The year of 2010 is an important year of the first decade of the new century, the year when the international situation saw great volatility, great adjustment and great change marked by the accelerating evolution of the international order remarkably with many transitional features. The configuration of the international powers moving forward with the momentum of multi-polarization and diffusion of power, though remains basically as a trio structure consists of the United States, EU and emerging powers with the U.S., remaining as the only superpower, arching over the structure. The profound evolution of the international system and the growing demand of global governance are contradicted with insufficient mechanisms of international governance, leading to the primary contradiction of the present international relations. Driven by the configuration and contradiction depicted above, the present international situation presents a complex, volatile and entangling posture and the international relations suffer a range of contradictions, which reflect important shifts in respect of the configuration and trends in the era of the great evolution of the international system.
I. Three Variables to the Foreseeable International Situation
First, the international financial crisis is being felt continually with multidimensional and profound repercussions, which not only accelerates the adjustment of the international economic configuration and economic structure, but also deals a serious blow to the social and political arenas around the world.
A new round of global economic recovery and a new pattern of growth will become key factors to the international situation in the foreseeable future. On one hand, the world economic recession was over in the third quarter of 2009 and a full-scale recovery is basically available in 2010. The developing countries, took the lead in the global economic recovery, recorded 7% growth rate, more than double that of the developed countries. Economic activities in many developing countries have recovered or exceeded the pre-crisis level and the growth rates of their imports have outstripped their exports, which indicated that their recovery is positive to the growth of the advanced countries. By contrast, the major advanced countries were slow to recover due to the aftermath of the global crisis and the frustration of home-debt-relief process. The two-speed recovery of the world economy is the most remarkable character of the global economy in 2010.
On the other hand, the world economic recovery is turning from the stage of rebound to the stage of slowing down, though the double-dip of the world economy is unlikely in 2011. Emerging markets continue to take the lead in the world economic recovery though the gap between their growth rates and those of the advanced countries will narrow down, for the emerging markets are facing the pressure of over-heating and need to withdraw from the economic stimulation as soon as possible; the United States has implemented a new round of quantitative ease policy and extended tax-cut policy span that will spur a short-term economic growth; European debt crisis and tightening policy will slow down the euro-zone economic growth; and Japanese economy will slow down on the declining external demand as well. According to the forecast of the IMF World Economic Outlook of Oct. 2010, the world economic growth rate in 2010 will be down to 4.2%, of which the advanced countries will fall from 2.7% in 2010 to 2.2% in 2011; the developing countries from 7.1% in 2010 to 6.4% in 2011. Other statistics agencies of China and abroad have correspondingly revised down their forecasts on 2011 economy, though to various degrees.
The world economy maintains a “two-speed” and “moderate” recovery, and the developing countries, especially the emerging markets, continue to take lead in the global economic recovery that indicate three profound and complex changes in the international economic configuration:
（1）The international economic power distribution is in favor of the emerging powers, which further pushes the structure of international powers towards multipolarization and diffusion. According to the statistics compiled by the US National Bureau of Economic Research, since 1990s the developing countries’ share of the world GDP have grown by 1 percentage point year on year to 30% so far, among which the BRICS(China, India, Russia, Brazil and South Africa) account for 15%. On average, however, the change of the relative power between developing countries and developed countries remains a stage of “quantitative change”, where the developed countries situate at the upper level of development and dominate the international economic system.
(2) The world economy is experiencing a profound structural adjustment. Technology innovation and industrial transformation are still in their incipiency. Hit by the worst financial crisis in the last hundred years and the worst post-war economic recession, the industrial foundation for a real economic recovery has yet to be set up. Investment and fixed asset that will be brought up by the business cycle of new industries have hardly started. Nor does the consumption sector commence its expansion period. The physical foundation of the world economic recovery will take time for rehabilitation. Moreover, the world economy is in the downward period of the sixth Kondratieff long-wave cycle, which will presumably undergo a slow-growth period for about 10-15 years. The world is storing up energy and laying a physical basis for a new round of science and technological revolution around the year 2025. Countries are respectively adjusting their economic structure. For examples, China’s 12th Five Year Plan sets to speed up readjusting shares of consumption, investment and export in their contribution to economic growth; and the United States seems set to relinquish the model that resorts to the lending-pulled consumption and consumption-pulled growth. Likewise, other major economies share the commonality at least to find alternative industrial stimulators and do their best to preempt an advantageous position and leadership in the next industrial revolution.
(3) The world economy is facing three short-term risks that interweave with the long-wave cycle of the world economy, which makes it more difficult for the major economies to coordinate their macro-economic policies. 1, The European sovereign debt crisis and the tight fiscal policy of EU will further deteriorate the existent fragility of the international financial system. Besides, any credit crunch emerges on a large scale in Europe will surely cause “butterfly-effect” on the world economy. 2, Over-capacity and high unemployment that long beset the advanced countries end up with a catch-22 between further stimulation and unsustainable budget deficit. The problem is especially true to the United States, which has become the gravest challenge to the world economy in the medium term. 3, Low interest rate of the advanced countries may trigger capital inflow to the developing countries. That the United States has started QE2 policy, in particular, will alter the direction of international capital flow, drive up the exchange rates of the emerging markets, aggravate their inflation pressure and cause adverse consequences to their economic growth and poverty reduction. In sum, as the economic recovery slowing down and running unbalanced, policy disagreement will grow between the advanced and emerging economies. The same can be said even within the advanced countries. It is more difficult for countries to strike a balance between domestic agenda of economic development and international economic cooperation. In particular, various forms of trade protectionism and actions thereof in the process of the global economic rebalancing have inflicted substantial harm to the world economic recovery. The international economic and trade systems are at a crucial crossroad.
(4) The political and social unrests caused directly or indirectly by global economic recession and imbalanced recovery have stepped up into new stages. Many countries in Europe, including United Kingdom, France, Italy, Greece and Portugal, have witnessed a large scale of strikes and protests against governments’ austerity policy. The angry mass in these countries not only voiced their disappointment at governments’ inefficiency in responding to economic meltdown, but also fury over the unfair distribution of the economic system in which the average people are most vulnerable during the economic slow-down. Those unrests in European countries, while varied in the degrees of tension and impact on governmental policy and stability of the effected countries, are still within the control. Meanwhile, the deteriorating inflation in less developed countries and the huge hike of food and other bulk commodities prices, which are largely driven by the loose fiscal policy in United States, Japan and some other European economies, have finally find their political and social tolls in North Africa and Gulf area. Initiated in Tunisia and then spreading to Egypt, the large-scale anti-governmental protests have toppled down the decades-old Ben Ali and Mubarak regimes respectively within a few weeks. While those political and social transformations in Tunisia and Egypt are largely non-violent, the snowballing effect to other North Africa and Gulf area countries is by no means peaceful, particularly in Libya. The almost uncontrollable violence and bloodshed between pro-Qaddifi forces and anti-regime forces has already resulted in severe humanitarian catastrophes and pushing the country to the brink of splitting and civil war. The UN and its various agencies responded quickly to the turmoil, including humanitarian assistances to those effected countries, Libya included. However, the March 19 air strike against Qaddafi regime led by US, France, Briton, which allege that military action is mandated by UN security council resolution, has caused many countries, including China, Russia, Brazil and India, to concern about unpredictable follow-up consequences and warn against even more severe humanitarian disaster. Anyway, while the historical social and political change taking place in this region is still on its way of evolution, the world has already felt and will continually absorb the multi-dimensional repercussions for a long timeframe.
Secondly, adjustment of major power relations goes on though with ups and downs, which is another important factor to affect the global governance and regional situation at present and beyond.
Major powers speed up their external strategic adjustments and do their best to secure an advantageous strategic environs. The US foreign strategy equipped with Obama doctrine is entering into the stage of changing strategic priorities and the stage of strategic implementation, aiming at preserving the U.S. leadership and influence over international affairs. U.S. is contracting its counter-terror strategy in the Middle East and South Asia. Europe is consolidating its strategy of entrenching the NATO and restarting its strategy of focusing on European-Russian relations. The U.S. strategic adjustment of resuming and strengthening its influence on Asia-Pacific is particularly notable. Its Asia-Pacific strategic focusing on dealing with China’s rise is in its initial stage. Japanese politics was brewing new volatility. The DPJ diplomatic policy of “pro-American while returning to Asia" is oppressed by the United States. The Naoto Kan people have greatly adjusted the Yukio Hatoyama foreign policy to find a reappearing of “pro-American and estranging China”. Russia is actively cultivating a worldwide “modernization alliance”, aiming at establishing “modernization partnerships” with European countries, establishing “strategic partnership in innovation cooperation, and establishing “partnership on technology” with Asia-Pacific and emerging markets. In general, having got rid of the strategic dilemma of being isolated by the West on Russian-Georgian conflict in 2008, Russia is pursuing a pragmatic diplomacy. The European powers, mainly Germany, France and England, continue to push forward the EU integration as well as reasserting their respective national interests and national positions in their foreign relations, though the pluralization approach in the EU foreign relations has exerted mixed impacts on EU integration. Brazil, India and South Africa are active in participating in the globalization process, demonstrating a new configuration that emerging powers are shifting from regionalism to internationalism and pursue pluralistic diplomacies. In the wake of international financial crisis in 2008, in particular, emerging powers have accelerated the mechanization process to make concerted efforts to deal with the outside pressures and pursue their own interests. The “BRICS”, “BASICs” and “the developing five” are the cooperation mechanisms that become important forces on the present global arena of multilateralism.
The dualism that major power cooperation coincides with their competition is on rise. On one hand, major power interdependence is growing due to the worsening global issues like financial crisis, nuclear proliferation, climate change and energy security. Major powers are more earnest in responding to the global issues. This response to the various and complex global challenges has become the core concept that the leaders of the major powers have been continuously stating at various bilateral and multilateral occasions. On the other hand, the cooperation and coordination issues remain the most at the level of lip-service, instead of substantial progress. At the same time, major powers are increasingly competing on key issues, such as regional influence, exchange rates, trade advantages and so on. The competition tends to spread to the realm of political security. The likelihood of perceiving each other as a threat is growing. The dualism reflects the innate law of major power relations. The dualism is not only true between China and the United States, but also among other major powers to different extents. The dualism also represents that whenever the international system is about to change, major powers are more resolute to maintain vital and core interests, contending for interests, consolidate and strengthen their own position, while developing powers have not fully dug out the potential of their cooperation and solidarity, which makes it more difficult for major powers to cooperate, reconcile, compromise and maintain their common interests.
Adjustment of major power relations exerted complex impacts on the reform and construction of the global governance regimes. The reforms of international political and security regimes, especially the reform of UN Security Council, have entered into the stage of negotiation, though the negotiations are extremely arduous thanks to the huge gaps of interests and positions between major powers. The reforms of international economic regimes represented by G20, IMF and the World Bank are sped up on financial crisis. However, traditional major powers increasingly declined to make concession now that they have come out of the crisis while the emerging powers, following the breakthrough opportunity that they had seized during the crisis, have entered into a stage with more strenuous and routine games. The international community has also seen the “period of active discussion” in regard of financial and economic issues gradually shifting to the “period of consultation fatigues”. Major power contradictions and divergences in respect of sharing the risks and the cost of global governance, sharing the interest, and distributing the room for development are ever more intense. Taking G20 Summit as an example, given that the financial crisis have crossed over the peak of the risks, upon which the London summit and the Pittsburgh summit reached great successes, the Toronto summit and Seoul summit have apparently witnessed contradictions of divergent interests among member states, which indicated that the G20 has completed the arduous transition from a crisis committee to a global steering committee. Without a fundamental change of a strong North vis-à-vis a weak South in the North-South relations and a change of the U.S. dominancy, the reform of international economic system will prove to be a slow and tortuous process.
Thirdly, China factor or China issue has increasingly become one of the most active and most influential variables that impacting the current international relations and international configuration. In the first thirty years of reform and opening-up, China has solved the issue of integrating into the Western-led international system. As China is growing fast both in its development and international influence beyond outside expectation as well as its own, China needs to redefine its relations with major powers and the periphery regions and the need of their mutual adaptation is looming large. A new round of adjustment with regard to redefining identification, structure of interests, norms of behavior, obligations, rights and interests between China and other members of international community, which will be sensitive and full of frictions, will come sooner than expected. For example, the third round of post-war reconstruction of the Asia-Pacific order is unraveling and focusing on China, while China’s strategy and policy will become one of the key factors to the reconstruction of regional order.
II. Three New Challenges to the New Situation of China’s Diplomacy
The year of 2010 is the connecting year between the first decade and the following new decade of China’s strategic opportunity in the first twenty years of the new century. In the first decade China had successfully seized the advantageous international environment to create a propitious external environment for China’s development. The general environment of the international situation at present and beyond will continue to be favorable to China.① Meanwhile, China’s diplomacy is also facing coincidence of unprecedented opportunity as well as unprecedented challenges, both are more likely and more frequently to interact and interchange with each other. That will put up a higher requirement on China regarding its ability of strategic planning, external environment cultivation and opportunity creation. In other words, China’s diplomacy is shifting from that of mainly utilizing opportunity to one that mainly creating opportunity. China needs to shift from “free riding” to “trend-making”.
Firstly, China is facing overlapping external challenges and interweaving contradictions home and abroad. 1, Traditional issues and non-traditional issues overlap. Traditional issues include the Cross-Straits unification, and the controversies on land- and maritime territories, and so on. China is also facing the rapidly growing non-traditional security issues and the pressure that those issues tend to concentrate in China. 2，Domestic contradictions and international contradictions overlap. China is facing international pressures as well as the burgeoning and sensitive internal contradictions that involve all the realms. Political reform is in its critical stage. Economic structure has to be adjusted and transformed. Socio-economic disparity is enlarging increasingly. The military is facing the problem how to protect and expand national interests. Culturally, core values have to be established. The above-mentioned internal contradictions coincide with the external problems including that the world economy is likely to enter into a mid- and long-term slow-growth period and the world-wide populism and nationalism are rising. 3, The hotspot issues around China’s periphery areas coincide with contradictions between China and other powers regarding their strategic relations. The United States, in particular, has given up courting for Chinese cooperation and instead turned to strengthen the strategic hedging against China, i.e., the U.S. strategic priority moves eastward. Countries in the sub-regions on China’s periphery, Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia and Central Asia, are under political, economic and social transformation and a new round of power reshuffling, which adds to the regional uncertainty. That the regional hotspots are looming large and the unrests in the neighboring countries pose serious challenge to the harmony of China’s periphery. China’s periphery environment has won a decade of opportunity which might be followed with a decade of challenge. Therefore, it is one of the priorities of China’s diplomacy to think about preventing and offsetting the challenges coinciding, rallying and even amplifying home and abroad, and preventing the separate challenges from undermining the overall external environment.
Secondly, along with the new historical conditions, come the contradictions about how China and the world will mutually redefine and re-adapt their relations. Following 30 years of reform and opening-up, China is transitioning from the stage of mainly adapting and learning in its effort to integrate into the existing international system to the mixed stage of reforming, reshaping and innovating the international mechanisms per se. The mixed stage will prolong, as China’s influence grows continually. This process is prone to be exaggerated by the international community and regarded by the latter as “taking a Chinese approach to global issues”. The process also highlights the sharp contrast between the internal as well as external expectations on China’s responsibility now that China is obliged to be a big-power and even a strong power on one part and China’s real ability and the will to live up to the responsibility on the other. Moreover, the process will worsen the pressure of the time by which China breaks in and adapts to the global and regional strategic forces. China would have taken time to adjust its relations and mutually cognize with other powers otherwise, but in fact the relations might end up with accumulating contradictions merely due to unskilled operation or to mis-assessment. Finally, as the strength of China grows fast, it is extraordinary difficult to sustain the “keeping a low profile” diplomacy. However, it is with the goal, the means and the core values and conceptions that China is to construct the new round of the interactions with the outside world and international system that will determine the linchpin of the interactions.
Thirdly, the main challenge to the implementation of China’s foreign strategy in the new decade remains to be the gap between the new requirements of the reconstruction and transition of the international system and China’s proactivity and ability to make strategic planning, to construct the international system, to design international agenda, to tackle contradictions and crisis, to steer policies, and to foster a favorable environment of public opinions abroad. China’s diplomacy will face mounting pressures emerge from plural identities, plural actors and the lagging and insufficient mechanisms of interest coordination. Thus, further emancipation of mind, renewal of conceptions and stepping up ability that will start on a new historical level are much needed and will take a long time to go. China has to be initiative and creative regarding its foreign strategy, which lags behind the realistic requirement arise from the rapid international influence. 1, China is facing a growingly complex diplomatic situation that needs China to step up planning for a global strategy. 2,Optimism and “complacent of strength”, to some extent, instead of crisis consciousness, are there inside China. 3, China’s diplomacy is kind of responsive and reactive more than initiative and creative. Therefore, it is increasingly urgent for China to strengthen the strategic consciousness and national tolerance in cultivating a big power and even a strong power consciousness and to take an omni-directional approach in mapping out China’s big-power diplomatic strategy.
III. Proposals on Approaches to New Changes in External Environment
First, in the process of China’s readapting to the world and construction of interactions between China and the world, the ability and the right of international voice are most important and should be underscored. Diplomatic theories that define China as “an emerging developing power” in the context of globalization and multipolarization and the issues of national interests and international responsibility need to be discussed within China, which aims at developing a new consensus in China on the goals, conceptions, means, and mechanisms in the new stage of China’s diplomacy. Internationally, we should be proactive regarding the international discourse on the definition of “international responsibility”, so long as defining China as a “developing country”. China must take into account both international responsibility on one part, and on the other part, China’s diplomatic principles, confine of national interests, international status, competence and influence on practical issues. China should balance between “common responsibility” and “differentiated responsibility”, take active response to the internationally concerned issues, and replace the mindset of reactive response with the approach of actively cultivating international environment in favor of China. China should adhere to the principle regarding the issues concerning China’s basic interests, and take a clear-cut stand in defending sovereignty, security and development right. China should engage in what may not directly involve Chinese interests by positively putting forward solutions with Chinese characteristics. China should foster a climate that NGOs will engage in regional and global issues and regime construction, by which to expand China’s influence and China should regard addressing international conflict as an important ring for cultivating big-power consciousness.
Secondly, to the strategy of omni-directional, big-power diplomacy, the present priority is to stabilize and develop the Sino-US relations, to take care of Sino-Japanese relations, and actively develop Sino-EU relations and China’s relations with other emerging and regional powers. 1, In terms of cultivating basically stable, balanced and cooperative relations between China and major powers, China shall gradually shift from the approach of “promoting political relations by economic relations” pursued in the past to the approaches of “promoting economic relations by political relations” and “stabilizing political relations by military relations”. 2, During the process of the new round of building international order, China should try to enlarge the convergence of interests with other major powers, effectively control their divergent interests and contradictions, advance the ideas shared by China and other major powers and influential regional powers in their joint construction of the international order, join with other major powers to select priority issues in the global governance, to map out schedule of actions, and gradually push for the construction of the commonwealth of interests between China and other major powers. 3, In the process of building periphery regional security frameworks, China shall discuss with the United States on developing “inclusive security framework” in Asia-Pacific and try the best to get rid of the geo-strategic posture left over by the trilateral interactions of China, US and the neighboring Asia-Pacific countries in 2010 that is disadvantageous to China. All in all, in its diplomacy, China should attach high attention to “topics”, to the “mutual rights and interests”, and to the “tangible effect” of China’s policies towards respective countries.
Thirdly, as for regional strategy, China will have to play a more vigorous, leading and creative role in the new round of construction of the Asia-Pacific order. 1, In the fields of economics and trade, given that the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement(TPP) is yet small in scale and so is its influence, and thanks to China’s geo-economic advantages, it is advisable for China to follow the model of Sino-ROK free-trade zone in promoting the realizations of Sino-Japanese free-trade zone and Sino-Japanese-ROK free-trade zone; to accelerate the construction of the mechanism of 10 3 cooperation, and to explore phased goals and agendas for actions regarding the interactions between 10 3 and TPP, and between 10 3 and the whole Asia-Pacific economies put together. 2, With regard to the security areas, China shall follow the path of “promoting traditional security by promoting the nontraditional security, i.e., strengthening China’s military cooperation with regional countries on nontraditional security areas for the purpose of promoting defense cooperation with relevant countries and enhance mutual strategic confidence. China should make great effort to cultivate a consensus that regards “intercommunication” as “win-win cooperation”, for the purpose of strengthening China’s periphery infrastructure construction and strengthening China’s coordination with governments and civilians of the regional countries, which will hopefully become the common cause of the region. As for the maritime and land disputes, China should try new ways such as to organically combine China’s long-term interests with the general trends of the evolution of the international maritime rights and to combine China’s maritime strategy with China’s development strategy.
Source of documents：
