, but also more about various contentious issues in relation to basic principles and ideas of international relations and law. A global consensus of both major powers and various middle and small countries around the world is urgently needed to smoothly advance such reform.

One critical issue is about the role and future of veto powers of permanent members. The practices of using vetoes in Security Council deliberation during the post-Cold War period have shown at least two aspects of positive change. It has been only used in the circumstances of non-procedural matters. In the meantime, whether certain issue belongs to procedural matters has usually been decided by the President of Security Council with the consensus of all members, which means that the worries about “double veto” power prove to be overstated. The recent practices of permanent members also show that they are more prudential in terms of veto powers. This power has actually become a kind of deterrence power in the hands of permanent members. It will not be used so often, but only as a potential restraining tool over others’ foreign policies and actions. In this way it may prompt the members of the Security Council to take more efforts in reaching compromises and certain extent of consensus through the channel of informal consultation. This actually just reflects the intention of the drafters of UN Charter in setting up veto power. It was intended to maintain appropriate balances and mutual restraint among major powers so as to promote the dialogue, consultation, and consensus building process among major powers. A brief survey of the history of the UN and post-war international relations will show that it actually depends on the smoothness in operation of concert of major powers among permanent members to decide whether the Security Council can play its critical role in international security.

At the beginning of the 1990s, the post-Cold War international system was just in the process of restructuring, while the consultations and concerts among the permanent members had greatly advanced the unity within the Council. It finally got released of the status of “dysfunction” and played a critical leading role in addressing various regional crises and conflicts. However, while the United States and some developed states were getting more tilted toward unilateral use of force in addressing regional conflicts, such as NATO’s air campaign in Kosovo, “war on terror”, and America’s invasion into Iraq, the concert of major powers in the Council again fell into impasse. Currently the Security Council is faced with a new dilemma in addressing myriads of turmoil and conflicts inside many MENA countries. It has been shown by past practices that only when the permanent members of the Security Council respect one another’s substantial interests and concerns, can the Council as well as the whole UN system be raised to its best effects and function. That said, we also need to bear in mind the increasing contribution of small and medium-sized countries in terms of initiative making and conceptual innovation. A properly drafted Council reform should definitely be an inclusive approach with concerns of non-major power countries being addressed.

In sum, the Council now is faced with great representation and effectiveness problem in search of an overhaul. Emerging powers and developing countries should have more voices and influence in the Council’s work. Yet the concert of permanent members is still critical to the Council’s smooth operation, with the veto rights becoming certain kind of bedrock to ensure the Council stay on course. This inequality in voting rights can only be eliminated when the international community has really developed to a much sophisticated and well-governed level. There may also be certain way stand in-between to have more restraint on the use of veto power, such as a regional approach. Yet all the new thinking on Council reform definitely depends on the political will of various countries and the feasibility of a consensus.

IV. Conclusions

The Security Council remains the primary organ for addressing matters concerning international peace and security. The priority for it now is to adapt to the reality of global power shift and the complexity of global challenges and threats:

--China’s global strategy gradually comes into shape. It’s based on China’s worldview of a globalized and multipolar world and its attempt to building the new type of major power relationship.

--China is known for its principled pragmatism in the deliberation process of the Security Council. On the one hand, China has demonstrated certain policy consistency in its adherence to guiding principles in the Council, in particular the respect for sovereignty and non-interference principle. On the other hand, China has shown fully flexibility and pragmatism in dealing with principle-related issues.

--In recent years China has taken an active role in UN peacekeeping operations based on its evaluation of national interest and China’s role as a responsible global power. Yet China has strong concern over the erosion of peacekeeping principles in practice.

--China has gradually taken an active role in practicing preventive diplomacy in Asia regional and sub-regional arrangements.

--China takes a modest view on Security Council reform. While recognizing the necessity for reform, it firmly advocate for a thorough consultation and consensus-building process. China thinks the concert of permanent members in the Council based on veto rights has been a stabilizing mechanism for international system.

Source of documents：Global Review