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Japan officially declared its participation in the TPP negotiations on 23rd July, becoming the 12th participant of the negotiations. A number of think tank experts suggested that China join the negotiations, because the U.S. welcomed China as a new TPP negotiating partner. In fact, China has never opposed the negotiations, instead, its attitude to the agreement has always been open, tolerate, and transparent. However, when the U.S. is now urging to conclude the negotiations, China, while keeping an open mind, should not hurry to join.
Firstly, the TPP is a core element of the U.S. “rebalance” strategy, which China does not necessarily have to help achieve. Washington frames the TPP as an indispensable pillar in the restructured Asia-Pacific architecture and a game-changer in reginal economy and diplomacy. It will be a serious setback to the strategy, if the negotiations cannot be concluded by the end of the year, depriving the strategy of its economic and diplomatic elements, left only with stark military intentions. Without the TPP, the importance of the U.S. for its Asian allies and partners lies only in preventing potential military conflicts. Therefore, China does not need to help the U.S. enforce its strategic intentions.
Secondly, U.S. academic and political communities do not expect to include China into the TPP in the near term. Mainstream economists believe that China should be one of the last states to join the TPP after 2020. This attitude has been shown by U.S. Vice President Joe Biden in his address at the opening ceremony of the Fifth Strategic & Economic Dialogue between China and the U.S.. From a diplomatic perspective, we should think positively of the absence of any TPP agenda in the Dialogue.
Thirdly, the TPP should not be regarded as being agreed upon. Some argue that if China does not join now, it shall face challenges as great as it had encountered during the negotiations before entering the WTO. In fact, the TPP is no more than a proposal. The U.S.-led negotiations have been prolonged into the 18th round, far more than the intended 9 rounds.
Finally, China is capable of making contributions to the next generation of trade rules. Even if the TPP deal is agreed upon without China’s participation, will that mean China has to face another “challenging test” like its accession to the WTO? It is clear that tempered for many years, China is capable of passing another major test. First, China is likely to face the challenges presented by trade shift, but the wellbeing effect delivered by the TPP is far less than what can be delivered by the RCEP(the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership). Second, the U.S. labels a number of horizontal agendas in the TPP like those concerning SOEs(State-owned enterprises), E-business, rule consistency, labor standards as the next generation of trade rules. The U.S. intends to set up rules that will meet its own demands, and even requires other governments to institute coordination offices. The U.S. would like other countries to align themselves with the U.S. and become its affiliates. Last, quality standards should be measured against whether they meet practical use and demands. The high standards set up in the TPP only accommodate to the U.S. demands, but not necessarily conform to the demands and interests of developing countries. That is why Indonesia refused to participate in the TPP. According to the Chinese standards, those window air conditioners used in most American houses are poor in quality. But the Americans like them because they meet their demands. Likewise, China should enforce its own FTA strategy, advances prudently and steadily, and surely will contribute to the establishment of the next generation of trade rules.
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