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Jun 01 2015
Shaping China-Africa Cooperation on Post-2015 Agenda
By
FOCAC
Post 2015
Agenda
China Africa
Community
of
Destiny
The UN post-2015 development agenda is under intensive inter-governmental negotiation and will be implemented from January 1, 2016, which calls for greater cooperation between China and Africa. China-Africa cooperation in the post-2015 agenda has solid foundations based on bilateral cooperation in MDGs, and similar strategic visions for guiding the implementation of the post-2015, and overlapping policy positions about the configuration of the post-2015 agenda. The FOCAC meeting can be the key platform to facilitate bilateral cooperation on the post-2015 agenda, especially the 6th FOCAC Ministerial Conference, which has the potential to fasten the pace of implementation of the post-2015 agenda in Africa.
The UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) will expire at the end of 2015, and the negotiation of the succeeding framework for international development, now named as UN post-2015 development agenda (hereafter “post-2015 agenda”), is entering into its final stage, the inter-governmental negotiation. Such inter-governmental negotiation will be finished by the end of July 2015, following which the UN Summit in September 2015 will officially launch this crucial international development effort. While a universal project in nature, Africa is still the key focus of the post-2015 agenda, and China, an emerging power, has been requested to provide more global public goods for this course. Indeed, China and Africa have both solid foundations and important potential to cooperate on this topic and cement their “community of destiny”.
1.Solid Foundations for China-Africa Cooperation on Post-2015 Agenda
Three stages of China-Africa MDGs cooperation
As the biggest developing country and biggest developing continent, China-Africa cooperation on MDGs in the past 15 years has experienced 3 stages of development, determined by the general economic and social development progress on both sides.
Preparation: 2000-2005
The formulation of MDGs possesses a different logic in comparison to the current post-2015 agenda. In the year 2000, there was only a political guideline for MDGs, namely the UN Millennium Declaration. In the following years, the international community, dominated by the Western developed countries, did its best to crystallize the MDGs.[2] Thus for almost all developing countries, the first 5 years since 2000 have comprised of: 1) implementing domestic development strategies respectively and finalizing the MDGs; 2) internalizing MDGs and integrating MDGs with domestic development strategies respectively; and 3) exploring how to implement global partnerships (MDG-8). In other words, both China and Africa did not have substantive cooperation in implementing MDGs because of the general development of MDGs. It is true that the FOCAC Addis Ababa Action Plan of the 2nd Ministerial Conference in 2003 did mentioned some related indicators of MDGs[3] and that the Millennium Development Goals: China’s Progress 2003 mentions “international cooperation” twice, but with meaning of promoting domestic MDGs implementation through absorbing international investment and assistance.[4]
Fast Development: 2006-2011
The year 2006 was officially named as China’s “Africa Year” which witnessed the announcement of China’s African Policy whitepaper[5] in January as well as the convening of the FOCAC Beijing Summit and the 3rd Ministerial Conference in November. Since then cooperation between China and Africa on MDGs implementation has been strengthened greatly. Even before 2006, such cooperation has been facilitated intentionally. For example, China’s Progress Towards the Millennium Development Goals 2005 mentions that “by the end of 2004, China has invested up to … US $ 625 million FDI in Africa”, “China has signed debt relief agreements with 41 countries in Africa, Asian, South America and Oceania”, among others.[6] During this period, such cooperation between China and Africa mainly happened under the framework of FOCAC bilaterally and UN, IMF and World Bank multilaterally, and through south-south cooperation frameworks including G77 China, Non-Alignment Movement, and BRICs, etc.
The main driving forces for this fast development can be attributed (but not limited) to the following: 1) the prospect of fulfilling MDGs is viewed as quite positive on the Chinese side; 2) the difficulties Africa faces in terms of MDGs implementation; 3) calls for providing more public goods which has accompanied China’s rise; 4) fast development of China-Africa relations.
Two Tracks Progressing: 2012-
Since 2010, the discussion about a successive plan after MDGs expiration in 2015 absorbed more and more international interest, which pushed China-Africa cooperation into a two tracks progressing period. China and Africa always pay equal importance to the persistent implementation of MDGs and the forward-looking building of the post-2015 agenda.
For example, the Beijing Declaration of the 5th FOCAC Ministerial Conference in July 2012 calls on,
the international community to, under the leading role of the UN, take seriously the inefficient implementation in the field of sustainable development, show the political will and commitment to build consensus, and reach agreement on the implementation plan of the post-MDG framework of sustainable development.[7]
China also declared at the 18th CPC National Congress that China proposes to build “new type of global development partnership”, even earlier than the UN proposed “new global partnership” of the post-2015 agenda,[8] and promised to “remain a reliable friend and sincere partner of other developing countries”.
When delivering his keynote speech at the 5th BRICS leaders summit in March 2013 in South Africa, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated.
We should jointly participate in the setting of international development agenda, fully harness the productivity and material resources accumulated in the past, fulfill the UN Millennium Development Goals, narrow the North-South gap in development, and make global development more balanced.[9]
Thus, while continuing cooperation on MDGs implementation, China and Africa have been strengthening exchanges and joint actions in the post-2015 agenda building. For example, there was an international conference on China-Africa cooperation in the post-2015 agenda with lots of high-level African officials participated.[10] Another example is that at the workshop on post-2015 agenda co-hosted by Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and UNDP in June 2014, African representatives introduced the Common African Position (CAP) to the post-2015 agenda and asked for strengthened cooperation.[11]
Cooperative Achievements in MDGs
It’s important to note that the establishment of FOCAC in 2000 was earlier than the final formulation of the MDGs, which laid down a concrete platform for bilateral cooperation on MDGs implementation. Indeed, reviewing the action plans since 2006, one can identify the valuable achievements of this bilateral cooperation showing as in table 1.
Author compiled.
Resource: Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009), FOCAC website, November 16, 2006, http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/dscbzjhy/DOC32009/t280369.htm; Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Sharm El Sheikh Action Plan (2010-2012), FOCAC website, November 12, 2009, http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/dsjbzjhy/hywj/t626387.htm; The Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2013-2015), FOCAC website, July 23, 2012, http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/dwjbzjjhys/hywj/t954620.htm.
Beyond and above physical achievements, this cooperation provides other bases for bilateral cooperation on the post-2015 agenda. Firstly, it provides new ideas and concepts including, for example, a new model of economic development and new inputs about south-south cooperation, while also helping changes in international perception regarding African development. Secondly, it provides new methodologies of development, especially new ways of dealing with the development-security nexus which is a traditional debate about whether development is the precondition of security or vice versa, China’s development-first policy and practice proved successful since 1980s, while African (imported) security-first approach failed to a large extent. Thirdly, it provides new platforms for future cooperation on the post-2015 agenda, FOCAC and other international platforms. Such forums are not established for MDGs, but experience of MDGs cooperation helps future performance improvement. And finally, it provides new financing sources for future cooperation on the post-2015 agenda implementation, including for example the BRICS Development Bank , which is anticipated to be operational by 2016.
2. Great Potential for China-Africa Cooperation on Post-2015 Agenda
One of the most important international consensuses regarding the post-2015 agenda is that it should be based on the achievements and lessons of MDGs and set out more ambitious development norms and goals.[12] Both China and Africa have ambitious strategic visions and under the guidance of such visions, both parties have very important overlaps in terms of the building of the post-2015 agenda, thus laying down significant foundations for future bilateral cooperation.
Similar Strategic Visions
It is important to note that both China and Africa have long-term strategic visions that could guide their policy towards the post-2015 agenda, not reversely using the post-2015 agenda as guidance of their long-term development efforts.
Shortly after taking power, Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed the concept of the “Chinese Dream” for all Chinese in late 2012. The vision of Chinese Dream built upon “two centuries” namely 2021 (100th anniversary of CPC creation) and 2049 (100th anniversary of PRC establishment); the concept is a guiding principle for Chinese domestic development and also a vision for 2150.
On African side, the year 2013 marked the 50th anniversary of Africa Unity Organziation. Reviewing the experience and lessons of the past 50 years and looking forward to the next 50 years, the African Union formulated the African “Agenda 2063” as its long-term strategic vision.
Although different in detailed goals, the Chinese Dream and Agenda 2063 share overlapping visions, including prosperity, stability, peace, international status, etc.[13]
Overlapped Policy Positions
Under the framework of strategic visions, both China and Africa have issued their policy positions in regard to the post-2015 agenda.
On September 22, 2013, just before the start of the UN General Assembly debate on the MDGs progress, the Chinese government published its position paper on the post-2015 agenda.[14] On the African side, while a little bit late, the final Common African Position (CAP) was launched at the end of February 2014 in N’Djamena, Chad.
In comparing these two documents, one can identify many common features. Firstly, both China and Africa share similar guiding principles for building the post-2015 agenda as shown in table 2. While less principles, African principles do cover almost all of Chinese ones: for example, African principle a (Learning from the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)) covers principles 1 (Take eradicating poverty and promoting development as the centerpiece) and 3 (Ensure continuity and keep forward-looking) of China; and principle b (Assuming ownership) covers China’s principle 2 (Respect diversity in development models) and 5 (Seek consensus through consultation); and principle c (Reaffirming our common interests) covers China’s principles 4 (Adhere to the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”), 6 (Ensure universality), and 7 (Promote coordinated and balanced development).
Resources: China’s Position Paper on the Development Agenda beyond 2015, Chinese Foreign Ministry website, September 22, 2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/t1078984.shtml; African Union, Common Africa Position (CAP) on the Post 2015 Development Agenda, March 2014.
These two documents also identify key areas and priorities (table 3). To compare these detailed priorities and sub-goals, one can identify 2 major differences: 1) the 2nd pillar of CAP, “science, technology and innovation”, is totally missed in China’s position; and 2) the 5th pillar of CAP, “peace and security”, is also not on the priority list of the Chinese agenda. However, it’s important to note that the FOCAC process addresses both factors. For science, technology and innovation are always two of of the most important elements of the FOCAC action plan. Issues of peace and security are more sensitive because of their domestic affairs nature and non-interference principle. Nevertheless, China did propose an “Initiative on China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security” in the 5th FOCAC meeting in 2012.[15] Thus, one of the core explanations as to why such an disparity exists is because they have developed their respective policy position from different considerations. For China, both issues are actually the guarantee for realization of the post-2015 agenda; or in other words, these two issues belong to the measures of implementation (MOIs) of the post-2015 agenda.
Resources: China’s Position Paper on the Development Agenda beyond 2015, Chinese Foreign Ministry website, September 22, 2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/t1078984.shtml; African Union, Common Africa Position (CAP) on the Post 2015 Development Agenda, March 2014.
Common Proposed Goals and Indicators
Beyond above-mentioned similarities in strategic visions and policy positions, China and Africa have many common proposed goals and indicators in the formulation of the post-2015 agenda.
Since 2013, the Open Working Group of the General Assembly on Sustainable Development Goals (OWG) started the process of condensing the more than 200 proposed goals and 2000 targets during the 2012-2013 global consultation process. The goals were transformed into a more workable negotiation framework for governments to discuss during the inter-governmental negotiation started from January 2015. During this process, both China and Africa played quite positive roles in goal and target advocacy. However, concrete evidence for this enthusiasm can only be confirmed by the working document for the 11th session of the OWG, because following this, there is no record showing the details of which country proposed which target.
The document shows high similarity between China and Africa in exact targets proposed. Among the 140 targets of 16 focus areas, China proposed 30 targets while Africa proposed 75; 19 of those targets proposed by the two countries overlapped (composing 63% of the total number of China’s proposed targets). This highlights that Africa has the highest score in terms of common proposed targets, the second being China and the least developed countries (45 targets proposed) with 16 in common. In compare, China and America (52 targets proposed) have 13 in common, China and Brazil (33) 9 in common.[16]
3. Ways for Future Cooperation on the Post-2015 Agenda
While rich experiences have opened the way for great potential future cooperation, there remain many unaddressed issues For example, both the European Union (EU) and the Group of Seven (G7) have expressed their willingness for the support of the Common African Position (CAP),[17] while China has not. In terms of the remaining negotiations and future implementation of the post-2015 agenda, both parties should follow the guidance of building China-Africa Interest-Responsibility-Destiny trinity community and making best use of the FOCAC.
Taking China-Africa Interest-Responsibility-Destiny Trinity Community Building as Guiding Theory
China and Africa are a “community of destiny”, using Chinese President Xi’s term, because both parties have common historical memory, common liberation histories and development experiences, and both face common global challenges. Meanwhile, after 60 years engagement, especially cooperation since 2000, economic engagement between the two parties has developed quickly and promoted an “community of interest” between two parties.
However, if one digs into this relationship further, one can find that certain elements are missing. Borrowing Chinese Premier Li Keqians’s term, the China and Africa need to develop their “community of responsibility” responsibly. Currently, the building of “community of responsibility” in the China-Africa relationship is weakest pillar comparing with the “community of interest” and “community of destiny”.[18] To further develop China-Africa relations, both parties should take the building of the interest-responsibility-destiny trinity community as a common strategic goal. Within this trinity community, the “community of interest” is the short-term economic or physical interest basis for all other two pillars, and the “community of destiny” is the long-term common strategic vision for bilateral relationship, and the “community of responsibility” is the mid-term goal and the bridge for the other two.
With such a trinity community, bilateral cooperation on the post-2015 agenda is driven by a strategic guideline which needs to stick its principles when when facing western pressures especially those pressures in the name of technical but not political or moral needs. Thus, the strategy for China-Africa cooperation in the post-2015 agenda should include following dimensions:
——From the perspective of the “community of interest”, China and Africa should build a negotiation coalition within the inter-governmental negotiation process, the key focuses including developing a common goal/target system and a common understanding in regard to the MOIs of the post-2015 agenda;
——From the perspective of the “community of responsibility”, both parties should adhere to the principle of common but differentiated responsibility, emphasizing the main role of south-north cooperation and official development aid, and promote greater roles for south-south cooperation;
——From the perspective of destiny community, both parties should jointly safeguard the final conclusion of the post-2015 agenda, guarantee the continuous implementation of the unfinished MDGs, and focus on the localization and implementation of the post-2015 agenda.
Gearing the Post-2015 Agenda into the FOCAC Framework
As discussed above, FOCAC has the potential to be the best candidate platform for China-Africa cooperation in the post-2015 agenda. The 6th FOCAC Ministerial Conference, to be hosted in late 2015 in South Africa and hopefully be lever-upped into summit, is the best chance to gear the post-2015 agenda into.
This year is the 15th anniversary of the FOCAC platform, with one of the key tasks of the being the planning of the next 15 years of China-Africa relationship. Here one can easily identify the convergence of the post-2015 agenda with FOCAC because both envision to 2030.
Thus, the 6th FOCAC Ministerial Conference should: 1) set the strategic goals for China-Africa relations by 2030, with the post-2015 agenda as one of the core elements; 2) set key stage goals for 15 years, with the post-2015 agenda as one of the core elements; 3) set the action plan for next 3 years (2016-2018), keeping in mind how to facilitate the implementation of the post-2015 agenda as soon as possible.
Strengthening Cooperation on the Formulation of Post-2015 Agenda
There are still several months for formulating the post-2015 agenda, which provide a narrow window of opportunity for China and Africa to cooperate on developing joint positions in terms of the key building blocks of the post-2015 agenda.
As it stands, the post-2015 agenda includes three building blocks: the goal/targets system, MOIs, and peer-review and reporting mechanisms. While differences remain, the sustainable development goals (SDGs) proposal, the core of the post-2015 agenda, has been well developed and accepted. Thus, for China and Africa, the best strategy is not to oppose the SDGs as a whole, but rather to focus on how clear those unset x% of the detailed targets to make them friendlier to future development of both China and Africa.
More importantly, China and Africa need to focus more on the MOIs and peer-review mechanisms. Regarding the MOIs, there are more than 30 listed measures, mainly in the proposed goal 17 and some specific MOIs within different goals. It’s important to note that China and Africa have potentially different even conflicting opinions with regard to certain MOIs, especially the financing arrangements for SDGs. However, due to FOCAC, both parties can find solutions beyond the post-2015 process.
Finally, regarding the peer-review mechanisms, China and Africa should join hands into carefully achieve a balance between technical rationality and political conditions. The most important issue is the issue of the “data revolution” which supports the MOIs and reviewing of the post-2015 agenda. Technically, it is reasonable because we need better and timely data for better policymaking, and the imperfections of MDG implementation has forced policymakers into a corner. However, the political implication of data revolution is closely interconnected with issues such as good governance, transparency, data sovereignty, etc. Thus, it is a real challenge for both China and Africa to balance such a technical needs and political correctness.
Conclusion
The year 2015 will be one of the most important years in recent memory for many reasons; it is the 70th anniversary of the World War II (WWII), the discussion of the post-2015 agenda and the forging of the post-2020 global action on climate change. The fact that both China and Africa are involved in all these events makes the 6th FOCAC Ministerial Conference a crucial gathering for developing joint plans. However, the most important element of these potential joint efforts is how to dovetail the post-2015 agenda with the 6th FOCAC meeintg, so as to harmonize the simultaneity of Africa’s rising and China’s transformation.
Based on the rich experience in MDGs cooperation and great potential in post-2015 agenda cooperation, it’s safe to say that the post-2015 agenda will have a big voice in the final document of the 6th FOCAC meeting. The only uncertainty regards the final wording, which has instrumental importance, although little overall strategic impact.
Source of documents:《FOCAC VI》
more details:
[1] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China and United Nations System in China eds., China’s Progress towards the Millennium Development Goals 2013 Report, Beijing, 2013, p. 51.[2] On the formulation of the MDGs, see Jan Vandemoortele, “The MDGs Story: Intention Denied,” Development and Change, Vol.42, No.1, January 2011; David Hulme, “The Making of the Millennium Development Goals: Human Development Meets Results-based Management in an Imperfect World,” BWPI Working Paper, No. 16, Brooks World Poverty Institute, December 2007, http://www.bwpi.manchester.ac.uk/media library/publications/working_papers/bwpi-wp-1607.pdf.
[3] Forum on China-Africa Cooperation-Addis Ababa Action Plan (2004-2006), FOCAC website, September 25, 2009, http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/dejbzjhy/DOC22009/t606801.htm.
[4] UN Country Team in China, Millennium Development Goals: China’s Progress 2003, An Assessment by the UN Country Team in China, Beijing, 2003, pp. 37-38.
[5] China’s African Policy, January 2006, FOCAC website, September 20, 2006, http://www.focac.org/eng/zfgx/dfzc/t481748.htm.
[6] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, United Nations System in China, China’s Progress Towards the Millennium Development Goals 2005, Beijing: October 2005, pp. 62-67.
[7] Beijing Declaration of the Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, July 23, 2012, FOCAC website, July 23, 2012, http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/dwjbzjjhys/hywj/t954245.htm.
[8] It was officially advocated by the HLP report in May 2013, see A New Global Partnership: Eradicate Poverty and Transform Economies through Sustainable Development: The Report of the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, United Nations, May 30, 2013.
[9] Chinese President Xi Jinping, Work Hand in Hand for Common Development, Keynote Speech by H.E. Xi Jinping, President of the People's Republic of China, at the Fifth BRICS Leaders Meeting, Durban, March 27, 2013, Chinese Foreign Ministry website, March 27, 2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/xjpcf1_665694/t1027968.shtml.
[10] “International Conference on ‘The 6th Ministerial Conference of FOCAC and Post-2015 Development Agenda’ Held in SIIS,” SIIS, March 19, 2014, /shgjwt201512107417/index.php?m=content&c=index&a=show&catid=1&id=1498.
[11] “UNDP and MOFA Jointly Host Workshop on Post-2015 Process,” UNDP China, June 3, 2014, http://www.cn.undp.org/content/china/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2014/06/undp-and-mofa-host-workshop-on-post-2015-development-process/.
[12] Zhang Chun, “China’s Role in the Post-2015 International Development Agenda,” Contemporary International Relations, Vol. 24, No. 2, March/April 2014, pp. 86-87.
[13] The Agenda 2063 lists 7 key goals for Africa by 2063; while the Chinese Dream is still not clear about its components. See The African Union Commission, Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want, Draft Document, May 2014.
[14] China’s Position Paper on the Development Agenda beyond 2015, Chinese Foreign Ministry website, September 22, 2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/t1078984.shtml.
[15] Zhang Chun, “The Fact of the Post-2015 International Development Agenda in the 6th FOCAC Meeting,” NORRAG New, No. 51, 2014, p. 98.
[16] “Working Document for 5 – 9 May Session of Open Working Group,” UN Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform, May 2, 2014, http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/3686WorkingDoc_0205_additionalsupporters.pdf.
[17] Fourth EU-Africa Summit Declaration, April 2-3, 2014, Brussels, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/142096.pdf, p. 8; The Brussels G7 Summit Declaration, June 4-5, 2014, Brussels, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/143078.pdf, p.5.
[18] ZHANG Chun, “On China’s Responsible Great Power Performance in Africa,” West Asia and Africa, No. 5, 2014, pp. 46-61.