As three major powers with global reach, the United States, China, and Russia has overlapping as well as distinctive features in their respective Asia-Pacific strategies due to their divergent national interests and different levels of comprehensive national power. Observing from a ten-year framework, their strategic trajectories and features are as follows:

First, China will formulate and implement a more comprehensive and forward-looking Asia-Pacific strategy. The Chinese view the Asia-Pacific region as the most important neighborhood and the principal platform for interactions among global powers. While safeguarding its core national interests, China will implement a more comprehensive and forward-looking Asia-Pacific strategy. By more comprehensive, it is meant that China attempts to translate the momentum for economic cooperation into sustained impetus for cooperation in the political, security, social, and cultural realms, and continues its efforts in shaping a favorable neighboring environment for its modernization drive. A more forward strategy means that China tries to turn the Asia-Pacific region into the testing ground for the new model of Sino-US relations, and forge communities of shared interests, shared development, and shared destiny with other Asia-Pacific states. In other words, China’s Asia-Pacific strategy for the next decade includes not only targets of material achievements but also non-material ones such as cultural and value aspirations.

Second, the United State will advance its rebalancing strategy while recalibrating it from time to time. For the next ten years, it will continue to elevate Asia-Pacific’s position in its global strategy and push forward the rebalancing efforts in various forms. Military security will remains its strategic priority. The U.S.-led Asia-Pacific alliances will be transformed from a hub-spoke model to a multilateral network model. Political and diplomatic involvement will revolve around U.S. relations with emerging powers like China, India, regional powers(middle powers) like Australia, South Korea, and regional organizations like ASEAN. In terms of economic ties, the Trans-Pacific Partnership(TPP), which constitutes an important component of the U.S. global economic institution, will remain a priority for the Obama administration.

Third, the focus of Russia’s Asia-Pacific strategy is driven by geopolitical concerns and energy diplomacy. Russia’s overall national strength is not great enough for it to exert comprehensive influence in the region. Therefore, it will attempt to gradually expand and enhance its influence and role in the Asia-Pacific by concentrating on energy-driven economic cooperation and Sino-Russian geostrategic cooperation. Moreover, Russia will more deeply involve in various mechanisms for regional cooperation and make greater efforts in fostering closer political and economic ties with Japan, India and ASEAN members.

Fourth, features of strategic interplay among US, China, and Russia can be summarized as follows. First, the trilateral interaction is characterized by cooperation, competition, and sometimes even confrontation. Generally speaking, as member states of APEC, ARF, and EAS, all the three adopt positive attitudes towards Asia-Pacific dialogue and have similar positions on North Korean issues. However, in-depth cooperation among the three powers is constrained by persistent distrust of each other. Secondly, strategic interactions among the United States, China, and Russia in the Asia-Pacific region are also affected by other regional issues such as the Middle Eastern situation and the Crimean crisis in former Soviet areas. The interactions among the three inside and outside the region will reflects the international balance of power and affect other countries and regions. Thirdly, the trilateral interplay will increasingly concern regional economic and security mechanisms.

I offer four points of recommendation for increasing trust and dispelling suspicion among the three powers. The first is to enhance cooperation in economic and security mechanisms like prior notice and consultations before major decisions, ensuring there is no surprise in the policy process, strengthened economic and financial cooperation, joint efforts in humanitarian relief or military exercises. Secondly, collective responses to nontraditional security threats, jointly addressing climate change impacts and environmental degradation, joint efforts in countering the eastward expansion of Islamic extremism and terrorism. Thirdly, conducting multilevel and multichannel strategic dialogues. Launching trilateral Track One Dialogue, strengthening Track Two Dialogues, and increasing institutionalized strategic communication. Last but not least, transcending the geographical and thematic constraints on trilateral cooperation to deepen cooperation with more states in more thematic fields and to narrow disagreements through expanded cooperation.       

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