Periphery policy is the core of China’s external strategy. It has served, in the last 60 years, for the national strategic goals to maintain national security and territorial integrity, to create stable periphery, and to build up friendly neighboring relations by implementing the guideline of “always doing good to your neighbors and making your neighbors partners”, whether in period before or after the outset of reform and opening up. Periphery policy has played a very important role materializing the objectives of China’s peripheral strategy, and even has determined the direction of China’s foreign policy. As clearly described in relevant official documents, the most serious challenge in the period shortly after the founding of PRC was from the peripheral region; periphery policy has been crucial in shaping China’s international environment both in the Cold War and the post-Cold War eras and the beginning years of the new century. This paper is to address the changes of the guiding principles and China’s periphery strategies, review the evolutions of China’s periphery policy in the Cold War and post-Cold War eras, summarize the process that China realizes its periphery strategy, and look into the future roles and objectives of periphery policy on China’s path to emerge as a world power.

I. China’s Periphery Policy before Reform and Opening Up

The founding of new China was in sync with the process the USA and Soviet Union constructed the bipolar system, which undeniably had influence, to different degrees, on all members within it, and the new China was no exception though its leadership was not engaged in the forming of the Yalta system. The series of articles written by Mao Zedong on the eve of the founding of new China described clearly its determination to launch a fresh start (chongqi luzao) in foreign policy area, and expressed definitely the choice to ally with the socialist block headed by the Soviet Union. The consequential so-called “leaning-to-one-side” (yibiandao) decision had in decades guided the direction of China’s peripheral strategies. That is the starting point to observe China’s periphery strategies in the beginning years of the Cold War.

The choice of “leaning-to-one-side” determined the approaches of China’s periphery strategies in the initial years of the Cold War. By diplomatic practice, the approaches, on the one hand, meant that China, as one member of the socialist block, would identify with other members on ideology within the general context of the initial stage of the Cold War; on the other hand, China had to maintain strategic autonomy while pushing forward relevant policies since China’s periphery had already become complicated when new China was founded. Then, could China maintain a certain kind of strategic autonomy within the framework of “leaning-to-one-side”? It seemed that joining in the socialist block by itself objectively excluded such possibility. However, the complexity of real international politics goes well beyond alliance. China’s debate with India over the Tibet issue in early 1950s suggested that China’s tasks to safeguard national security and territorial integrity were far beyond its membership in the socialist block. China must formulate its sustainable periphery policy to its own interests, whose significance was equal to its membership in the socialist block. Without peaceful coexistence and joint cooperation, China would not be able to have a foothold in Asia, and to play its due role in international system as a normal actor. Judging by such logic, China’s strategic autonomy is not a whether question but at what degree.

Successful participation in the Bandung Conference in 1955 marked the beginning of China’s efforts to seek strategic autonomy, and a critical step toward national identity. The significance of the Bandung Conference lies firstly in China’s success in building consensus on cooperation with neighboring countries. As is well known, one major challenge for new China was how to reconstruct cooperative and friendly relations with neighboring countries while achieving the great cause of national reunification. China’s debate with India on the Tibet issue and its solution was the first example of such diplomacy. In fact, the five principles of “peaceful coexistence”, which both China-India agreement on the Tibet issue and the joint statement during Zhou Enlai’s visit to India in 1954 mentioned, was the core of China’s periphery policy, not only paved the way for China’s participation in the Bandung Conference, but also laid the foundation for future diplomacy with neighboring countries after China’s choice of ideology. Zhou Enlai’s call for the spirit of “seeking common ground while reserving differences (qiutongcunyi)” indicated that China had realized the fact worthy of high attention-the difference between China and neighboring countries necessitated it to formulate an external strategy with flexibility. It is obvious that China could by no way work for the pressing socialist cause without a peaceful periphery. China’s forced involvement in the Korean War demonstrated in another way that a flexible periphery policy was urgently needed shortly after new China was founded. Therefore, China’s striving for peaceful coexistence and friendship and cooperation with the spirit of “seeking common ground while reserving differences” meant a major strategic breakthrough at its early stage.

It was another big challenge to deal with disputes left in history, one of which was boundary demarcation. For dual reasons of history and real politics, there was no formal boundary recognized by international law between China and its neighbors when new China was founded. China either had no boundaries with some neighbors, or only had traditional boundary lines with some other neighbors, which historically reflected the reality that it was only late in the recent modern times that Asian nation state system had come into being. During the transition from Tributary System to modern nation state system, most Asian countries fell to victims of western colonialism. As a result, boundary demarcations were either indefinitely pushed off or was casually conducted, which was finally left as legacy of colonialism. The delay of the demarcation was also of domestic reasons. After the giant empire was overthrown by revolution, throes as the product of modernization allowed China no time to consider the issues like boundary demarcation, and China’s territorial interests were even undermined by neighboring colonialists. After the end of the Second World War, China had to accept the established international structure and relevant arrangements.

Fully aware of the importance of boundary demarcation, Chinese government attached great importance to and invested tremendous efforts in such issues. In 1960, China signed a boundary treaty with Burma, which was the first of the kind that China had signed with its neighboring countries. Since then, China had signed boundary treaties respectively with Nepal, Pakistan, Mongolia, Afghanistan and North Korea. But as was known, all these were not among the most important. China’s border disputes with India and the Soviet Union even escalated into clashes instead of being resolved. The number of countries having border disputes with China increased along with the ending of the Cold War since the Central Asian countries became independent from the Soviet Union. For China, the biggest challenge among all periphery is to solve border disputes in line with international law and acceptable to both parties. China and its neighboring countries therefore have paid tremendous cost. China’s clashes with India in 1962, with the Soviet Union in 1969, and with Vietnam in 1979 were all results of border disputes. It is just because of such reasons that generations of Chinese leaders have made great endeavors, and to solve border disputes as early as possible have become the common expectation of Chinese public. That’s also why boundary demarcation with any country could trigger strong resonance at home.

China has spent a lot of efforts in solving border disputes with its neighbors since signing the border agreement with Burma in 1960 as a beginning. And the land border agreement with Vietnam in 2008 signifies that along its land border of 22000 kilometer long, China has defined formally its boundaries with all neighbors except India and Bhutan. The climax came when China and Russia jointly set up the mechanism of “Shanghai Five” and smoothly solved border disputes with three newly independent Central Asian countries, which also laid favorable foundation for the full boundary demarcation with Russia. In addition, Chinese and Vietnamese leaders finally reached acceptable agreements through mutual understanding and mutual accommodation and with the spirit of pragmatism despite high difficulty.
 

II. Reform and Opening Up and the Evolution of China’s Periphery Policy

After the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CPC that decided the policy of reform and opening up, China adjusted its periphery policy significantly so as to create a favorable periphery to ensure the deepening of reform and opening up and modernization cause. Chinese government and leaders had been keeping a close pace with the change of times, and had created the best peripheral environment since the founding of the new republic due to their forwarding thinking and pragmatic attitude.

From reform and opening up to the end of the Cold War, China’s primary task had been to resolve problems and conflicts. To put it in detail, China worked to improve and develop relations with peripheral countries at the following levels: country-to-country relations, party-to-party relations, external economic relations and peaceful resolution of disputes. Firstly, China dealt with country-to-country relations based on national interests. China abandoned “the leftist (zuo)” policy, and no longer judged other countries by ideology. As early as the beginning of reform and opening up, Deng Xiaoping emphasized the importance of developing country-to-country relations on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence. Such remarks not only reiterated the position that Chinese government would develop relations with other countries according to the five principles of peaceful coexistence instead of ideology. As a result, China’s diplomacy entered into a new era shortly after the end of “the Cultural Revolution”. China not only broadened the range of its external exchanges and communications but also created favorable periphery for peace and development.

Secondly, China constructed new type of party-to-party relations as a part of its general diplomacy. Party-to-party relations, a troubling factor in China’s relations with neighbors, had been one of the major causes of China’s tensions with neighbors. Deng Xiaoping pointed out that we should differentiate between party-to-party and country-to-country relations. The comment provided the right direction of party-to-party relations in the new era. By solving problems of party relations with neighbors, China started the process adjusting overall party-to-party relations. Consequentially, China not only located relations between parties in the right place but also properly differentiated between party-to-party and country-to-country relations, and the two kinds of relations had been dynamically integrated while enhancing each other.

economies could be categorized into a variety of development levels after the evolution of many years. Newly rising industrial countries stayed at a higher level than China; some developing ones were similar with China by development level, but were more advanced than China in some ways and less advanced in other ways; some other under-developed ones were at a lower level compared with China. And cooperation between China and these countries had proved to be no less effective than that between China and developed ones because of the economic mutual complementarities, and such equal and mutual benefit cooperation was to have broad prospect. China’s economic and trade cooperation with its neighbors laid solid foundation for the development of bilateral friendly relations and promoted prosperity of both as well.

Fourthly, China creatively put forward the approaches of “laying aside disputes and engaging in joint exploitation (gezhizhengyi gongtongkaifa)” for peaceful resolution of disputes. The territorial and sea disputes became prominent between China and peripheral countries with the change of international situation. It was Deng Xiaoping who was the earliest to raise the new thinking of joint development while putting aside the sovereignty issue, which could eliminate the problems accumulated for years. He also raised an antithesis that whether we could engage in joint development while shelving sovereignty disputes. Deng Xiaoping also said that we Chinese people stand for peace, and hope for peaceful solution of disputes. The initiative not only brought new opportunities for solution of relevant problems but also promoted the relations between China and peripheral countries.

Security cooperation presented difficulties and should be taken the most seriously. Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen had initiated the new security concept on ARF in July 1994, and President Jiang Zemin further elaborated it on the UN disarmament conference in March 1999. China had a very complex periphery in terms of security, and had carried out a series of measures concerning its peripheral regions in security area since it put forward “new security concept”. Major powers had overlapping interests in the area, and their positions and policies would determine, to a great extent, whether security cooperation could be launched and whether it could be effective. In its peaceful development, China’s participation in regional security cooperation had grown deeper and broader, and China had become an important force for driving security cooperation. China attached great importance to peripheral security cooperation, which was an indispensable path to a favorable peripheral environment, one of the preconditions of China’s peaceful development. For geopolitical, historical, cultural and religious reasons and different social systems, China’s periphery fared with serious potential security problems, including territorial land and sea disputes, ethnic and religious conflicts, and residual problems of the Cold War. And security cooperation is an effective measure to keep these potential dangers under control and to prevent armed conflicts and war. China actively participated in security cooperation in the peripheral region, and had become a member of various security dialogue mechanisms, which served to improve peripheral security environment, and had far-reaching effect on China’s friendly relations with neighbors.

Since the beginning of the new century, China’s peripheral policy had even shifted from constructing peaceful environment for its own development to seeking joint development with neighbors, that is, to achieve win-win results by building “a good-neighborly relationship and partnership (yulinweishan yilinweiban)”. Such periphery policy had become a component part of China’s general diplomatic strategy of peaceful development, “harmonious region” and “harmonious world”. China’s diplomacy includes the following four areas:

　　1. Maintain a stable periphery. China stressed on solving international disputes and hotspots through peaceful means and equal consultation, which set a good example for others. China laid foundation for peaceful resolution to South China Sea disputes and played an important role alleviating the tensions by signing Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. China also published with ASEAN Declaration on Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues in order to safeguard regional security and stability. China had been the first regional power to formally join in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, and even played a positive role in maintaining regional stability. In addition, the agreements between China and Vietnam on the delimitation of the Tonkin Gulf and fishery cooperation were of great and far-reaching significance; the agreement among China, Philippines and Vietnam oil companies on joint exploration of oil reserves in relevant areas of South China sea marked the first step implementing the approach of “laying aside disputes and engaging in joint exploitation”. All these had served to create favorable conditions for maintaining peripheral stability.

　　2. Construct cooperation mechanisms. China created new cooperation mechanisms like SCO, six-party talk while participating in existing mechanisms, which had greatly promoted peripheral peace and stability. The evolution of “Shanghai Five” into SCO had been an important diplomatic practice. The SCO was the first international organization in the region and named after a Chinese city. The establishment of SCO had substantially elevated China’s international status, and built an important platform for China’s participating in and facilitating cooperation with peripheral countries. It was the SCO that had initiated the new type of country-to-country relations based on mutual trust, arms reduction and security cooperation, and initiated a new regional cooperation model with the characteristics of joint initiation by both big and small countries, priority of security issues and mutual benefit and coordination. Shanghai Spirit of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation, respect for diversity of civilizations and pursuit of joint development served not only as the basis for members to deal with relations with each other, but also was significant in facilitating the construction of just and equitable international political and economic order.

　　3. Enhance strategic mutual trust. China strengthened dialogue, exchange, coordination and cooperation with peripheral countries, increased consensus, expanded common interests, and enhanced strategic mutual trust on the basis of equality and mutual respect and for the purposes of maintaining peace, stability and prosperity. China constructed strategic partnership with major neighbors and regional organizations including Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity with ASEAN, Strategic Relations of Mutual Benefit with Japan, Strategic Cooperative Partnership with Russia, Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity with India. These strategic partnerships, though different in titles, were of the same purposes, that is, to expand common interests, and to maintain peripheral peace, stability and prosperity through dialogue and cooperation.

　　4. Promote joint development. China turned its own economic development into opportunities to be shared with peripheral countries, and stressed the necessity of mutual-dependence and cooperation so as to jointly shape peaceful peripheral environment. The spirit was embodied in the Early Harvest Programme (EHP) between China and ASEAN. China and ASEAN FTA would soon be completed as required in the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between China and ASEAN; as a member of SCO, China conducted all-round cooperation with Russia and Central Asian countries in various fields within the framework of the SCO; China was accepted as an observer of South Asian Association For Regional Cooperation (SAARC) on its 13th summit in November 2005; China participated in the development cooperation in the Great Mekong Area and Tumen River, and regional economic cooperation among Bangladesh, China, India and Burma.

III. Constructing Harmonious Periphery

For special geopolitical reasons, China has to put periphery diplomacy as one of the priorities. Without recognition by peripheral countries, China’s peaceful emergence could not be accepted in the world at large. China’s periphery diplomacy has made huge achievements in the 60 years since the founding of new China. However, in order to construct harmonious periphery and maintain the general stability, we must further consolidate and deepen the work to lay foundations for our peripheral geostrategy.

To construct harmonious world is primarily to deal with new challenges in periphery. China’s current periphery has been the best since the founding of new China, and could hopefully be maintained. But we should not overlook some factors that might cause instabilities, and in particular, some real and potential factors might undermine stability and development in border areas. Firstly, traditional and non-traditional security challenges are interwoven. Secondly, there are both theses of “China Threat” and “China Responsibility”. China’s rapid economic development and emergence have produced tremendous impact on China’s peripheral countries. Some countries actively cooperate with China to seek joint development while some others regard China’s development and emergence as a threat, and even want to check China with domestic problems. Expectation of peripheral countries on China is also rising with China’s increasing comprehensive national power. Coexistence of the two theses adds to the difficulty and pressure that China handles relations with neighbors, and causes disharmonies in the periphery. Thirdly, major powers’ presence and behaviors in relevant regions have both positive and negative impact on China’s relations with peripheral countries. The global strategy and national interests of the United States, the only superpower after the Cold War, extend to all areas of the world, and in particular have huge influence in politics, economy and security along China’s periphery. The consequential spillover of their presence and behavior will have effect on China’s efforts to build and maintain peaceful and stable periphery. For the above-mentioned reasons, China should in the future set the objective of constructing “harmonious periphery” and make in real sense a strategic foundation for China’s peaceful development.

China has issued statements such as “hold high the banner of peace, development and cooperation”, “adhere to peaceful development road”, and “construct harmonious world” explaining China’s new diplomatic concepts since the beginning of the 21st century. Peace and development have become the themes of today’s world, and various countries are all exploring the road of cooperation to realize the common themes. Meanwhile, the first 20 years of the 21st century will be the period of opportunity for China’s peaceful development, and a harmonious, stable, cooperative and developing periphery is the precondition of China’s peaceful development while China’s development will enhance stability of the periphery. The 17th national congress of the CPC stresses China’s wishes to cooperate with peripheral countries: “for our neighboring countries, we will continue to follow the foreign policy of friendship and partnership, strengthen good-neighborly relations and practical cooperation with them, and energetically engage in regional cooperation in order to jointly create a peaceful, stable regional environment featuring equality, mutual trust and win-win cooperation”.

Looking into the future, “harmonious periphery” should be an indispensable part of “harmonious world” and “harmonious region”. China should become “a China of its periphery”, and periphery should not become “a periphery of China”. Only when accepted by neighbors, could China be accepted by the world, and could China’s peaceful development road be materialized. The deeper China gets involved in the construction of peaceful periphery, the more China’s peaceful development road can be guaranteed.

“Harmonious periphery” should be the leading concept of China’s periphery policy. The concepts of “harmonious world” and “harmonious region”, as have been put forward in recent years, are both the embodiment of the essence of China’s traditional culture and indication of the maturity of China’s foreign policy. China’s periphery policy, with the core of “harmonious world” and “harmonious region” concepts, with the banner of “peace, development and cooperation” guidelines, and with the backup of the increasing comprehensive national power, persistently works for peace and development, carries out independent and peaceful foreign policy, adheres to opening strategy of “mutual benefit and win-win”, endeavors for “harmonious periphery” with peripheral countries, and reaches the targets of economic development, peace and stability. On the one hand, China should learn the lessons of other major powers in handling relations with their neighbors in their rise. One of the common causes leading to the defeat of Germany and Japan in the Second World War is that they both formed military axis or sphere of influence challenging international system in their periphery. Former Soviet Union didn’t regard their weak neighbors as potential security problems, consciously or unconsciously continued Tsar’s policy seeking its own interests at the cost of neighbors, and its chauvinist policy has become one of the major causes of the radical change of East Europe and the disintegration of itself. Though the United States is the only country that has successfully risen to the status of world hegemony, its power is built upon bullying the weak, and has problems with Latin America. China should not duplicate the model of other powers in its rising, and peace and development should go through the whole process of China’s rising and at all levels of China’s relations with its neighbors. On the other hand, China should enhance dialogue, exchange and understanding with neighbors, and make them accept the concept of “harmonious periphery”. Only by that basis, “harmonious periphery” could be truly achieved.

Source of documents：