The successful conclusion of the 18th Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) marked a new starting point of China’s domestic politics and foreign policies. The Xi Jinping-led new leadership has largely inherited and continued the diplomatic strategy of its predecessor, such as the strategic guiding principle of independence and self-reliance, the strategic self-identification as a developing country, the strategic objective of creating a peaceful environment for China’s modernization, and the strategic approach of a peaceful development path. On the other hand, after careful assessment of internal and external developments, the new leadership has readjusted and enriched China’s comprehensive foreign policy in a distinctive way: specifying strategic self-identification, updating strategic thinking, keeping strategic composure, enhancing strategic initiative, strengthening strategic planning, and developing strategic theories. For the next decade, China’s overall diplomacy requires further readjustment to increase theoretic innovation and enhance execution. With a more proactive, pragmatic, and effective guiding principle, China’s diplomacy will continue to develop and advance in meeting challenges and overcoming difficulties.

I. Internal and External Impetus for Readjusting Foreign Policy

1.1 Growing comprehensive national strength calls for a new perspective on China’s international status and role.

Domestic economic growth, social progress, and political stability elevate China’s international status in a comprehensive way. With the total GDP volume rising to $8.26 trillion in 2012 from $1.23 trillion in 2002, China had become the world’s second largest economy, making the Chinese development path an alternative to the Western model. China is a major participant and player in G20 and BRICS, playing an increasingly greater role in economic cooperation mechanisms of the Asia-Pacific region. In the political and security fields, China initiates the concept of “a community of shared destiny for mankind”, safeguards world peace and security, advances the cause of human development and progress, and enhances deep cooperation with relevant international organizations in addressing global challenges. In areas that concerns culture, education, sports, and public health, China has forged closer ties with the rest of the world by hosting the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games and the 2010 Shanghai World Expo, which marked a major stride towards China’s comprehensive development. At the domestic level, the self-awareness of the Chinese government and people as a major country has been heightened. And the international community recognizes China’s major power status and requires it to shoulder commensurate responsibilities and obligations.

1.2 Major international challenges require revised strategy and policy.

First, the West has shifted from resorting to China to overcome the financial and economic crises to constraining it with relevant institutions and mechanisms. At present, recovery is picking up in the U.S. and Japan, and Europe has withstood the heavy blows of the euro and debt crises. The West is beginning to water down the G20’s role as a major economic platform, takes a bearish view of the BRICS’ economic outlooks, and tries to exert pressure on China with new institutions and mechanisms by initiating the TPP and TTIP negotiations.

Secondly, new difficulties cropped up in China’s relations with neighboring countries as direct results of U.S. “pivot” strategy. China was dragged into the disputes over maritime rights and interests in the South and East China Seas; its leading role and initiative in regional political and security issues have been undermined. Moreover, China’s role in propelling the China-ASEAN relations through economic cooperation is diminished under the prevailing mindset of “economically depending on China while guarding against it out of security concerns”. To make matters worse, the likelihood of Sino-Japanese clashes is increasing, and significant changes may occur in China’s relations with North Korea and Myanmar respectively.

Thirdly, turmoil persists in the Middle East and North Africa. Sectarian conflicts and secular-sacred clashes have become more acute in countries of the region. The dynamics in the Middle East and North Africa has affected and will continue to affect the stability in western China, China’s energy security, and China’s role in world affairs.

Fourthly, a number of countries look inward to address domestic problems, which may further complicate the current international relations milieu. In the context of a global financial crisis and sluggish recovery of the world economy, extreme nationalism and populism, trade and investment protectionism resurfaced, and the influence of new forms of media and social groups is ever increasing. Governments in a number of countries are increasingly looking inward when devising their respective foreign policies, reducing the likelihood of compromises in external relations. Some even divert the public’s attention from domestic politics to foreign affairs, resulting in more complex international relations on the world stage.


1.3 International leadership transitions calls for a holistic and dynamic foreign policy recalibration.

In a generally peaceful international environment, it has become almost a rule for the head of state or government in major countries to stay in power for the longest possible period of two terms (ten years more or less). In a globalized and information age, the time for the government to make domestic strategies and foreign policies has been greatly shortened. Between 2012 and 2013, new guiding principles and policies have been introduced in a number of countries, like the U.S., France, Germany, Italy, Canada, Australia, Russian, North and South Koreas, and China, as respective leadership transitions took place one after another, contributing to a cluster effect of foreign policy readjustments. In addition, at a time when domestic and foreign issues can be mutually convertible, diplomatic work should be more responsive to various domestic demands, such as accelerating economic transition, deepening institutional reforms, better coordinating interests of people of all ranks and social groups, striking a balance between the domestic demand for flexing muscle and the external mentality of fearing the powerful, and better guiding media supervision. As the world’s biggest emerging country, China needs to call the world’s attention to its development path and international standing. Bearing in mind the “two centennial goals” and the historic mission of building a moderately prosperous society by the centennial of the Communist Party of China and of achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation by the centennial of the People’s Republic of China, the new leadership, at a critical juncture of modern times, will certainly make innovations in its strategy and policy to undertake a great cause.

II. Strategic Identity and Mission

Chinese scholar Cai Tuo thinks that the international identity of a state usually refers to the establishment of the state’s identity, role, standing, and influence in the international community. According to the English scholar Barry Buzan, identity is a constructivist concept. It assumes that who the actors think they are, and how they construct their identities in relation to each other, shapes behavior independently from the distribution of capabilities. According to the present author’s findings, the global strategic identity of a state refers to the state’s overall assessment of its status in the contemporary international system and of its capabilities of achieving strategic objectives.

Accurate self-identification helps to define the nature of a state and reach broad domestic consensus on strategic objectives and policy approaches.

The 8th CPC Congress identified China as a “backward agricultural country”, “joining the Soviet-led socialist camp for enduring peace and human progress and forging impregnable friendly cooperative relations with the Soviet Union and other people’s democracies”. The 13th Party Congress stated that China would remain at the primary stage of socialism for a long time. After the 14th Party Congress, China’s self-identification evolved from “a third world country” to “a developing country”. The identity of “a primary socialist country” helped to build consensus within the Party and state on basic national conditions and tasks while the identity of “a developing country” contributed to the international environment for China’s economic and social development.

Currently, there is no consensus on China’s identity, whether at home or abroad. In recent years, China has strategically identifying itself in a multidimensional and multilayer way. It is a major power, but not yet a great power. Its economy grows rapidly yet it remains a developing country. Though it has been playing a greater role in regional affairs, it has not acquired the capabilities of a global power. In recent years, the majority of Chinese academics identify China as an emerging power. Since the new leadership assumed power, “emerging power” has been avoided in official documents, replaced by “emerging economy” or “major developing country”. For example, “emerging economy” was adopted by President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang in their respective speeches at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations and the Indian Council of World Affairs. The Chinese government has begun to stress to the rest of the world that “today’s China is exploring the path of major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics”. Compared with China’s previous diplomatic focus on bilateral and multilateral relations with major countries, nowadays China is designing its foreign policy as a country with global influence and vision, showing the rest of the world its own ideas, awareness, manner, methodology, and magnanimity.

In a globalized and information age, China ought to properly handle the self-other relations. China classifies countries into developed countries and developing ones. There are certainly other classifications. Western countries see the world as composed of democracies, authoritative countries, and dictatorships, or western countries and non-western ones. Middle Eastern countries see the rest of the world as Arab or non-Arab, or Islamic or non-Islamic. Despite different classifications according to different standards, the rest of the world regards China more as a developed country or even a superpower, than a developing country.

Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger once remarked that “the helm of a China undeniably ‘arriving’ as a world power, with interests in every corner of the globe.”[①] As Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, former Singaporean Prime Minister said that “There are two views. One view is that the Chinese will quietly become strong and quietly increase their influence, without acting like a bully. The other, that they'll flex their muscles and try to browbeat everyone. I think they will choose the former, but grow their muscles at the same time.”[②] Prof. Niu Xinchun also argues that “in the long term, China should concentrate solely on becoming a global economic power and not dilute its strategic resources in the pursuit of unrealistic political/security goals, with the aim to mitigate the impact it may encounter in the process of its rise.” American scholar David Shambaugh assessed China’s performance in global diplomacy, global governance, economics, culture, and security, and commented that China has made undeniable achievements, but it has only successfully become a participant in world affairs; it is not yet a global power.[③]

III. Strategic Thinking and Composure

Strategic thinking refers to the thought process of planning, analyzing, generalizing, judging, forecasting, and decision-making with regard to major issues of overall, enduring, and fundamental significance. Strategic thinking of a nation’s foreign policy concerns a complicated political, economic, security, social, and cultural system. It also concerns a complicated and compound system of internal-external, state-to-state, and state-nature interactions. It consists of not only assumptions but also specific anticipations for diplomatic outcomes. It had been made clear in the 16th and 17th Party Congresses’ reports that China’s diplomacy will strengthen strategic thinking. But the new leadership’s reiteration of strategic thinking has multilayer meanings:

3.1 Enhancing strategic thinking and proactive planning.

Guided by the principles stated in the report of the 18th Party Congress, bearing in mind the “two great goals” and the immediate, mid- and long-term requirements of China’s diplomatic work, the new leadership takes a long view to plan China’s diplomacy in a comprehensive and systematic way. Soon after taking office, the new leadership focused on China’s foreign policy at the third study session of the Politburo on January 29th, 2013 when General Secretary Xi Jinping emphasized the importance of strengthening strategic thinking. The new leadership’s definition of Chinese diplomacy has broken through the traditional boundaries, not only highlighting the traditional “high politics” diplomacy, but also giving equal attention to non-traditional “low politics” diplomacy. The new leadership also focused on the planning of diplomacy at the governmental, party, and military levels, as well as the designing of economic, people-to-people, public, and civil diplomacy, hoping to take a holistic approach to achieve foreign policy objectives. At the same time, foreign affairs departments and offices at the central and local levels began to take a holistic approach to better align with overall national diplomatic work.

The new leadership recognizes that with China’s growing national strength, its diplomatic work should also evolve from “responsive” to “proactive”, and be planned and conducted at a strategic height. After a careful, strategic planning, the new leadership set a visit itinerary for 2013, the opening year of China’s “new diplomacy”. In March, President Xi Jinping chose Russia as his first leg of foreign visit since he took office, underscoring Russia’s prominent status as a strategic support in China’s diplomatic map and prompting the U.S. proposal of the Xi-Obama meeting at Sunnylands, California. The healthy U.S.-China interactions helped advance China’s relations with neighboring countries, creating a further chain effect. Afterwards, President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang respectively proposed the strategic assumptions of building the Silk Road Economic Belt, BCIM Corridor, China-Pakistani Route, and the China-ASEAN community of shared destiny. In addition, the new leadership also articulated a series of strategic concepts, namely, guiding international relations in the spirit of “community of shared destiny for mankind” and “regional community of shared destiny”, advancing China’s relations with the rest of the world under the principle of “inclusiveness and mutual learning” and “cooperation with win-win results”, keeping Sino-U.S. relations on the track of “a new model of major-power relations (NMMPR)”, elevating China-Africa relations with “sincerity, substance, closeness, and honesty”, navigating China’s relations with neighboring countries in the spirit of “sincerity, honesty, benefit, and inclusiveness”.

3.2 Emphasizing strategic composure and bottom-line thinking.

“Strategic composure” and “bottom-line thinking” have become catchphrases regarding China’s diplomatic strategy among China watchers at home and abroad since the new leadership took office. Strategic composure means a clear definition of long-term strategic objectives and overcoming short-sighted impulses on the one hand, and viewed progress and setbacks in a detached manner on the other. Since 2010, as the U.S. returned and rebalanced to Asia, there has been mounting challenges popping up on China’s periphery, manifested in increasing U.S.-China competition in the Asia-Pacific, deteriorating Sino-Japanese relations due to Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s provocative actions, and escalating disputes over maritime rights and interests in the Huangyan Island/Scarborough Shoal between China and the Philippines. Against this backdrop, the new leadership has kept its strategic composure, assessed the current situation in a scientific and comprehensive way, adhered to the basic strategic objectives, and met the challenges in a composed manner. After a whole year’s efforts, China has not only stabilized peripheral situations, but also advanced its relations with Russia, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, and Central Asian countries.

“Bottom-line thinking” usually refers to forestalling risks. But in the Chinese context, it also refers to the lowest limit for compromise. In the spring of 2013 President Xi Jinping remarked that “we must adopt bottom-line thinking in making decision and handling state affairs. We must try for the best but prepare for the worst. Forewarned is forearmed. We must firmly grasp the initiative in our own hands so that we won’t be in a hurry.” Over the last year, bottom-line thinking has been demonstrated in three aspects. First, favorable conditions are only one side of China’s diplomatic strategy. Sense of insecurity has been heightened and risks have been forestalled. Second, a red line has been drawn and articulated to the parties concerned to avoid their misinterpretations and miscalculations. China has made clear its bottom line in the disputes over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands and the Huangyan Island/Scarborough Shoal, preventing further escalation and curbing provocative actions by certain countries. Third, forestalling and managing risks and crises. China not only faces the world’s most complicated neighboring relations on its periphery, but also encounters increasingly urgent needs to protect its overseas rights and interests in other regions of the world. In this connection, the bottom-line thinking is an effective guiding principle for crisis management.

The combination of “composure” and “bottom line” not only defines China’s strategic objectives, but also outlines the upper and lower limits in China’s foreign policy, reflecting the clarity and transparency of China’s diplomatic strategy. For over a year, in the increasingly complicated internal and external environments full of uncertainties and ambiguities, the new leadership has stayed on the set track and moved unswervingly in the right direction, adhered to the strategic objectives, striven for the best and circumvented traps, advancing China’s diplomacy steadily.

IV. Strategic Design and Approach

4.1. Sequencing strategic priorities.

After careful and comprehensive assessments of domestic and external issues, the new leadership has recalibrated its diplomatic planning, and sequenced strategic priorities. The new leadership has not only continued its predecessor’s country-specific and thematic diplomacy, but also upgraded ideas about major-power relations and concepts about neighborhood diplomacy. A central conference on neighborhood diplomacy was held for the first time since the founding of the P.R.C. China has doubled its efforts to create a peaceful neighboring environment for development and to promote the establishment of a new model of major-power relations with established powers, traditional powers, major developing countries, and regional powers (middle powers). At the bilateral level, China focuses on strengthening relations with major countries like Russia and the U.S., and with neighboring countries. At the regional level, China focuses on improving its neighboring environment by enhancing cooperation frameworks and easing tensions over rights and interests. At the global level, China continues to promote the reform of the international system, improve global economic governance, and effectively respond to non-traditional security challenges.

With regard to thematic diplomacy, China has paid greater attention to the process of rule-making and institution-building in non-traditional diplomatic issues. The current international institution-building efforts are inadequate to meet the challenges ranging from climate change to energy security, from epidemic prevention and disease control to water scarcity, and many other global issues. Therefore, the new leadership regards norm-setting and institution-building as an important component of thematic diplomacy. In its multilateral diplomacy at the regional and global levels, China advocates the “same boat” spirit of inclusiveness, mutual learning, and win-win cooperation to guide and regulate international behavior, focusing in particular on working with the international community to review the current international mechanisms, strengthening the role of the international court in the field of international law, developing the UN Security Council in the security field, reforming the International Monetary Fund and World Bank in the financial field, and innovating global governance on climate change according to national conditions. To close the gaps and compensate for the inadequacies in the current global governance mechanisms, China has been making greater efforts in promoting cooperation at the global level through regional and group approaches, building and strengthening bilateral and multilateral free trade areas, enhancing the role of the Chiang Mai Initiative, preparing for the financial cooperation mechanisms for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICS, and China-ASEAN cooperation, establishing order in global commons like outer space, cyberspace, and polar regions.

4.2 A neighbor-central and summit-led peripheral diplomacy.

Bordering as many as twenty-some countries, China has to deal with issues either left over from history or arise presently. The new leadership has elevated the role of neighborhood diplomacy in China’s foreign policy agenda, making it a priority in summit diplomacy, changing the previous practice of giving equal attention to high-level visits. Since March 2013, making neighboring countries as their first leg of foreign visits, President Xi and Premier Li have respectively attended the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit (in September), the APEC Summit (in October), and the East Asia Summit (in October) and many other important regional forums for cooperation. The year of 2013 witnessed the full coverage of direct interactions between Chinese leadership and those of neighboring countries through mutual visits and bilateral meetings on multilateral occasions. Moreover, China has advanced its comprehensive strategic partnerships with Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, deepened its strategic partnerships with India, Pakistan, South Korea, Uzbekistan, Mongolia, Afghanistan, launched the consultation process on China-ASEAN Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, slowed down the escalation of tensions between China and its neighbors over maritime sovereignty and interests, and facilitated the interaction and conversion between economic links and security ties.

4.3 A major power’s tri-pronged strategy of idea, priority, and pragmatism.

Major countries are the key priority in Chinese diplomacy. China regards Russia as the most important strategic support. With mutual strategic trust, the two powers support each other and vigorously advance pragmatic cooperation and people-to-people exchanges. President Xi Jinping appreciated that “the Sino-Russian relationship is the most important bilateral relationship in the world, and the best major-power relationship. A strong and top-notch Sino-Russian relationship not only serves the mutual interests of China and Russia, but also provides the guarantee for international strategic balance of power, world peace and stability.”

The Sino-U.S. relationship is also one of the most important and difficult bilateral relationships. In the current internal and external context, the two governments have been making efforts in addressing bilateral practical issues for immediate benefits and interests in order to gain broader domestic support for sustained Sino-U.S. relations. But the leaderships in the two giants have their greater strategic visions and development blueprints. The new Chinese leadership hopes to overcome the Thucydides’ Trap of great-power conflict by proposing the concept of a new model of major-power relations, in order to avoid confrontation and strive for mutual trust and win-win cooperation. In advancing the Sino-U.S. relations, both sides have strengthened constructive interactions for mutual economic benefits, military relations, cyber security in the Asia-Pacific region. Though the Sino-U.S. military interactions remain more symbolic than substantial at the current stage, the two sides, working on the platform of the Pilot Free Trade Zone in Shanghai, have been substantially advancing their economic and trade relations through bilateral investment agreements.

Although the focus of efforts in promoting the new model of major-power relations is currently on the Sino-U.S. relationship, the Chinese definition of major power is rather extensive and inclusive, because “promoting the Sino-U.S. relationship in the NMMPR fashion and achieving sound interactions for win-win cooperation between China and other major powers” constitutes the essence of the concept designed by the Xi-led Central Committee of the CPC. Currently, China is pushing forward its relations with the European Union, other major European countries, and BRICS members, and deepening relations with regional powers (middle countries). China opposes the G2 proposal and accommodates the interests and concerns of middle and small countries, making its healthy relations with major powers the leverage for world peace, development, and win-win cooperation.

4.4 A developing country’s diplomatic strategy with the parallel development of politics and economics, morality and interests.

China has always identified itself as a developing country. For a time in China’s development agenda, economics outweighs politics, interests override moral principles, and “to take” is placed before “to give”, and as a result, political exchanges and consensus between China and developing countries have been declining. The new leadership, therefore, stressed on many occasions that equal attention should be given to politics and economics, interests and moral principles. Sometimes moral principles should be placed ahead of interests. Under this new guiding principle, China has increased its strategic investment in political, economic, and cultural ties with developing countries. At the political level, China upholds justice, adheres to impartiality, and puts moral principles before others. At the economic level, China advocates mutual benefit, win-win cooperation, and common development. At the level of foreign policy, China strengthens consultation and coordination with developing countries, strives for closer economic cooperation on the basis of political consensus, enhances cooperation in investment, finance, construction of infrastructure, medical care and public health, and projects which bring real benefits to local people, and prepares to launch a number of landmark cooperation projects.

V. Strategic In-Depth Development

5.1 China’s diplomatic strategy requires continuation and enrichment.

Today’s China is a rising power and its diplomatic strategy has entered a phase of further development and enrichment. The making, development, improving, and implementation of China’s diplomatic strategy put together is a vast systems engineering. A global diplomatic strategy covers multiple dimensions, namely, global, thematic, regional, national, and social. It is a daunting task, and China lacks relevant experience in drafting relevant strategies. Moreover, diplomatic strategy constitutes an integral part of national strategy, and should be implemented within the framework of national strategy. The two should be an organic whole. Besides, China’s diplomatic strategy is interconnected and interacts with other nations’ diplomatic strategies. With China’s growing national strength and rising international status, the overlap between its diplomatic strategy and the international community will further expand.

For China, it is of primary importance to design and implement a full-spectrum strategy in traditional diplomatic domains concerning core national interests in high politics. At the same time, China ought to pay more attention to the strategic planning and designing on non-traditional diplomatic agendas, which largely comprises today’s pressing global challenges. The current international norms, regulations, and laws are inadequate to address these challenges, so as a major power with global influence, China bears the responsibility of proposing solutions and setting agendas. Therefore, China needs to make early strategic decisions on climate change, energy and resource security, disease control and disaster relief, and population aging, so as to play its part in international decision making and to take the strategic and constructive lead in the region and the world at large.

5.2 China’s diplomatic strategy requires in-depth exploration and practice.

Diplomatic strategy cannot be separated from diplomatic practice. The former is tested and shaped by the latter. As a major power with global influence, China must go beyond the narrow thinking limited to short-term interests, explore its comprehensive and long-term strategic interests, and reach a new equilibrium. Therefore, as a responsible major country and with unprecedented and exemplary courage, China should take on the historic mission of further exploring its rich and multidimensional diplomatic practice. Indeed, China needs to be more judicious in readjusting its principles of diplomatic strategy. But it also needs to conduct more strategic exploration, and accumulate experience and deepen its understanding in diplomatic practice to propose and implement new strategic principles.

At the current stage, for China it is possible to provide consultation and advice to countries enjoying friendly relations with China on national governance while adhering to the principle of “non-intervention”; advisable to more actively contribute to UN peacekeeping missions and enhance bilateral military and security cooperation while upholding the principle of “no overseas military base”; desirable to strengthen consultation and planning with major countries, BRICS members, and other important neighboring strategic partners while sticking to the principle of “not being the forerunner”; and preferable to enhance the security consultation and military cooperation within the framework of strategic partnership of cooperation while carrying on the principle of “non-alignment”.

5.3 China’s diplomatic strategy requires theoretical innovations.

Major theoretical issues have come up and will continue to crop up in the process of designing and implementing China’s diplomatic strategy. It is preferable that China establish more systematic diplomatic theories with broader worldwide significance in terms of strategic objectives. Since 2003 when it articulated the doctrines of “peaceful rise” and “peaceful development”, China has issued two white papers on its “peaceful development path” in 2005 and 2011 respectively, further expounding on the peaceful development theory. However, with the changing international environment, China not only needs to clarify its national strategic objective of peaceful development, but also needs to transcend the traditional Western Pan-Pacifism, to construct a theoretical system of peace for the international community, and to propose the strategic approach of the community of common destiny for the region and for mankind, pushing forward the tide of the times featuring peace, development, and win-win cooperation.

It is also desirable for China to establish a systemized theory for strategic partnership in terms of strategic cooperation with others. China sticks to the “non-alignment” principle and has lifted the strategic partnership of cooperation to the highest level of strategic cooperation. Since 1993 when it established the first ever strategic partnership with Brazil, China has set up strategic partnership, to varying degrees, with more than a quarter of the countries (nearly 50) that have formal diplomatic relations with China. Yet the real role of strategic partnership is still not completely clear in international relations, and its potential in choosing peace over war, safeguarding core national interests and advancing reforms of the international system has not been fully tapped. Therefore, China should study theoretical issues concerning strategic partnership of cooperation from the height of war and peace, in particular focusing on defining its substance and role in contemporary international relations, and should also explore how strategic partnership could contribute to international military and security cooperation from the perspective of avoiding global and regional bloc confrontations.

In terms of strategic theories, it is also advisable for China to gradually readjust some concepts and perspectives. Since the beginning of the 21st century, cooperation at the regional and global levels has been changing people’s views on Westphalian sovereignty founded on the Westphalian System established in 1648. Countries all over the world, China included, have transferred part of their sovereign powers to relevant regional and international organizations. On the other hand, western countries have come up with new ideas and measures concerning the issue of national sovereignty, manifested in the Kosovo war, the Iraq war, the civil wars in Libya and Syria. Non-intervention in a country’s internal affairs, humanitarian intervention, the Responsibility to Protect, and overseas military bases have become central theoretical and practical issues in the international community. At the same time, China’s theories and experience concerning national sovereignty have also been enriched. For example, China began its escort mission for counter-terrorism in the Gulf of Aden in 2008 and evacuated Chinese nationals from Libya when the civil war broke out in 2011--the largest ever evacuation effort in China’s history. Chinese scholar Wang Yizhou thinks that China should adopt a “creative involvement” policy and makes it a new orientation in foreign policy now that China’s diplomacy has entered a new era. As China grows in economic size and national strength, it has gradually evolved from a regional power with regional-concentrated interests to a global power increasingly and inevitably involved in international affairs. China should change its long-standing, low-profile and non-intervention principle and let itself be heard. Sheng Dingli, another Chinese scholar suggests that on the North Korean nuclear issue, it is advisable for China to carry out constructive intervention. The key to Northeast Asia’s stability lies in Chinese hands. China ought to build a stable environment on the Korean Peninsula, increase dialogue with North Korea and impose China’s influence on it while reassuring the latter with security commitments. In a changing internal and external environment, domestic debates and discussions on relevant issues has been heating.

VI. Conclusion

President Xi Jinping remarked at the central conference of neighborhood diplomacy that, “the thinking on neighboring issues and the neighborhood diplomatic work should be conducted from a multidimensional and multifaceted perspective which crosses space and time.” This principle should be upheld in the process of thinking, exploring, devising, and implementing China’s diplomatic strategy. Surveying the internal and external environment for China’s diplomacy in the next decade or even longer term, more consideration should be given to the changing situation and the interplay between domestic politics and foreign policies. First, China’s diplomatic strategy must be aligned more closely with its grand strategy. For quite a long time in the future, China’s diplomatic strategy must first and foremost serve the nation’s development strategy. However, as China grows in national strength and rises in international standing, its diplomatic strategy should demonstrate a more proactive posture to not only promote national development but also enhance mutually reinforcing interactions between domestic politics and foreign policies. Secondly, China’s diplomatic strategy requires consolidated and deepened broad domestic support. Considering the national trend toward greater plurality and diversity, the process of devising and implementing diplomatic strategy should listen to, adopt, and give feedback to a variety of actors, popularize an international perspective and heighten diplomatic awareness among leaderships at all levels, improve media’s role in rational guiding and effective publicity without blindly and excessively raising the popular expectations for China’s diplomatic capacity and performance. Thirdly, the making and developing of China’s diplomatic strategy must proceed under a more dynamic framework of thinking. Linear thinking must be avoided in devising and implementing diplomatic strategy. China should adopt a global power’s vision to foresee external trends and responses on the one hand and be equipped with multiple contingency plans on the other. While advancing major diplomatic strategies and policies, China needs to enhance publicity and communication in advance, prepare supporting policies and measures and public information materials, because the cost for preparations beforehand is far less than remedies afterwards. Last but not least, academic circles of international and diplomatic studies in China, with a full and urgent sense of historic mission, should make best efforts to build and develop Chinese strategic studies within the theoretical framework of diplomacy with Chinese characteristics based on richer experience and heightened self-awareness, in order to provide greater Chinese share of public goods to the international community.

Source of documents：Global Review