Prof. Jiemian YANG (hereafter as “Yang”), Editor-in-Chief of Global Review and Mr. Fyodor Lukyanov (hereafter as “Lukyanov”), Editor-in-Chief of Russia in Global Affairs conducted a dialogue on the new features of the trilateral relations among China, Russia and the United States on a sideline meeting of an international conference in Shanghai, China, on March 22, 2014 and the following are the main points of their discussion (the subtitles are added by the editors):

I. Ukraine Crisis and New International Setting
Yang: The mainstream academia in China characterizes the current international developments as political multi-polarization, economic globalization, culture diversity and socialization of information. Because of the shifting of political, economic and cultural gravity and changing configuration of powers in the world, China is rising, Russia is reemerging and the United States is trying to retain its leadership. Therefore, this trilateral relationship has acquired some new features and significances. For instances, we are observing very closely how these three countries interact each other over the Ukraine crisis. I wonder if you could share with us your general and specific evaluation of the Ukraine and Crimea crisis.

Lukyanov: This is the very right moment to discuss the triangle. I watch news and visit the internet all the time. In terms of Russia-U.S. relations, every hour sees something happening and the tensions between them are high. Frankly speaking, I do not remember this level of tension since I started to work at international affairs in the late 1980s. Although I am too young to see through all the developments in the entire Cold War period, this may be the biggest shift of Russian foreign policy since the Gorbachev years. Of course, it is a little uncomfortable to see how easily and how quickly the relationship can deteriorate. Unfortunately, it shows that the bases are very weak. Despite all the beautiful words heard from Mr. Gorbachev, the mutual suspicions and mistrusts are always there. Today’s Washington Post carries an article by Anne Applebaum.[1] She is a very famous writer and journalist and wife of Polish Foreign Minister Mr. Radosław Sikorski. The key idea of the article is that Russia will never be like us, which is true, but strangely they believed before.

Yang: In the past two decades and more, the Russia-U.S. relations have witnessed a complicated process of developments and most time the United States has upheld an advantageous and initiative position. However, the current Ukraine issue has evolved into a reversed direction of pushes between Russia and the U.S. and its European allies. This looks very much like a watershed in their post-Cold War relations. In your opinion, what have caused this important change and new turn of relations between Russia and the United States?

Lukyanov: This is a much extended field of different reasons. Let us start from the personal ones. I think when President Putin came into power 15 years ago, he was one of the most pro-Western and pro-American leaders we have. To a certain extent, he is more pro-western than Mr. Gorbachev because when Gorbachev was in power, the structural confrontations between the then two superpowers were still going on. Mr. Putin assumed Russian presidency at its very weak time. He was genuinely interested in establishing a relationship with the United States which would accept Russia and Russia's gradual rise. This stage of his policy lasted a couple of years when he made real efforts to find common ground with the United States. Personally, Mr. Putin was extremely disappointed by the George W. Bush Administration, and experienced many situations that were the results of very arrogant and non-reciprocal behavior of the United States. Russia in 2001 opened up Central Asia for American Bases, closed down military facilities in Vietnam and Cuba, as well as offered really deep cooperation against terrorism. Then what did Mr. Putin get in return? He got Iraq, Georgia, and the first color revolution in Ukraine. He was really hurt by that. That creates a deep feeling that with Americans you cannot have normal business. They will always betray you because they will do whatever they want and they do not respect your position and your interests. That was a start which ended up now and it is very much personal fight against Putin. Even in the Cold War, I have never seen such level of personal hatred vs. Russian leader. In the Cold War, as a child I remembered that there were a lot of propaganda war, but not a lot of personal attacks on, for example, Brezhnev or Gorbachev. This time Putin is absolutely and fantastically demonized. He is seen in the West as an evil, which is I would say an exaggeration, which he is not that big, not that evil.

Beyond that personal level, there is of course a feeling in Russia that United States never accepts any country’s security interests if they try to be independent. The United States see their relations with other countries as hierarchical and subordinate. The United States has very good relationships with many countries, but the latter have to admit United States supremacy and America’s higher status than themselves. That might be a comfortable position for European countries, South Korea, Japan and others but of course not for Russia because of our history, culture and strength, among other things. Ukraine is a real red line, although it might sound a little bit imperialist. Any countries and especially big countries need to decide which area belongs to its core interests. Due to many reasons, history, geo-politics, culture, security, psychology, Ukraine is seen as something absolutely necessary for Russia. I would not say security of Russian identity. Since the 17th Century, Russia have been struggling to get these territories and become a great power. Discussing with my colleagues from Europe and United States some years ago, I said to them that Ukraine is very special for Russia, so don't be that active there. The response was: Oh come on, when Poland joined NATO, Russia was angry but you accepted it; when Estonia joined NATO, you didn't act either; when Balkan states started to join NATO, you didn't take moves. Obviously at that time they did not understand the reasons why Ukraine is special to Russia. It is different. Neither Poland nor Estonia belonged to the inner interests of Russia. They started to understand in August 2008, when Russia used forces in Georgia and that was quite a serious blow because NATO stopped for a while. But then we see that everything started again.

I do not believe that what happened in Ukraine now was a pre-planned scenario. Rather it is a postponed effect. Investment has been made 10 years ago. The American-trained new generation leaders failed because the “Orange Revolution” produced terrible results and political chaos. When President Obama came into the White House, he had no big interests for that. His interests shifted towards China and the Middle East. At that time Ukraine was not the very core of his interest. Then those investments started to work. Now when it happened, President Obama was quite passive during the initial stages of crisis. But now of course, we see that they concede what happened in and around Ukraine not as just the domestic situation of Ukraine, not even a struggle for this country, but as an uprising of big contender like Russia. Now we see that the perception of Russia as a threat has never disappeared and I think that Putin made a conclusion based on quite consensus among Russian population that we cannot be a real partner with the United States, and that we cannot work together until and unless they know that Russia is ready to response anytime. For Americans it is a shock because since the Gorbachev times until very recently, they got used in any emergency situation. Russia might be very nasty and tough but in the end, it gives up, at least it leaves a room for compromise. When they discovered this situation has no room for compromise at all, they are really furious. This is what we see now.

Yang: There seems to be a trend nowadays that the governments should show their firmness and toughness in stating and carrying out their foreign policies. Many big countries put their domestic concerns before external relations as a result of election-driven politics. In your opinion, how much support did President Putin get from inside Russia?

Lukyanov: For ordinary people, they regard Russia as a great power eager to resist the pressure from the only superpower of the United States. Of course, this idea is very popular. Partly because of TV, there is quite special coverage of everything, but mainly because of traditionally being important. In this regard, what happened in Russia in the 1990s lost its capacity of a great power. That was very humiliating for many Russian people, despite polite words from the West. In this regard, President Putin is enjoying support among the society. It is more interesting to think which I guess was a calculation of those who design or draft sanctions against Russia. It was told that powerful tycoons around Putin, not those old oligarchs, but new ones created under his rules. Many of them, his former friends and buddies from his time in the KGB, they are well integrated into international market. The Americans calculated if they exert pressure on those through their assets and business activities worldwide, the Americans can achieve their influences on Putin to make him stop it. Those people would argue that they need to protect what they earned. I think at least so far it seems to be a miscalculation. Yes, these Russians have a lot to lose, because some of them are now multi-billionaires. But the Americans believed too much their own propaganda that the Putin regime is a corrupted and very rotten bureaucracy. In fact, unfortunately, it is both corrupted and bureaucratic enough but not that much as they believed. In fact this causes the consolidation of the core rather than the other. That might generate and add more willingness to shift towards different partners in Asia and Africa. The result might be exactly the opposite of what those Americans expected.

II. New Trilateral Interactions
Yang: The relations between and among China, Russia and the United States are important components of the present major power relations. All these three powers are undergoing tremendous changes as a result of on-going global developments. When Russia was facing the Georgian incident in August 2008, China was hosting its first Olympic Games in Beijing that, plus the followed-up breakout of global financial crisis, put China in the world’s center stage. China has since been deemed as one of the global powers. China is still being pulled by a global power’s responsibilities and a developing nation’s limits when it comes to China’s foreign policy. Compared with China, Russia under President Putin seems more determined to play a big power’s role. But the outsiders’ defining Russia’s status is divided. Some believe that Russia is still a regional power but others think that Russia is a global power, especially its determinations and skills of handling the global issues. What is your defining and what are the supporting arguments?

Lukyanov: Russia had tried to be a regional power but the United States and the Europeans did not respect it. It seems that Russia’s self-positioning and self-defining have changed in the course of development. Putin was not really determined to become that hostile towards the United States and Europe as he is now. He tried a couple of times to become a part of this club and more or less for several times, he was ready to identify Russia as a regional power. But of course, then the assumption was that the United States and Europe would respect Russian regional interests including those related to Ukraine and post-Soviet areas. The problem with the Americans and Europeans was that they were never ready to do that and were never ready to accept even the regional interests of Russia. Consequentially, Putin started to gradually transform Russia’s status into the position that in order to be regionally accepted, Russia needs to be globally active. What he and his team did in the Middle East in recent three to four years was just an attempt to show that Russia still has a lot of leverages and can bargain there, but not here. Finally Putin came to the conclusion that it does not work either. Now I think Putin has gone back to the idea of being a global partner. Of course, as a person who follows the development, I am very much aware that Russia has a lot of disadvantages. In many areas, Russia is weak. In many areas, Russia is forced to rely on a few instruments like hard power which is important now, but not the only single means. Anyway, I think, to answer your question, Putin returns to the perception of Global Power of Russia.

Yang: The current Chinese leadership has two emphases on its diplomatic strategies and policies. One is the major countries’ relationship and the other is its neighborhood relationship. These two relationships are interrelated and mutually reinforcing. In Chinese definition of major countries, it has four kinds, the established power of the United States, the traditional powers of some European ones and EU as a whole, the emerging and reemerging powers represented by the BRICS, and, some regional powers or the so-called “Middle Powers” which include Canada, Argentina, South Korea, Indonesia, Australia, Turkey and Saudi Arab, all of them are members of G-20 now. Speaking of China, Russia and the United States, these three countries are very noticeable because of their different positions on the recent developments in and related to Ukraine and Crimea. We are quite interested in what changes these developments will bring to the international relations.

Lukyanov: They are both positive and negative for Russia-China relationship in the context of the triangle. On the first hand, Russia is interested in rapid development of relationship with China which is Russian priority stated before the Ukraine crisis. A couple of years ago, there were very intense debates about Russian shift towards its Siberia and Far East as well as Asia. Everybody knows that this could only be possible when there are real involvements with Chinese business, investment and people. Fortunately, more or less over is the period of anti-China paranoia which we had several years ago about China's manners and the idea promoted by several Russian politicians at that time and quite widespread in Russia's public opinion. There are still some people making this kind of statements. But in general, public opinion changes significantly. For example, in the past some politicians in the Far East like the former governor of Vladivostok and some others exploited this anti-China feeling just to establish their solid positions. Now it is exactly the opposite, politicians and people in the east part of Russia say that we need Chinese to come. In this regard, what happens now is accelerating the shift. Putin said in his address to Federal Assembly in December 2013 before the Ukraine Crisis that the shift to Asia is our priority in the 21st Century. So I expect that we will have many new projects, political rapprochement and economic revival. At the same time, to be frank, there is a fear in Russia that because of the very broken relations with the United States and the shift to Asia, we will be forced to get too close to China that we will be poorly dependent. China is stronger economically and more important politically than ever. This is a risk that Russia feels, after the first period of rapprochement, this relationship become too close without counter-weights. Because the Western policy towards Russia will still be negative, this might cause some problems not now but on the second stage. So on our side, Russia's intellectual community should very carefully explain how China works, what China is today and what Chinese specific decisions is made just to get rid of this fear.

As for Chinese position, I think it will be very important to be quite sensitive versus these feelings as for rapprochement with Russia. Another risk or factor that will play a role in the future but not immediately is what some strategic analysts in the United States have said today. They say, yes, Russia is bad and Putin is awful, they are always expansionist and imperialist, but we should not treat Putin like a Vampire, otherwise he will go to China and forge alliance with China. That is the worst-case scenario for the U.S. That might lead to change of the U.S. policy. We will not return to something like strategic partnership in the 1990s, but we can return to a more balanced position. I can imagine that the United States not with this President but the next President or somebody in the future who will see Russia-China relationship deepening could try to stop it by offering Russia something else. If I were an American politician, I will be very interested in stopping Russia-China rapprochement from this strategic point of view. It is very important.

Yang: The three pairs of bilateral relations that constitute the trilateral relations among China, Russia and the United States contain many deviating changes. In a pure game theory, all the three countries want to occupy a better position than the other two. In April 2012 I visited Vladivostok and Khabarovsk where some Russian colleagues said that Russia was in position of the trilateral relations as China did in the 1970s and the 1980s. Russia can have better relations with both China and the United States, but China cannot. But now things have changed fundamentally. We need to objectively study the new chains of actions and reactions, as well as of policies and counter-policies.

Lukyanov: In the foreseeable future, I do not know how long but at least until the change of administration of the United States, Russia-American relationship will be very bad. I can imagine that this relationship will be limited to a little beyond hostile relations and will be limited to a certain degree of cooperation in the Middle East. It changed form. For example, when it comes to Iran, I don't think Russia will change position much because Russia cannot stop this rapprochement between Iran and the United States and because both parties want, and Iran will want it very much. It will be very unwise to stop it and keep Iran isolation because Iranians do not like it. But as for Syria, I do not see reasons any more for Russia to help the U.S. to settle their troubles. The U.S. policy towards the Middle East has failed and Russia moves there to help Obama to save face and create new ground. There is Geneva II Process that is quite complicated and not very fruitful. But it is the only framework we have. We can only imagine that Russia, together with Iran, will actually increase assistance to Bashir Assad and help him to win. Until now, Russia has also supported him but only to keep balance in Syria. Now it can support it to stop this war by force that will be very bloody. As for big initiative, there are some big coincidences. Take the Arctic as an example, many people say that will be a good field of cooperation, but not in this psychological situation. As for trilateral relationship, they should be more forward-looking. We should disregard all troubles today and try to look at international situations in 10 or 15 years’ time because after the Cold War, big powers, first of all the U.S., have failed to produce stable international system. They believed that they could create a system under their auspices. But it was impossible because even such a powerful country as the United States cannot control the whole world. The reasonable approach is to discuss among three major powers, Russia, the United States and China, because the European Union with all my respect to that organization, they failed to produce a global actor, economically yes, politically no. Those three powers could agree on some rules of coexistence. It is senseless to speak about strategic partnership because this notion has been spoiled by what happened in recent years. I would prefer the term and notion of fruitful coexistence. In the Cold War time we had peaceful coexistence between the Soviet Union and the United States in some periods, but this time, we should have fruitful coexistence to promote development for all. So far, I do not see any preconditions for that when it comes to the U.S. and Russia or to the U.S. and China. The United States understands that China is very powerful, but they still believe that it should be some kind of American domination in the world, at least in some certain areas. But maybe after turmoil created by Ukraine and Russian uprising, we will arrive at a new balance among three powers.

III. Worthy-Efforts for Fruitful Co-Existence
Yang: I think to achieve new balance among three powers is very important. We should not only talk about it, but also seek for mechanisms that will bring about the fruitful coexistence. All of the three countries are important players of the world and shoulder special responsibilities for new international system and order. Obviously, good system and order will guarantee constructive interaction among China, Russia and the United States.

Lukyanov: The international order which emerged after the Cold War had big problems. On the one hand, there was no balance. Many aspects of the system of the second half of the 20th century were bad. Although they expressed some militant stances but they were very stable. These stability and balance disappeared when the Soviet Union collapsed. By the way, talking situation in Russia now, the Russian establishment represented by Putin still cannot accept the loss of the Soviet Union. Ukraine in this regard is very crucial because basically Ukraine involved in December 1991 and they declared independence on December 1st. That was the final blow to the Soviet Union. When they now try to get Ukraine back and what emerged after was based on this assumption that there is one rule as manifested by the famous article and book of Fukuyama The End of History. The question is only how fast the world moves into it. That was a very arrogant stance. This value-based approach that European and American introduced after the Cold War sounded very beautiful. But in fact, they caused the destruction of the principle of international relations. If you disregard sovereignty, what else do you have as a structural unit for the whole system? Whatever reasons, even very beautiful ones, you cannot deny that sovereign states are to protect people and secure their rights. This erosion of traditional principles was added to completing this imbalance and rising of deep suspicion of all sides. Therefore, for the future systems, we will need to come back to more traditional approaches. I wrote an article recently to point out: John Kerry criticized Putin being inspired by 19th Century spirit. I thought that of course, when one went back to the 19th Century, you would see those imperialist powers struggling against each other. But the second stance, the principle of the 19th Century, it was an era of combination of being European diplomacy, the so called, European Concert of Nations. After Napoleonic War and until World War I, it was based on the ideas that relationship between big players should be balanced and that big players should not be inspired to destroy one of those. It did not mean they stop stealing. In the 19th Century, three big wars happened in Europe. But after each war, Russian Crimean War and France-Prussia War, there was immediately peace conference to adapt European order to the new situation. This mechanism was completely lost in the 20th Century. What followed the two World Wars and Cold War were confrontation and total confusion. In this regard, if Putin was inspired by the 19th Century spirit, he maybe feels that it is needed. Now, we should have, not European Concert of Nations but international world Concert of Nations. We call China, the U.S. and Russia Concert conductors.

Yang: History is full of accidental and incidental events, such as Kosovo, “9/11” and Crimea issues. The major powers should have far-sights to chart the future course of human society. At the times of globalization and interdependence, China, Russia and the United States as well as all the members of the international community should adapt themselves to the changed and still-changing world. Therefore, the three countries should not only think about zero-sum games among themselves, but also look for enlarging their overlapping interests through new mechanisms. No matter how difficult and prolonged the road to fruitful peaceful co-existence may be, China, Russia and the United States should keep on striving and working.

Source of documents： Global Review